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   Ask	  just	  about	  any	  historian	  to	  associate	  a	  word	  with	  “strategic	  bombing,”	  and	  the	  Blitz	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  almost	  always	  comes	  first.	  So	  prominent	  is	  the	  Blitz	  that	  London	  historian	  Jerry	  White	  opened	  his	  book	  on	  the	  city	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War	  by	  saying	  “For	  most	  of	  us	  the	  very	  thought	  of	  ‘London	  at	  war’	  means	  just	  one	  thing—the	  Blitz.”1	  And	  White	  is	  right.	  The	  event	  has	  engendered	  countless	  books,	  films,	  paintings,	  and	  memorials,	  living	  on	  in	  the	  collective	  memory	  of	  society	  long	  after	  its	  days	  have	  ended.	  Unsurprisingly,	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  heavily	  researched	  stories	  in	  a	  heavily	  researched	  war.	  The	  Blitz	  still	  litters	  both	  history	  textbooks	  and	  popular	  mythology	  as	  Britain’s	  great	  stand	  against	  the	  Nazis,	  as	  a	  time	  when	  Britain	  remained	  the	  last	  bastion	  of	  democracy	  in	  an	  ever-­‐spreading	  totalitarian	  sea.	  These	  myths	  impact	  British	  culture	  to	  this	  day.	  Perhaps	  Angus	  Calder	  put	  it	  best	  when	  he	  named	  his	  famous	  book	  on	  the	  topic:	  there	  is	  a	  powerful	  nationalist	  “myth	  of	  the	  Blitz,”	  and	  it	  is	  a	  myth	  that	  societies	  continue	  to	  live	  today,	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  Britain.2	  
At	  4:14pm	  on	  Saturday,	  September	  7,	  1940,	  over	  three	  hundred	  German	  bombers	  accompanied	  by	  six	  hundred	  fighters	  swept	  over	  London,	  dropped	  their	  bombs,	  and	  began	  one	  of	  the	  longest	  sustained	  periods	  of	  aerial	  bombardment	  in	  military	  history.	  Named	  the	  Blitz	  after	  the	  German	  military	  tactic	  that	  carried	  a	  similar	  name,	  this	  period	  in	  British	  history	  lasted,	  strictly	  speaking,	  from	  early	  September	  until	  May	  10,	  1941,	  though	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Jerry	  White,	  Zeppelin	  Nights:	  London	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War	  (London:	  Random	  House,	  2014),	  preface.	  Jerry	  White’s	  book	  does	  an	  outstanding	  job	  illuminating	  life	  in	  the	  metropolis	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  2	  Angus	  Calder,	  The	  Myth	  of	  the	  Blitz	  (London:	  Pimlico	  Publishing,	  1994).	  One	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  books	  about	  the	  Blitz,	  Calder	  debunks	  postwar	  mythologies	  of	  grand	  societal	  unity.	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  German	  bombing	  raids	  had	  been	  taking	  place	  with	  increasing	  intensity	  since	  August,	  and	  London	  would	  occasionally	  be	  subject	  to	  aerial	  bombardment	  well	  after	  the	  ‘official’	  end	  of	  the	  Blitz,	  most	  notably	  late	  in	  the	  war	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  V1	  “flying	  bomb”	  and	  V2	  ballistic	  missile.	  
	   The	  Blitz	  came	  at	  a	  unique	  historical	  moment,	  a	  chapter	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  between	  the	  fall	  of	  France	  and	  Operation	  Barbarossa,	  Nazi	  Germany’s	  June	  22,	  1941	  invasion	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  When	  the	  war	  began	  on	  September	  1,	  1939,	  many	  Brits,	  both	  in	  government	  and	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  expected	  bombs	  to	  fall	  on	  the	  country	  almost	  immediately.	  To	  prepare	  for	  what	  many	  assumed	  to	  be	  forthcoming	  poison	  gas	  attacks	  on	  large	  civilian	  population	  centers,	  the	  British	  government	  distributed	  gas	  masks	  to	  its	  citizens	  and	  began	  mass	  evacuations	  to	  the	  rural	  countryside.	  Yet	  as	  German	  forces	  overran	  Poland,	  to	  everyone’s	  surprise,	  bombs	  did	  not	  fall.	  	  After	  the	  partition	  of	  Poland	  by	  Nazi	  Germany	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (an	  arrangement	  organized	  in	  the	  Molotov-­‐Ribbentrop	  Pact),	  the	  Germans	  spent	  the	  winter	  securing	  their	  position	  in	  the	  east	  before	  turning	  to	  France.	  This	  included	  the	  winter	  conquests	  of	  Denmark	  and	  Norway.	  The	  Soviet	  Union,	  then	  Germany’s	  ally,	  spent	  its	  winter	  in	  a	  bloody	  six-­‐week	  war	  to	  conquer	  Finland,	  a	  war	  which	  only	  added	  to	  Nazi	  racial	  stereotyping	  of	  the	  “weak”	  Bolsheviks	  to	  the	  east.	  By	  the	  spring,	  with	  its	  eastern	  and	  northern	  fronts	  secure,	  the	  German	  military	  was	  ready	  to	  engage	  the	  combined	  armies	  of	  Britain	  and	  France.	  
On	  May	  10,	  1940,	  the	  relative	  quiet	  in	  France	  ended.	  That	  morning,	  the	  German	  military	  began	  its	  drive	  westward.	  German	  forces	  stormed	  through	  the	  Ardennes	  Forest,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Peter	  Stansky,	  The	  First	  Day	  of	  the	  Blitz	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  1.	  I	  highly	  recommend	  Stansky’s	  book	  for	  those	  interested	  in	  understanding	  the	  relative	  suddenness	  with	  which	  the	  Blitz	  began	  and	  progressed.	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  swept	  into	  Belgium	  and	  the	  Low	  Countries,	  and	  drove	  for	  the	  English	  Channel,	  trying	  to	  split	  British	  and	  French	  forces.	  Within	  weeks,	  the	  Wehrmacht,	  with	  help	  from	  the	  Luftwaffe	  (air	  force)	  and	  SS,	  had	  split	  British	  and	  French	  forces.	  On	  June	  22,	  1940,	  France	  capitulated.	  British	  forces,	  surrounded	  and	  alone,	  were	  evacuated	  at	  Dunkirk	  by	  a	  motley	  assortment	  of	  British	  channel	  vessels	  as	  German	  dive-­‐bombers	  harassed	  from	  above.	  For	  the	  next	  year	  until	  the	  invasion	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  June	  1941,	  Britain	  (though	  not	  to	  be	  forgotten	  is	  the	  substantial	  assistance	  provided	  by	  Britain’s	  significant	  empire)	  would	  stand	  alone.	  
	   Hitler’s	  grand	  plan	  following	  the	  defeat	  of	  France	  involved	  first	  taking	  Britain	  out	  of	  the	  war.	  Though	  Hitler	  had	  an	  invasion	  planned	  for	  mid-­‐September	  1940	  (Operation	  Sealion),	  Hitler	  and	  his	  generals	  understood	  that	  such	  an	  operation	  required	  air	  supremacy.	  Hitler	  tasked	  his	  deputy	  and	  chief	  of	  the	  Luftwaffe,	  Hermann	  Göring,	  with	  immobilizing	  the	  Royal	  Air	  Force,	  thus	  enabling	  his	  military	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  English	  Channel	  to	  facilitate	  an	  invasion.	  To	  accomplish	  the	  mission,	  early	  German	  air	  attacks	  focused	  on	  Royal	  Air	  Force	  facilities,	  not	  cities.	  	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  destroy	  the	  critical	  infrastructure	  that	  the	  RAF	  required	  to	  carry	  on	  the	  war.	  Airfields	  and	  fighter	  production	  facilities	  became	  the	  primary	  target—and	  by	  all	  reports,	  it	  was	  working.	  But	  just	  as	  the	  German	  strategy	  was	  making	  serious	  progress	  and	  hampering	  the	  British	  air	  defense	  system,	  RAF	  Bomber	  Command	  launched	  a	  raid	  on	  Berlin.	  Though	  relatively	  small,	  the	  raid	  had	  a	  profound	  and	  immediate	  impact.	  An	  enraged	  Hitler,	  who	  had	  vowed	  that	  German	  cities	  would	  never	  fall	  victim	  to	  hostile	  bombing	  raids,	  ordered	  terror	  attacks	  against	  London.	  Rather	  than	  try	  to	  knock	  the	  Royal	  Air	  Force	  out	  of	  the	  war,	  Hitler	  gambled	  that	  he	  could	  bomb	  the	  British	  population	  sufficiently	  to	  force	  them	  to	  sue	  for	  peace.	  He	  largely	  gave	  up	  the	  idea	  of	  invading	  Britain	  (though	  Operation	  Sealion,	  the	  codename	  for	  the	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  proposed	  invasion,	  remained	  on	  the	  table	  in	  Berlin,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  ever	  garnered	  serious	  attention	  again)	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  campaign	  of	  aerial	  attrition.	  Perhaps,	  reasoned	  Hitler,	  the	  British	  could	  be	  brought	  to	  their	  knees	  through	  the	  air.	  For	  the	  next	  eight	  months	  until	  aircraft	  had	  to	  be	  moved	  east	  to	  Poland	  in	  preparation	  for	  Hitler’s	  summer	  1941	  offensive	  against	  the	  USSR,	  that	  was	  what	  Hitler	  tried	  to	  do.	  
	   Before	  discussing	  the	  Blitz	  itself	  and	  south	  London’s	  role	  within	  it,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  give	  a	  brief	  sketch	  of	  the	  overall	  damage	  to	  the	  city.	  It	  should	  first	  be	  said	  that	  the	  results	  of	  the	  German	  bombing	  raids,	  while	  terrifying,	  by	  no	  means	  reached	  the	  scale	  of	  destruction	  found	  elsewhere	  during	  the	  war.	  Readers	  with	  images	  of	  burned-­‐out	  cities	  or	  post-­‐atomic	  bomb	  Japan	  should	  be	  advised	  to	  put	  such	  images	  to	  rest	  while	  reading	  this	  thesis.	  Much	  of	  London	  suffered	  bomb	  damage,	  but	  only	  a	  relatively	  small	  percentage	  of	  the	  city’s	  area,	  particularly	  that	  around	  the	  River	  Thames,	  suffered	  any	  form	  of	  complete	  destruction	  close	  to	  the	  scale	  that	  cities	  like	  Hamburg,	  Dresden,	  Tokyo,	  Hiroshima,	  Nagasaki,	  or	  even	  the	  fellow	  English	  city	  of	  Coventry	  suffered	  during	  the	  war.	  Much	  of	  the	  damage	  was	  confined	  to	  blast	  damage,	  including	  most	  notably	  shattered	  windows	  and	  bombed-­‐out	  streets.	  Homes,	  trains,	  buses,	  shelters,	  and	  places	  of	  employment	  all	  faced	  periodic	  destruction,	  but	  it	  was	  never	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  much	  of	  the	  European	  continent.	  If	  judging	  merely	  by	  tons	  of	  ordinance	  dropped,	  London	  got	  off	  light.	  But	  just	  because	  the	  Blitz	  was	  a	  “lighter”	  version	  of	  aerial	  bombardment	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  was	  any	  less	  scary.	  In	  fact,	  its	  prolonged	  nature	  and	  the	  impossibility	  of	  knowing	  when	  the	  ordeal	  would	  end	  made	  the	  Blitz	  particularly	  troublesome	  for	  its	  survivors.	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   The	  Blitz	  must	  have	  been	  a	  terrifying	  time	  to	  live	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  it	  is	  that	  sense	  of	  standing	  alone—but	  also	  the	  sense	  of	  community	  spirit	  which	  previous	  scholars	  of	  the	  Blitz	  have	  only	  recently	  examined—that	  this	  thesis	  will	  address.	  To	  keep	  the	  topic	  narrow	  and	  fit	  it	  into	  existing	  historiography	  (see	  below),	  I	  will	  examine	  only	  on	  southern	  London,	  focusing	  on	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  Blitz	  from	  September	  to	  November.	  The	  region	  covered	  includes	  most	  of	  the	  southeast	  London	  postal	  codes	  (with	  the	  deliberate	  exclusion	  of	  Greenwich,	  since	  it	  is	  an	  island	  of	  considerable	  wealth	  among	  an	  otherwise	  lower	  middle	  class	  area)	  as	  well	  as	  a	  few	  of	  the	  southwest	  postal	  codes.	  This	  thesis	  will	  examine	  how	  people	  in	  these	  areas	  lived	  during	  the	  Blitz,	  how	  they	  acted,	  and	  how	  their	  lives	  changed	  when	  German	  bombers	  came	  overhead	  every	  single	  night	  without	  respite.	  Did	  Londoners	  resent	  having	  to	  shelter	  every	  single	  night,	  or	  did	  they	  see	  sheltering	  as	  a	  heroic	  activity	  in	  a	  valiant	  stand	  against	  Hitler?	  How	  did	  people	  deal	  with	  damage,	  and	  how	  did	  they	  cope	  with	  the	  psychologically	  disturbing	  fact	  that	  one’s	  home	  could	  be	  suddenly	  destroyed	  one	  day,	  destroying	  all	  of	  one’s	  possessions	  in	  the	  process?	  How	  did	  transportation	  and	  work	  experiences	  change?	  How	  much	  and	  in	  what	  ways	  was	  social	  life	  altered?	  And	  through	  it	  all,	  how	  did	  Londoners	  interact	  with	  their	  friends,	  families,	  and	  neighbors	  in	  a	  city	  still	  built	  on	  close	  emotional	  bonds?	  Did	  these	  bonds	  grow	  stronger	  or	  break	  down	  under	  the	  pressure	  of	  the	  Blitz?	  
	   Out	  of	  the	  everyday	  lives	  of	  Londoners	  emerge	  questions	  more	  fundamental—and	  more	  often	  debated—about	  the	  Blitz.	  Did	  south	  Londoners	  resent	  the	  hardships	  of	  the	  Blitz,	  or	  did	  they	  feel	  that	  everyone	  had	  a	  share	  in	  the	  sacrifice	  and	  that	  they	  were	  just	  doing	  their	  parts?	  Did	  Londoners	  resent	  the	  changes	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  Blitz,	  or	  were	  they	  willing	  to	  embrace	  them	  as	  part	  of	  the	  “Peoples’	  War”?	  All	  these	  questions	  point	  to	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  whom	  and	  what	  exactly	  constituted	  “unity”	  and	  “community”	  in	  south	  London	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  It	  is	  these	  questions	  of	  unity,	  loyalty,	  and	  community	  around	  which	  this	  thesis	  will	  ultimately	  focus.	  
***	  
	   London’s	  historiographical	  role	  has	  been	  prominent	  in	  Second	  World	  War	  history	  since	  its	  occurrence,	  but	  its	  position	  within	  that	  historiography	  has	  undergone	  a	  series	  of	  transformations.	  It	  did	  not	  take	  long	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  for	  scholarship	  to	  begin	  to	  emerge,	  a	  scholarship	  which	  seldom	  addressed	  divisions	  within	  London	  or	  the	  country	  as	  a	  whole.	  From	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  until	  the	  1970s,	  scholars	  typically	  portrayed	  London	  as	  a	  city	  unified	  in	  its	  stand	  against	  Hitler	  and	  emphasized	  unity	  as	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	  London	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  Books	  common	  during	  this	  era,	  such	  as	  Richard	  Titmuss’s	  
Problems	  of	  Social	  Policy,	  focused	  on	  how	  unity	  during	  the	  Blitz	  led	  to	  major	  postwar	  changes	  British	  society,	  changes	  (such	  as	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  National	  Health	  Service).	  which	  came	  about	  ostensibly	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  “reward”	  to	  the	  people	  for	  their	  valiance	  during	  the	  event	  itself.	  Scholars	  such	  at	  Titmuss	  asserted,	  usually	  quite	  explicitly,	  that	  the	  Blitz	  generated	  an	  unusually	  high	  level	  of	  social	  cohesion	  and	  solidarity.4	  
By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s,	  it	  was	  clear	  to	  most	  scholars,	  however,	  that	  unity	  was	  not	  the	  only	  story	  of	  the	  Blitz.	  In	  1969,	  Angus	  Calder	  published	  what	  would	  become	  one	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  studies	  of	  the	  Blitz,	  The	  People’s	  War,	  a	  book	  which	  deconstructed	  many	  of	  the	  unity	  myths	  that	  were	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  postwar	  years	  to	  explain	  London’s	  unwillingness	  to	  surrender.	  Calder	  believed	  that	  it	  was	  important	  to	  focus	  not	  just	  on	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  city	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Richard	  Titmuss,	  Problems	  of	  Social	  Policy	  (London:	  Longmans,	  Green,	  and	  Company,	  1950).	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  and	  country	  but	  also	  on	  the	  disunity;	  conscientious	  objectors,	  complainers,	  and	  dissatisfied	  Londoners	  all	  suggested	  to	  Calder	  that	  there	  was	  another,	  yet	  unexplored,	  history	  of	  the	  Blitz	  to	  be	  told,	  a	  theme	  which	  he	  returned	  to	  in	  his	  later	  work.5	  In	  The	  Myth	  of	  the	  Blitz,	  Calder	  took	  his	  ideas	  farther	  and	  put	  forward	  the	  idea	  that	  class	  played	  a	  much	  bigger	  role	  than	  previous	  scholars	  had	  asserted.	  Wealth	  had	  its	  power	  and	  influence,	  and	  Calder	  argued	  that	  those	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  social	  hierarchy	  deliberately	  promulgated	  and	  reinforced	  notions	  of	  unity	  and	  national	  identity	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  underlying	  social	  structures	  of	  British	  society	  would	  remain	  unharmed	  by	  the	  war.6	  
In	  1976,	  Tom	  Harrisson	  published	  Living	  Through	  the	  Blitz,	  the	  first	  major	  study	  to	  uproot	  the	  view	  of	  a	  unified	  London	  by	  addressing	  the	  stories	  of	  individuals.	  In	  his	  book,	  Harrisson	  became	  the	  first	  scholar	  to	  successfully	  incorporate	  the	  voices	  of	  the	  individual	  into	  a	  larger	  narrative	  of	  collective	  experience	  as	  he	  deconstructed	  what	  Calder	  termed	  “the	  myth	  of	  the	  Blitz”	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  smooth	  over	  tensions	  in	  British	  society.	  Though	  imperfect,	  Tom	  Harrisson’s	  work	  began	  a	  long	  and	  ongoing	  line	  of	  scholarship	  which	  uses	  individual	  responses	  to	  position	  the	  Blitz	  outside	  of	  the	  historical	  myth	  of	  strictly	  unity.	  Harisson	  agreed	  with	  previous	  scholars	  that	  the	  Blitz	  did	  little	  to	  “destroy	  ‘mass	  morale,’”7	  but	  he	  also	  believed	  that	  it	  was	  essential	  to	  “recapture	  the	  atmosphere	  of	  those	  remote	  nights”8	  when	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  seemed	  a	  distant—and	  often	  bleak—prospect.	  He	  wanted	  to	  know	  how	  the	  common	  man	  experienced	  the	  war	  and	  how	  such	  experiences	  shaped	  the	  collective	  experiences	  of	  London	  during	  the	  war,	  not	  how	  observers	  looking	  back	  viewed	  the	  Blitz.	  Harrisson	  believed	  that	  hindsight	  had	  led	  many	  scholars	  astray,	  distorting	  their	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  Angus	  Calder,	  The	  People’s	  War:	  Britain	  1939-­‐1945	  (New	  York:	  Pantheon	  Books,	  1969)	  6	  Angus	  Calder,	  The	  Myth	  of	  the	  Blitz	  (London:	  Pimlico	  Publishing,	  1991).	  7	  Tom	  Harrisson,	  Living	  Through	  the	  Blitz	  (London:	  William	  Collins	  Sons	  &	  Co.	  Ltd,	  1976),	  277.	  8	  Tom	  Harrisson,	  Living	  Through	  the	  Blitz,	  16.	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  perceptions	  of	  events	  with	  their	  own	  knowledge	  that	  Britain	  would	  ultimate	  end	  up	  victorious.	  Harrisson	  concluded	  that	  while	  there	  was	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  unity	  within	  London	  during	  the	  Blitz,	  individual	  actors	  nonetheless	  held	  their	  own	  prejudices	  and	  seldom	  bought	  into	  the	  government	  propaganda	  in	  its	  entirety.	  The	  Blitz	  thus	  failed	  to	  “smooth	  over”	  tensions	  in	  British	  society	  that	  existed	  before	  the	  war.	  For	  example,	  London’s	  working	  poor	  still	  resented	  the	  privilege	  of	  the	  rich,	  especially	  when	  the	  latter	  could	  afford	  to	  dine	  in	  expensive	  underground	  restaurants	  to	  escape	  the	  noise	  of	  the	  bombings.	  To	  be	  sure,	  Harrisson	  believed	  that	  overall	  unity	  had	  been	  maintained	  to	  a	  much	  stronger	  degree	  than	  many	  of	  his	  successors	  do,	  but	  it	  was	  a	  unity	  based	  on	  “erratic	  resilience”	  rather	  than	  never-­‐ceasing	  happiness	  to	  suffer	  for	  King	  and	  Country.9	  
	   In	  the	  nearly	  forty	  years	  between	  Living	  Through	  the	  Blitz	  and	  today,	  two	  new	  lines	  of	  scholarship—both	  coming	  out	  of	  the	  1970s	  movement	  away	  from	  notions	  of	  pure	  unity—have	  emerged;	  foremost	  among	  these	  is	  a	  newfound	  desire	  by	  scholars	  to	  read	  and	  interpret	  the	  diaries	  of	  the	  bombed.	  In	  addition	  to	  illuminating	  the	  feelings	  of	  individuals,	  studying	  diaries	  has	  an	  added	  methodological	  benefit	  in	  that	  it	  removes	  cross-­‐racial,	  class,	  and	  gender	  biases	  by	  reading	  the	  words	  written	  by	  individuals	  about	  themselves	  rather	  than	  by	  outside	  observers,	  often	  with	  vastly	  different	  backgrounds,	  commenting	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  others.	  Amy	  Helen	  Bell’s	  London	  Was	  Ours	  tells	  the	  story	  of	  the	  London	  Blitz	  by	  “[restoring]	  the	  voices	  of	  individuals[,]	  revealing	  variations,	  heterogeneity,	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  dissenting	  points	  of	  view.”10	  	  Bell	  spends	  her	  two	  hundred	  page	  book	  examining	  various	  aspects	  of	  life	  in	  wartime	  London,	  from	  the	  challenges	  that	  the	  rationing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Tom	  Harrisson,	  Living	  Through	  the	  Blitz,	  279.	  10	  Amy	  Helen	  Bell,	  London	  Was	  Ours:	  Diaries	  and	  Memories	  of	  the	  London	  Blitz	  (New	  York:	  I.B.	  Tauris	  &	  Co.	  Ltd,	  2008),	  3.	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  system	  imposed	  and	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  civil	  defense	  preparations	  to	  experiences	  of	  love	  and	  sexual	  intimacy	  during	  the	  war,	  arguing	  along	  the	  way	  for	  a	  much	  more	  nuanced	  picture	  of	  London.	  She	  presents	  London	  as	  a	  city	  of	  both	  strained	  relations	  as	  well	  as	  impossible-­‐to-­‐miss	  symbols	  of	  national	  unity.	  Though	  she	  does	  engage	  with	  the	  public	  sphere,	  Bell	  largely	  confines	  her	  work	  to	  private	  spaces;	  after	  all,	  she	  is	  reading	  documents	  almost	  exclusively	  written	  by	  individuals	  in	  private	  places.	  Bell	  agrees	  with	  the	  likes	  of	  Calder	  and	  Harrisson	  that	  any	  scholar	  portraying	  London	  as	  a	  unified	  mass	  of	  humanity	  is	  oversimplifying	  London’s	  immense	  complexities	  but	  goes	  even	  farther,	  believing	  that	  national	  unity	  was	  far	  more	  tenuous	  than	  even	  Harrisson	  claimed.	  	  
	   While	  Amy	  Helen	  Bell	  largely	  removes	  documents	  from	  the	  public	  sphere	  from	  consideration	  in	  her	  telling	  of	  London’s	  story,	  other	  historians	  have	  not	  done	  so—the	  second	  strand	  of	  recent	  historical	  scholarship.	  Instead,	  these	  historians	  have	  told	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Blitz	  by	  examining	  official	  propaganda	  to	  make	  arguments	  about	  wartime	  constructions	  of	  national	  identity.	  In	  her	  now	  famous	  book	  Which	  People’s	  War?	  National	  
Identity	  and	  Citizenship	  in	  Wartime	  Britain,	  1939-­‐1945,	  University	  of	  Michigan	  professor	  emeritus	  Sonya	  Rose	  argues	  that	  public	  officials	  “portrayed	  the	  nation	  as	  composed	  of	  self-­‐sacrificing,	  relentlessly	  cheerful,	  and	  inherently	  tolerant	  people”	  but	  that	  even	  in	  a	  time	  of	  war,	  constructions	  of	  “the	  nation”	  remained	  largely	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  personal	  identification.11	  While	  the	  government	  wanted	  to	  portray	  Britain—and	  in	  particular	  London—as	  signs	  of	  the	  great	  English	  unity,	  in	  particular	  conflicts	  of	  class,	  gender,	  and	  race	  kept	  Englishmen	  from	  seeing	  themselves	  as	  one	  people	  perfectly	  united	  against	  Hitler.	  Each	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  O.	  Rose,	  Which	  People’s	  War?	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  3.	  
Baker	  	  	   10	  individual	  constructed	  “the	  nation”	  as	  he	  or	  she	  saw	  fit,	  and	  these	  individual	  definitions	  “contributed	  to	  a	  reconfigured,	  emotionally	  charged	  political	  culture”	  which	  failed	  to	  bring	  the	  kind	  of	  unity	  sought	  by	  the	  government.12	  Thus,	  Rose’s	  work	  bridges	  the	  divide	  between	  scholars	  like	  Harrisson	  who,	  while	  not	  in	  agreement	  with	  the	  “myth	  of	  the	  Blitz,”	  nonetheless	  focus	  largely	  on	  the	  communal	  presentation	  and	  those	  like	  Bell	  who	  work	  with	  the	  inner	  emotions	  of	  the	  war’s	  participants.	  	  
	   Perhaps	  driven	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  history	  within	  the	  academy,	  recent	  	  scholarship	  has	  worked	  to	  fuse	  these	  two	  divergent	  strands	  of	  historical	  research.	  Because	  research	  such	  as	  Rose’s	  relies	  heavily	  on	  official	  presentations	  of	  nation	  and	  citizenship,	  scholars	  frequently	  struggle	  to	  make	  effective	  use	  of	  their	  primary	  sources	  because	  they	  cannot	  balance	  the	  stories	  of	  individuals	  with	  the	  official	  propaganda	  coming	  from	  the	  government	  to	  create	  convincing	  narratives.	  	  To	  solve	  this	  problem,	  researchers	  like	  Rose	  who	  study	  official	  propaganda	  and	  government-­‐led	  representations	  of	  “the	  nation”	  are	  increasingly	  augmenting	  their	  work	  in	  official	  sources	  with	  private	  documents	  such	  as	  those	  used	  by	  Amy	  Helen	  Bell.	  	  As	  of	  the	  last	  ten	  years	  or	  so,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  general	  consensus	  within	  the	  scholarly	  community	  that	  reading	  the	  stories	  of	  individuals	  sheds	  more	  light	  on	  the	  wartime	  experience	  of	  London	  than	  do	  official	  documents	  but	  that	  official	  documents	  tell	  more	  about	  nationalism	  than	  do	  private	  letters	  and	  correspondences.	  Combining	  these	  two	  types	  of	  primary	  sources	  to	  create	  narratives	  which	  explore	  the	  nuances	  of	  London’s	  experience	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  “new”	  way	  to	  approach	  London.	  This	  development	  has	  led	  to	  narratives	  of	  a	  city	  in	  some	  ways	  unified	  and	  in	  other	  ways	  deeply	  divided.	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   It	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  the	  scholarship	  which	  has	  emerged	  over	  the	  last	  forty	  years	  has	  tried	  to	  deconstruct	  portrayals	  of	  London	  as	  a	  city	  of	  great	  “togetherness”	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  Nazi	  onslaught.	  However,	  scholars	  still	  disagree	  how	  much	  unity	  Londoners	  actually	  exhibited,	  and	  much	  of	  the	  contemporary	  scholarship	  still	  works	  to	  challenge	  notions	  of	  London	  as	  a	  unified	  city	  standing	  valiantly	  against	  Hitler.	  These	  historiographical	  debates	  tie	  into	  the	  most	  fundamental	  question	  of	  the	  Blitz:	  how	  did	  the	  nightly	  aerial	  bombardment	  of	  civilians	  in	  the	  crown	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	  impact	  what	  it	  meant	  to	  be	  British,	  and	  who	  or	  what	  got	  to	  (re)define	  this	  notion?	  It	  is	  a	  question	  that	  troubles	  historians	  of	  wars	  in	  virtually	  all	  nation-­‐states.	  While	  Angus	  Calder	  and	  Tom	  Harrisson	  moved	  the	  scholarship	  towards	  placing	  the	  individual	  civilian	  as	  the	  most	  important	  historical	  actor	  and	  away	  from	  large	  myths	  of	  mass	  unity	  and	  “togetherness,”	  this	  is	  an	  ongoing	  process,	  both	  within	  and	  external	  from	  British	  history.	  Other	  historians,	  like	  Sonya	  Rose,	  have	  focused	  on	  government	  attempts	  to	  define	  and	  represent	  “the	  nation,”	  approaching	  the	  same	  topic	  as	  the	  diary-­‐focused	  Bell	  but	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  
	   My	  scholarship	  will	  follow	  closer	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  Amy	  Helen	  Bell’s,	  working	  through	  the	  words	  of	  Londoners	  themselves	  as	  I	  attempt	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  complex	  landscape.	  However,	  even	  scholarship	  such	  as	  Bell’s	  faces	  a	  key	  issue:	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  entire	  city.	  To	  this	  day,	  London	  is	  a	  city	  composed	  of	  many	  individual	  boroughs	  and	  geographic	  regions,	  each	  with	  a	  distinctive	  sense	  of	  itself	  that	  exists	  in	  conversation	  with,	  but	  undeniably	  separate	  from,	  those	  same	  senses	  in	  other	  boroughs.	  Londoners	  in	  the	  1940s	  were	  well	  aware	  of	  these	  distinctions;	  accordingly,	  this	  distinction	  comes	  front	  and	  center	  in	  this	  thesis.	  I	  will	  focus	  just	  on	  southern	  London,	  excluding	  all	  of	  the	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  city.	  My	  research	  will	  explore	  a	  geographically	  limited	  area;	  by	  doing	  so,	  my	  research	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  examines	  how	  ideas	  of	  unity,	  nation,	  and	  community	  work	  in	  one	  part	  of	  one	  particularly	  segmented,	  factionalized	  city,	  London.	  
***	  
	   This	  thesis	  will	  explore	  wartime	  London	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  social	  spaces,	  loosely	  taking	  the	  reader	  through	  a	  day	  in	  the	  life	  of	  a	  Londoner	  at	  war.	  Structured	  so	  as	  to	  take	  the	  reader	  through	  a	  24-­‐hour	  period,	  it	  begins	  in	  the	  shelters	  (night),	  then	  moves	  to	  transportation	  (the	  space	  between	  home	  and	  work)	  before	  finally	  ending	  on	  places	  of	  employment	  (daytime).	  It	  argues	  that	  while	  there	  were	  senses	  of	  a	  national	  identity	  in	  wartime	  south	  London,	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  unity	  also	  came	  from	  much	  closer	  to	  home;	  that	  the	  Blitz	  made	  people	  care	  at	  least	  as	  much	  about	  what	  I	  term	  “local	  communities”	  as	  about	  the	  health	  and	  status	  of	  the	  nation.	  South	  London’s	  population	  was	  far	  more	  likely	  to	  worry	  about	  the	  fate	  of	  their	  friends,	  families,	  and	  neighbors	  than	  they	  were	  the	  fate	  of	  other	  Brits	  living	  hundreds	  (or	  even	  just	  tens)	  of	  miles	  away,	  though	  to	  be	  sure,	  both	  played	  a	  role.	  This	  thesis	  restores	  the	  voices	  of	  the	  individuals	  and	  their	  own	  lives	  to	  a	  historiography	  very	  much	  focused	  on	  the	  fate	  of	  “the	  nation,”	  reminding	  the	  reader	  that	  it	  is	  not	  ALL	  about	  being	  “British.”	  For	  many	  in	  south	  London,	  life	  was	  just	  about	  what	  it	  meant	  to	  live	  on	  a	  certain	  road;	  in	  a	  certain	  neighborhood;	  and	  to	  share	  this	  wartime	  experience	  with	  a	  certain,	  definable	  group	  of	  people.	  All	  this	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  notions	  of	  “Britishness”	  did	  not	  play	  into	  peoples’	  thinking	  at	  all,	  but	  rather	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  identification	  coexisted	  alongside	  identity	  with	  one’s	  local	  community.	  
	   The	  first	  chapter,	  entitled	  “London	  in	  Shelter,”	  explores	  sheltering	  both	  as	  an	  isolating	  and	  unifying	  experience,	  arguing	  that	  intense	  variety	  was	  south	  London’s	  status	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  quo	  in	  this	  area.	  It	  explores	  the	  various	  kinds	  of	  shelters	  used	  throughout	  southern	  London	  during	  the	  Blitz	  and	  examines	  which	  types	  dominated	  the	  experience	  there	  and	  which	  types	  were	  less	  common.	  It	  then	  turns	  to	  social	  experiences	  within	  shelters,	  showing	  readers	  how	  people	  lived	  in	  shelter	  conditions.	  Was	  conversation	  common?	  If	  so,	  what	  was	  it	  about?	  What	  other	  pastimes	  did	  Londoners	  pick	  up	  to	  endure	  the	  war?	  How	  did	  Londoners,	  particularly	  youth,	  deal	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  regular	  social	  activities?	  The	  chapter	  will	  conclude	  by	  discussing	  how	  and	  why	  Londoners	  came	  to	  see	  their	  shelters	  as	  their	  “homes.”	  The	  notion	  of	  “home”	  comes	  through	  strongly	  in	  the	  archival	  materials,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  sense	  of	  community	  built	  around	  the	  home	  that	  created	  strong	  ties	  among	  and	  between	  Londoners.	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  Londoners	  loved	  going	  into	  the	  shelters	  every	  night.	  They	  didn’t.	  Sheltering	  was	  a	  boring,	  socially	  isolating	  experience	  that	  few	  Londoners	  enjoyed.	  But	  they	  did	  make	  do	  and	  did	  see	  the	  purpose	  in	  it;	  as	  the	  Blitz	  wore	  on,	  sheltering	  became	  more	  normal,	  and	  Londoners	  found	  ways	  to	  create	  a	  smaller,	  more	  limited	  sense	  of	  community	  in	  the	  boring,	  isolating	  shelter	  spaces.	  The	  existence	  of	  these	  home-­‐like	  spaces,	  too	  often	  overlooked	  in	  historiography	  of	  both	  the	  Blitz	  and	  the	  social	  history	  of	  wars	  more	  generally,	  underscores	  the	  nature	  of	  communal	  loyalties	  in	  London.	  
	   From	  shelter,	  the	  thesis	  then	  moves	  to	  explore	  what	  many	  Londoners	  saw	  as	  the	  darkest	  depth	  of	  the	  Blitz.	  The	  second	  chapter,	  “Transport	  for	  London,”	  examines	  London’s	  complex	  and	  disrupted	  transportation	  structures	  in	  a	  time	  of	  total	  war.	  Bombing	  could	  destroy	  portions	  of	  roads,	  holding	  up	  buses,	  and	  could	  damage	  railroad	  tracks,	  causing	  massive	  service	  delays	  in	  London’s	  most	  common	  form	  of	  transportation.	  How	  did	  Londoners	  get	  to	  work	  when	  their	  regular	  commutes	  underwent	  disruptions?	  How	  did	  Londoners	  use	  different	  transportation	  systems	  to	  navigate	  a	  damaged	  city?	  What	  did	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  Londoners	  do	  when	  their	  normal	  means	  of	  transportation	  home	  after	  a	  day	  at	  work	  or	  out	  shopping	  was	  not	  functioning?	  Commonly	  ignored	  but	  also	  included	  in	  this	  chapter	  will	  be	  walking.	  When	  walking	  the	  streets,	  Londoners	  could	  suddenly	  encounter	  an	  air	  raid;	  what	  happened	  when	  this	  occurred?	  Did	  walking	  engender	  fear,	  or	  was	  it	  treated	  the	  same	  as	  it	  was	  before	  the	  Blitz?	  Transportation	  demonstrates	  that	  life	  during	  wartime	  was	  often	  about	  very	  little	  sense	  of	  community	  or	  nation	  at	  all!	  
	   The	  final	  chapter	  of	  the	  thesis,	  titled	  “A	  Day	  at	  the	  Office,”	  investigates	  the	  lives	  of	  Londoners	  at	  work.	  What	  was	  a	  “typical”	  day	  like	  during	  the	  Blitz?	  How	  much	  did	  air	  raids	  disrupt	  normal	  work	  operations,	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  different	  Londoners	  worked	  in	  vastly	  different	  jobs?	  As	  they	  are	  places	  of	  employment,	  I	  will	  also	  include	  shops,	  various	  kinds	  of	  stores,	  and	  places	  of	  social	  relaxation	  such	  as	  cinemas	  and	  pubs	  in	  this	  chapter.	  I	  investigate	  the	  usage	  and	  consumption	  within	  shops	  and	  stores	  during	  the	  Blitz,	  examining	  not	  only	  the	  availability	  of	  goods	  but	  also	  the	  notorious	  Blitz-­‐era	  queues	  and	  store	  closures	  during	  air	  raids.	  This	  completes	  the	  thesis’s	  attempt	  to	  study	  the	  lives	  of	  Londoners	  as	  they	  actually	  lived	  them,	  from	  their	  night-­‐times	  in	  their	  shelters	  to	  their	  travels	  about	  their	  city	  and	  ending	  at	  their	  places	  of	  work	  and	  shopping.	  This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  the	  actions	  and	  activities	  of	  both	  workers	  and	  patrons	  had	  complicated	  intersections	  with	  both	  local,	  regional,	  and	  national	  loyalties.	  
	   The	  thesis	  will	  then	  conclude	  with	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  the	  Blitz’s	  position	  in	  world	  history.	  Though	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  discuss	  the	  Blitz	  within	  a	  larger	  context	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  or	  aerial	  bombardment	  outside	  of	  Europe	  or	  the	  1940s,	  I	  offer	  a	  few	  implications	  for	  such	  discussions.	  	  I	  examine	  how	  the	  timing,	  scale,	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  Blitz	  have	  the	  power	  to	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  inform	  our	  understanding	  of	  London,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  and	  aerial	  bombardment	  in	  ways	  that	  national	  histories	  alone	  cannot	  do.	  In	  it,	  I	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  Blitz	  has	  substantial	  power	  to	  inform	  our	  understanding	  of	  a	  diverse	  array	  of	  historical	  phenomena,	  including	  some	  that	  seem	  initially	  to	  hold	  little	  relation	  to	  the	  Blitz,	  contributing	  to	  a	  more	  dynamic	  understanding	  of	  what	  is	  termed	  “world	  history.”	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  CHAPTER	  1	  
London	  in	  Shelter	  
	   In	  the	  early	  afternoon	  hours	  of	  September	  7,	  1940,	  a	  wave	  of	  German	  bombers	  swooped	  over	  London.	  Arranged	  in	  a	  vast	  aerial	  armada	  twenty	  miles	  wide,	  the	  raids	  that	  evening	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  eight-­‐month	  period	  of	  intense	  aerial	  bombardment	  of	  London	  known	  as	  the	  Blitz.1	  Uninterrupted	  until	  November,	  Londoners	  had	  to	  take	  extreme	  precautions	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  the	  bombings.	  None	  too	  surprisingly,	  this	  often	  meant	  that	  Londoners	  had	  to	  spend	  the	  nights	  away	  from	  their	  own	  beds,	  either	  in	  a	  large	  public	  shelter,	  in	  a	  personal	  shelter,	  or	  in	  a	  safe	  area	  of	  the	  home.	  Because	  of	  the	  air	  assaults,	  perhaps	  as	  much	  as	  half	  of	  London’s	  population	  was	  spending	  the	  night	  in	  various	  kinds	  of	  shelters	  by	  mid-­‐September	  1940.	  Most	  of	  the	  others	  not	  utilizing	  conventional	  shelters	  slept	  in	  safer	  areas	  of	  their	  homes,	  such	  as	  living	  rooms	  or	  basements.	  Few	  Londoners	  remained	  in	  their	  beds	  with	  no	  changes	  when	  the	  Blitz	  hit.2	  	  
Through	  the	  exploration	  of	  shelter	  spaces,	  activities	  within	  them,	  and	  attitudes	  towards	  them,	  this	  chapter	  argues	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  sheltering	  was,	  even	  in	  a	  limited	  geographic	  area,	  one	  of	  intense	  variety.	  While	  relationships	  with	  one’s	  local	  community—family,	  friends,	  neighbors,	  coworkers—became	  salient,	  they	  were	  by	  no	  means	  the	  only	  ones.	  True	  senses	  of	  national	  community	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  shared	  experience	  with	  those	  sheltering	  elsewhere	  also	  came	  through.	  The	  spaces	  in	  which	  these	  relationships	  existed	  shared	  just	  as	  much	  diversity,	  too.	  While	  some	  shelters	  were	  dirty	  and	  cramped,	  others	  were	  reasonably	  comfortable.	  Where	  some	  were	  inhabited	  with	  annoying	  strangers,	  others	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Peter	  Stansky,	  The	  First	  Day	  of	  the	  Blitz	  (New	  London:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  1.	  2	  File	  Report	  408,	  September	  18,	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  were	  filled	  with	  close	  friends	  and	  families.	  Some	  shelters	  were	  boring,	  and	  some	  were	  not.	  	  And	  while	  some	  shelters	  shared	  local	  ties,	  others	  had	  few.	  
	   This	  chapter	  will	  explore	  the	  varying	  ways	  in	  which	  Londoners	  took	  shelter	  and	  how	  they	  reacted	  to	  it.	  It	  will	  begin	  by	  exploring	  the	  material,	  such	  as	  the	  physical	  conditions	  within	  shelters,	  and	  transition	  to	  the	  immaterial—what	  Londoners	  did	  in	  shelters,	  how	  they	  felt	  about	  them,	  and	  how	  shelters	  shaped	  the	  wartime	  experiences	  of	  the	  city’s	  population.	  What	  emerges	  is	  a	  complex	  picture	  of	  a	  city	  forced	  to	  live	  underground	  but	  also	  a	  city	  which	  often	  enjoyed	  the	  time	  spent	  with	  loved	  ones.	  One	  such	  example	  makes	  this	  point	  immediately	  evident;	  across	  all	  types	  of	  shelters	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  southern	  London,	  lack	  of	  sleep	  and	  complaints	  about	  excessive	  noise	  come	  through	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  diaries.	  People	  genuinely	  resented	  going	  to	  work	  exhausted,	  and	  they	  blamed	  the	  war	  and	  the	  shelters	  that	  they	  had	  to	  sleep	  in	  for	  this.	  Yet	  those	  exact	  same	  individuals,	  often	  just	  a	  line	  or	  two	  after	  complaining	  about	  problems	  sleeping,	  went	  on	  to	  discuss	  how	  the	  time	  spent	  with	  family	  was	  a	  wonderful	  thing,	  something	  that	  the	  hustle	  and	  bustle	  of	  prewar	  life	  had	  made	  all	  but	  impossible.	  These	  citizens	  were	  angry	  that	  aerial	  bombardment	  had	  brought	  issues	  with	  sleep,	  yet	  some	  almost	  thanked	  it	  for	  bringing	  a	  familial	  intimacy	  that	  for	  many	  had	  been	  sadly	  lost	  in	  the	  years	  preceding	  the	  war.	  These	  two	  seemingly	  oppositional	  notions	  actually	  fit	  together	  well	  in	  the	  context	  of	  total	  war.	  
As	  with	  virtually	  all	  experiences	  during	  the	  Blitz,	  the	  physical	  characteristics	  of	  shelters	  varied	  widely,	  a	  theme	  that	  will	  receive	  ample	  attention	  in	  the	  coming	  pages.	  Relatively	  common	  north	  of	  the	  Thames	  but	  infrequent	  in	  southern	  London	  were	  large	  public	  shelters—Tube	  stations,	  deep	  bunkers,	  and	  the	  like.	  These	  spaces,	  while	  generally	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  safer	  and	  relatively	  guarded	  against	  the	  noise	  of	  air	  raids,	  brought	  with	  them	  their	  own	  problems,	  including	  overcrowding	  and	  long	  lines	  just	  to	  enter.	  Other	  forms	  of	  shelter	  were	  in	  the	  home,	  such	  as	  basements	  and	  living	  rooms.	  Providing	  a	  level	  of	  intimacy	  impossible	  in	  large	  public	  shelters,	  sleeping	  in	  the	  home	  was	  very	  common	  throughout	  south	  London	  during	  the	  Blitz,	  particularly	  among	  those	  located	  away	  from	  the	  Thames	  River.	  For	  those	  with	  a	  small	  garden	  (or	  a	  friend	  or	  relative	  with	  one),	  Anderson	  shelters,	  a	  prewar	  invention	  made	  popular	  during	  the	  Blitz	  and	  memorialized	  in	  memories	  of	  it,	  became	  a	  common	  destination	  among	  south	  London’s	  residents	  as	  well.	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  shelters	  built	  around	  homes,	  Andersons	  were	  more	  common	  in	  areas	  of	  south	  London	  farther	  from	  the	  River.	  This	  is	  for	  a	  simple	  geographical	  reason:	  individuals	  sheltering	  in	  an	  Anderson	  had	  to	  have	  enough	  garden	  space	  to	  house	  one,	  space	  that	  was	  seldom	  available	  near	  the	  city	  center.	  As	  just	  these	  brief	  examples	  show,	  the	  picture	  that	  emerges	  from	  south	  London’s	  shelter	  spaces	  is	  a	  picture	  not	  of	  similarity	  but	  of	  great	  variance,	  typically	  across	  geographic	  and	  physical	  space.	  It	  is	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  diffuse	  nature	  of	  experiences	  that	  local	  communities	  complemented	  regional	  or	  national	  ones	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  south	  London’s	  population.3	  
The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  describe	  general	  patterns	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  sheltering	  circumstances.	  Across	  all	  forms	  of	  shelter,	  critical	  (and	  too	  often	  forgotten)	  were	  the	  others	  with	  whom	  a	  Londoner	  shared	  the	  shelter	  space;	  loud	  or	  obnoxious	  people	  could	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  a	  well-­‐written	  analysis	  of	  shelter	  thoughout	  London	  during	  the	  Blitz,	  see	  chapter	  1,	  “Rockets	  Fell	  Like	  Autumn	  Leaves,”	  in	  Maureen	  Waller’s	  London	  1945	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Griffin,	  2004).	  Amy	  Helen	  Bell	  also	  discusses	  shelter	  extensively	  in	  her	  book	  London	  Was	  Ours:	  Diaries	  and	  Memoirs	  of	  the	  London	  Blitz	  (New	  York:	  I.B.	  Tauris	  &	  Co,	  2008).	  While	  Waller	  argues	  for	  a	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  sheltering,	  her	  analysis	  is	  slightly	  problematic	  because	  it	  addresses	  the	  entire	  city	  at	  once.	  I	  add	  a	  local	  perspective	  to	  what	  Waller	  says	  about	  the	  metropolis	  as	  a	  whole,	  restoring	  the	  sense	  that	  Londoners	  had	  of	  the	  city	  as	  being	  an	  amalgamation	  of	  distinct,	  separate	  boroughs	  rather	  than	  as	  simply	  one	  “London.”	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  create	  an	  aggravating	  shelter	  experience	  while	  sheltering	  primarily	  with	  family	  members	  could	  mean	  casual	  socializing,	  not	  to	  mention	  ample	  time	  with	  loved	  ones.	  Critical	  questions	  include:	  were	  shelters	  nice?	  Cramped?	  Noisy?	  Dirty?	  Who	  might	  be	  in	  a	  shelter,	  and	  what	  might	  one	  see?	  Where	  and	  on	  what	  would	  people	  sleep	  while	  in	  shelters?	  Such	  questions	  cut	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  what	  Londoners	  experienced	  during	  the	  Blitz	  and	  together	  form	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
	   The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  examine	  life	  in	  the	  shelters	  as	  Londoners	  experienced	  it.	  The	  result	  of	  years	  of	  myth-­‐making,	  scholars	  of	  the	  Blitz	  have	  generally	  focused	  on	  large	  Tube	  shelters,	  spaces	  where	  Londoners	  supposedly	  all	  stood	  together	  in	  unity.4	  But	  as	  discussed	  above,	  these	  formed	  a	  quite	  small	  fraction	  of	  the	  total	  shelter	  space,	  and	  an	  even	  smaller	  percentage	  in	  south	  London.	  This	  chapter	  restores	  the	  voices	  of	  individual	  Londoners,	  most	  of	  whom	  did	  not	  ever	  sleep	  in	  a	  large	  public	  shelter.	  It	  restores	  their	  thoughts,	  their	  actions,	  their	  worries,	  and	  their	  hopes.	  It	  will	  paint	  a	  picture	  which	  is	  both	  dark	  and	  rosy;	  of	  people	  missing	  their	  friends	  and	  families	  and	  troubled	  by	  the	  excessive	  noise	  but	  also	  accepting	  of	  changing	  circumstances	  and	  willing	  to	  endure	  whatever	  Hitler	  could	  throw	  their	  way.	  It	  is	  a	  story	  of	  significant,	  rapid,	  and	  traumatizing	  change	  but	  also	  of	  shared	  concerns	  and	  similar	  problems	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  landscapes.	  And	  it	  is	  a	  story	  suggesting,	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  that	  the	  Blitz’s	  record	  is	  spottier	  and	  more	  fluid	  than	  scholars	  have	  acknowledged.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Richard	  Titmuss,	  Problems	  of	  Social	  Policy	  (London:	  Longmans,	  Green,	  and	  Company,	  1950)	  offers	  a	  good	  example	  of	  such	  a	  scholar.	  Titmuss’s	  book	  focused	  extensively	  on	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  unity	  and	  overarching	  senses	  of	  nation	  during	  the	  war,	  a	  presentation	  that	  most	  scholars	  of	  the	  Blitz	  (including	  myself)	  have	  challenged	  in	  the	  last	  four	  decades.	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  At	  first,	  sheltering	  was	  almost	  universally	  loathed,	  but	  in	  some	  shelters,	  this	  attitude	  tempered	  as	  the	  Blitz	  continued,	  an	  interesting	  development	  that	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  third	  part	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Cleaning	  and	  repairing	  shelters	  became	  a	  common	  occupation	  of	  south	  London’s	  populations	  as	  the	  shelter	  spaces	  took	  on	  the	  role	  of	  bedrooms	  in	  regular	  houses	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  Blitz.	  For	  some	  Londoners,	  that	  shelter	  space	  became	  a	  “home	  away	  from	  home”	  at	  night,	  a	  place	  of	  refuge	  considered	  safe	  (or	  at	  least	  safer)	  from	  bombing	  raids.	  It	  was	  a	  space	  which	  protected	  those	  things	  considered	  most	  dear	  to	  each	  individual;	  typically,	  this	  meant	  one’s	  family	  and	  local	  community	  along	  with	  much-­‐valued	  items	  to	  pass	  the	  time.	  But	  this	  was	  again	  far	  from	  universal.	  Many	  shelters,	  particularly	  the	  large	  ones	  that	  dotted	  the	  Thames,	  lacked	  any	  sort	  of	  emotional	  love	  from	  their	  inhabitants.	  The	  emergence	  of	  homelike	  spaces	  in	  some	  shelters	  but	  not	  in	  others	  again	  underscores	  the	  diversity	  of	  the	  experience,	  a	  variety	  that,	  drawn	  together,	  this	  chapter	  will	  restore.	  
***	  
Perhaps	  most	  famous	  in	  popular	  memories	  of	  the	  Blitz	  are	  large	  public	  shelters,	  often	  Tube	  stations,	  which	  filled	  with	  hundreds	  of	  individuals	  on	  a	  given	  night.	  Related	  to	  Tube	  stations	  are	  large	  shelters	  at	  the	  surface	  or	  just	  below	  it,	  capable	  of	  holding	  a	  large	  and	  motley	  assortment	  of	  people.	  Known	  for	  their	  safety,	  deep	  public	  shelters	  could	  withstand	  bomb	  hits	  that	  other	  protective	  spaces	  could	  not.	  But	  this	  came	  at	  a	  price:	  large	  shelters	  were	  fairly	  safe,	  yet	  many	  Londoners	  avoided	  them	  because	  they	  were	  characterized	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  personal	  agency	  and	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  anonymity.	  Anonymity	  meant	  that	  families	  or	  individuals	  slept	  next	  to	  complete	  strangers,	  an	  experience	  that	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  many	  did	  not	  find	  reassuring	  in	  a	  time	  of	  war	  and	  in	  a	  shelter	  space	  which	  precluded	  most	  forms	  of	  individual	  control.	  Thomas	  Winter’s	  memory	  of	  such	  a	  shelter	  reflects	  these	  challenges	  well.	  He	  wrote	  that	  on	  September	  7,	  the	  community	  shelter	  near	  his	  family	  home	  was	  filled	  with	  “over	  two	  hundred	  people.”	  As	  the	  bombs	  began	  to	  fall,	  “the	  noise	  from	  outside	  began	  to	  rise	  to	  intense	  ferocity”	  as	  he	  and	  his	  fellow	  Londoners	  sheltered	  below	  in	  a	  stuffy,	  hot,	  cramped	  shelter.	  Strangers	  grew	  anxious	  and	  concerned	  as	  bombs	  fell	  around	  them.	  Once	  smoke	  filled	  the	  shelter,	  it	  had	  to	  be	  rapidly	  evacuated,	  pushing	  its	  inhabitants	  out	  into	  the	  danger	  of	  the	  city	  once	  more.5	  The	  large	  shelter	  provided	  no	  form	  of	  comfort	  and	  very	  little	  refuge,	  ultimately	  leading	  its	  inhabitants	  back	  onto	  the	  bomb-­‐laden	  streets	  from	  which	  they	  came.	  
Fortunately	  for	  those	  who	  hated	  these	  large	  shelters,	  south	  London	  did	  not	  have	  very	  many	  of	  them.	  While	  south	  London	  did	  have	  a	  few	  large	  public	  shelters,	  it	  did	  not	  have	  nearly	  as	  many	  as	  the	  areas	  surrounding	  the	  West	  End,	  Westminster,	  and	  the	  famous	  “underground	  restaurants”	  which	  kept	  London’s	  elite	  safe—not	  to	  mention	  well-­‐fed—during	  the	  Blitz.	  Even	  today,	  south	  London’s	  London	  Underground	  network	  remains	  comparatively	  limited;	  this	  was	  even	  more	  the	  case	  in	  1940,	  prohibiting	  extensive	  subway	  sheltering.	  Only	  the	  few	  Tube	  stations	  near	  the	  River	  Thames	  served	  as	  bomb	  shelters	  during	  the	  Blitz,	  most	  notably	  at	  Elephant	  and	  Castle	  and	  Borough.6	  Other	  types	  of	  large	  public	  shelters	  (often	  simple	  trenches	  dug	  in	  parks),	  varying	  in	  size	  from	  twenty	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  “Thomas	  S.	  Winter,	  “A	  Shout	  from	  the	  Night,”	  March	  1995,	  Southwark	  Archives.	  6	  “A	  Bunker	  in	  the	  Borough,”	  South	  London	  Press,	  March	  31,	  1981,	  Southwark	  Archives.	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  individuals	  or	  so	  to	  upwards	  of	  1,000,	  existed	  in	  south	  London,	  but	  their	  use	  never	  rivaled	  that	  of	  other	  types	  of	  shelters.7	  
Those	  choosing	  the	  famed,	  though	  rare,	  large	  public	  shelters	  typically	  did	  so	  because	  they	  had	  few	  other	  options,	  not	  necessarily	  because	  large	  shelters	  were	  particularly	  desirable.	  Official	  government	  planning	  policy	  was	  to	  limit	  the	  number	  of	  large	  shelters	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  for	  fear	  that	  concentrating	  too	  many	  people	  in	  one	  location	  may	  lead	  to	  panic	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  bomb	  strike.	  The	  abundance	  of	  small	  cellars	  and	  areas	  to	  place	  Anderson	  shelters	  meant	  that	  the	  authorities	  got	  a	  boost	  in	  their	  mission,	  limiting	  the	  number	  of	  large	  shelters	  available.	  Still,	  a	  visitor	  to	  south	  London	  in	  1940	  would	  find	  a	  fair	  deal	  of	  public	  sheltering	  near	  the	  Thames	  River.	  In	  spite	  of	  their	  anonymity,	  the	  Tube	  stations	  near	  the	  Thames	  along	  with	  some	  large	  bomb	  shelters	  became	  attractive	  choices	  for	  those	  living	  along	  the	  river.	  Why?	  Because	  there	  were	  few	  suitable	  alternatives	  in	  a	  land	  area	  too	  small	  for	  Anderson	  shelters	  and	  often	  too	  cramped	  for	  everyone	  in	  a	  building	  to	  shelter	  in	  the	  basement.	  The	  forced	  nature	  of	  public	  sheltering	  demonstrates	  how	  aerial	  bombardment	  removed	  much	  of	  the	  agency	  of	  a	  chunk	  of	  south	  London’s	  population.	  For	  those	  not	  near	  any	  smaller	  sheltering	  sites,	  the	  necessity	  of	  protection	  meant	  that	  all	  concerns	  about	  sheltering	  somewhere	  at	  least	  halfway	  desirable	  had	  to	  be	  quelled.	  
	   Far	  more	  common	  in	  southern	  London	  were	  various	  forms	  of	  shelter	  built	  around	  the	  home.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  famous	  example	  of	  such	  a	  shelter	  is	  the	  Anderson	  shelter,	  a	  small,	  corrugated	  iron	  dwelling	  that	  could	  be	  placed	  in	  a	  small	  garden	  or	  plot	  in	  the	  back	  of	  one’s	  house.	  Though	  not	  nearly	  as	  protective	  as	  deep	  underground	  shelters	  and	  made	  of	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  Air	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  Shelters,”	  September	  1940,	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  Archives.	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  rather	  thin	  iron	  covered	  with	  dirt,	  Andersons	  could	  be	  procured	  cheaply	  and	  proved	  amply	  strong	  against	  most	  blast	  damage.	  Many	  south	  Londoners,	  particular	  those	  of	  middle	  class	  background	  or	  those	  a	  bit	  farther	  out	  from	  the	  city	  center	  whose	  properties	  were	  large	  enough	  to	  include	  a	  small	  garden	  in	  the	  backyard,	  utilized	  Anderson	  shelters	  as	  their	  primary	  form	  of	  protection.	  Easy	  to	  equip	  with	  bunks,	  able	  to	  sleep	  an	  entire	  family,	  and	  fairly	  simple	  to	  keep	  in	  operational	  condition,	  the	  Anderson	  shelter	  became	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  southern	  London	  shelter	  experience.	  A	  south	  London	  resident	  known	  as	  Mr.	  Nichols	  echoed	  such	  sentiments	  when	  he	  remarked	  that	  his	  Anderson	  shelter	  was	  sufficiently	  roomy	  for	  him	  to	  remain	  in	  even	  after	  the	  all-­‐clear	  sounded	  each	  morning.	  He	  did	  not	  feel	  like	  he	  had	  to	  leave	  it	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  simply	  to	  escape	  its	  suffocating	  tightness.	  Adding	  to	  the	  comfort	  was	  the	  persons	  inside.	  As	  Nichols	  did,	  citizens	  sleeping	  in	  Andersons	  usually	  sheltered	  with	  their	  immediate	  families	  or	  close	  friends	  and	  neighbors,	  creating	  a	  far	  more	  intimate	  atmosphere	  than	  the	  one	  found	  in	  large	  public	  shelters.	  Its	  versatility	  and	  simplicity	  made	  it	  a	  popular	  option.8	  
Like	  all	  shelters,	  Andersons	  came	  with	  their	  own	  problems,	  however.	  Bad	  weather	  meant	  that	  grime	  and	  dirt	  commonly	  overtook	  Anderson	  shelters,	  as	  a	  one	  Mr.	  Harpur	  reported	  in	  his	  diary.	  Mr.	  Harpur	  had	  installed	  an	  Anderson	  shelter	  in	  his	  backyard	  which	  he	  and	  his	  wife	  used	  as	  their	  primary	  shelter.	  During	  the	  first	  week	  of	  November,	  Mr.	  Harpur	  wrote	  that	  the	  fall	  rainwater	  had	  begun	  to	  seep	  into	  the	  Anderson	  shelter	  at	  night.	  By	  morning,	  he	  would	  have	  to	  bail	  the	  water	  out	  of	  the	  Anderson,	  a	  tedious	  task	  for	  a	  seventy-­‐one	  year	  old	  man.	  Harpur’s	  situation	  suggests	  that	  even	  seemingly	  more	  desirable	  shelters	  had	  a	  combination	  of	  pros	  and	  cons,	  once	  again	  complicating	  any	  picture	  of	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Diary	  5163,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  unitary	  outcome	  of	  the	  London	  Blitz.	  Though	  he	  was	  able	  to	  shelter	  with	  his	  wife,	  the	  tradeoff	  for	  that	  luxury	  was	  waking	  up	  to	  inches	  of	  still,	  stagnant,	  mucky	  water.9	  	  
	   For	  those	  who	  did	  not	  have	  an	  Anderson	  shelter	  and	  chose	  not	  to	  frequent	  a	  public	  shelter,	  sleeping	  in	  different	  locations	  within	  the	  home	  became	  the	  most	  typical	  form	  of	  protection	  from	  air	  raids.	  In	  these	  “shelters,”	  conditions	  and	  spaces	  varied	  even	  more	  widely.	  Many	  of	  south	  London’s	  homes,	  particularly	  those	  farther	  from	  the	  River	  Thames,	  had	  sturdy	  enough	  basements	  to	  work	  as	  shelters,	  and	  Londoners	  pressed	  these	  into	  service	  immediately	  with	  the	  start	  of	  regular	  bombing	  raids.	  Basements	  and	  other	  cellars	  as	  well	  as	  dining	  rooms	  and	  even	  smaller	  closets	  throughout	  the	  home	  thus	  became	  one	  of	  the	  most	  common	  shelter	  experiences	  for	  much	  of	  south	  London	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  The	  vast	  range	  of	  housing	  options	  in	  south	  London	  makes	  generalizing	  difficult,	  but	  on	  the	  whole,	  shelters	  inside	  the	  home	  would	  usually	  include	  immediate	  family	  members	  and	  maybe	  close	  friends	  or	  neighbors,	  too—a	  similar	  demographic	  as	  those	  found	  in	  Anderson	  shelters.	  For	  apartment	  buildings	  or	  other	  structures	  with	  multiple	  tenants	  (often	  these	  were	  located	  in	  the	  more	  crowded	  housing	  areas	  near	  the	  river),	  basement	  sheltering	  became	  more	  of	  an	  amalgamation	  of	  people	  with	  anonymity	  reminiscent	  of	  large,	  public	  shelters,	  though	  residents	  would	  typically	  have	  at	  least	  a	  casual	  familiarity	  with	  one	  another.	  
Basement	  sheltering	  afforded	  Londoners	  enough	  room	  to	  sleep	  and	  familiar	  faces	  with	  which	  to	  pass	  the	  time,	  but	  this	  often	  came	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  coveted	  prewar	  personal	  space—yet	  another	  example	  of	  tradeoffs	  fundamental	  to	  the	  sheltering	  process.	  One	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  Diary	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  November	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  London	  woman	  using	  her	  apartment’s	  basement	  as	  a	  bomb	  shelter	  had	  plenty	  of	  complaints	  about	  the	  use	  of	  her	  flat’s	  basement	  as	  a	  bomb	  shelter.	  Because	  her	  entire	  building	  would	  sleep	  in	  one	  room	  together,	  she	  was	  unable	  to	  read	  and	  practice	  piano	  down	  there,	  her	  two	  favorite	  prewar	  pastimes.10	  Her	  flat’s	  dark	  basement,	  previously	  a	  space	  in	  which	  she	  could	  relax	  after	  a	  day’s	  work	  as	  an	  ambulance	  driver,	  had	  instead	  become	  a	  place	  of	  public	  protection.	  What	  she	  saw	  as	  her	  private	  area	  had	  been	  invaded,	  filled	  with	  lines	  of	  other	  tenants	  trying	  to	  stay	  safe	  during	  the	  war.	  Not	  only	  had	  she	  lost	  her	  piano	  playing	  area	  but	  also	  found	  herself	  living	  next	  to	  the	  building’s	  other	  residents	  in	  a	  cellar	  whose	  conditions	  were	  far	  less	  appealing	  than	  her	  own	  bedroom.	  	  
Basements	  were	  the	  most	  common	  type	  of	  home	  shelters,	  but	  they	  were	  not	  the	  only	  ones;	  dining	  rooms,	  living	  rooms,	  and	  even	  small	  closets	  could	  be	  pressed	  into	  service	  as	  shelters	  as	  well.	  Sometimes	  they	  were	  even	  reasonably	  nice!	  When	  asked	  by	  Mass	  Observation	  about	  her	  shelter,	  one	  south	  London	  woman	  named	  Ms.	  Corfe	  wrote	  that	  she	  slept	  in	  “a	  small	  […]	  cloak	  room”	  located	  within	  her	  home.11	  Her	  sheltering	  accommodation	  had	  no	  sheets	  for	  sleeping,	  just	  a	  handful	  of	  pillows	  that	  had	  been	  brought	  down	  from	  upstairs.	  However,	  Ms.	  Corfe	  had	  gone	  to	  considerable	  effort	  to	  create	  a	  comfortable	  shelter	  for	  herself	  in	  the	  prewar	  period,	  something	  that	  many	  Londoners	  lacked	  either	  the	  money	  or	  the	  foresight	  to	  do.	  Before	  the	  war,	  her	  home	  had	  been	  “strongly	  reinforced	  by	  some	  architectural	  firm,”	  making	  her	  home	  sufficiently	  safe	  to	  sleep	  in	  even	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  Blitz.	  	  In	  her	  prewar	  renovations,	  Ms.	  Corfe	  also	  had	  both	  a	  toilet	  and	  running	  water	  built	  into	  the	  area	  that	  became	  her	  sleeping	  quarters	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  Blitz.	  	  Unlike	  many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Directive	  Reply	  1570,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  11	  Directive	  Reply	  1543,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  Londoners	  whose	  facilities	  could	  often	  be	  separate	  from	  their	  shelters	  and	  thus	  difficult	  to	  access	  during	  a	  bombing	  raid,	  Ms.	  Corfe	  did	  not	  have	  to	  worry	  about	  such	  challenges.	  Her	  home	  hardly	  seems	  like	  a	  space	  properly	  equipped	  to	  handle	  sleeping	  needs	  in	  a	  time	  of	  war,	  but	  Ms.	  Corfe	  and	  millions	  of	  other	  Londoners	  had	  few	  other	  options	  and	  had	  to	  simply	  make	  their	  circumstances	  work.12	  
As	  with	  other	  forms	  of	  shelter,	  use	  of	  smaller	  rooms	  on	  the	  main	  floor	  of	  a	  home	  could	  have	  their	  own	  problems,	  too.	  The	  sometimes	  crowded	  conditions	  of	  such	  spaces	  aside,	  the	  frequency	  of	  air	  raids	  exposed	  another	  key	  problem:	  such	  rooms	  were	  very	  hard	  to	  keep	  clean.	  The	  pillows,	  cushions,	  and	  rugs	  that	  Ms.	  Corfe	  dragged	  into	  her	  sleeping	  space	  would	  have	  to	  be	  washed	  and	  aired,	  a	  process	  which	  could	  happen	  only	  during	  daylight	  hours	  and	  could	  be	  plagued	  by	  frequent	  air	  raid	  warnings	  or	  the	  arrival	  of	  German	  bombers	  overhead.13	  Though	  Ms.	  Corfe	  managed	  to	  keep	  her	  shelter	  space	  fairly	  clear,	  most	  could	  not,	  and	  this	  could	  make	  an	  uncomfortable	  situation	  worse.	  Unable	  to	  clean	  shelters	  properly,	  it	  was	  not	  uncommon	  for	  even	  relatively	  nice	  accommodations	  to	  become	  rather	  nasty	  in	  time,	  realigning	  the	  priorities	  of	  inhabitants	  within	  them	  away	  from	  collaboration	  and	  socializing	  and	  towards	  personal	  necessities.	  
South	  London’s	  shelter	  experience	  was	  marked	  primarily	  by	  intense	  diversity	  among	  the	  varying	  shelter	  spaces,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  overwrought	  generalizations	  without	  a	  more	  nuanced	  analysis	  about	  south	  London’s	  shelters	  lack	  valuable	  meaning.	  Some	  could	  be	  filled	  with	  strangers;	  others	  consisted	  of	  family	  members	  or	  at	  least	  casual	  acquaintances.	  Some	  shelters	  grew	  very	  dirty;	  others	  remained	  at	  least	  livable,	  though	  far	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Directive	  Reply	  1543,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  13	  Directive	  Reply	  1543,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  from	  ideal.	  Most	  shelters	  gave	  occupants	  little	  personal	  space,	  yet	  they	  provided	  ample	  protection	  against	  bombing	  raids—ultimately	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  for	  a	  city	  trying	  to	  stay	  safe.	  For	  scholars	  trying	  to	  understand	  the	  complicated	  effects	  of	  terror	  bombing	  not	  only	  of	  London	  but	  of	  other	  cities	  as	  well,	  the	  diversity	  seen	  in	  south	  London’s	  shelter	  spaces	  during	  the	  Blitz	  means	  that	  the	  lives	  of	  individual	  Londoners,	  even	  those	  living	  relatively	  close	  to	  one	  another,	  could	  be	  very	  different	  indeed.	  Within	  these	  shelters	  came	  senses	  of	  community	  and	  closeness,	  particularly	  with	  those	  sharing	  the	  space	  but	  also	  as	  a	  sense	  of	  solidarity	  with	  those	  enduring	  the	  hardships	  of	  shelter	  elsewhere.	  
***	  
	   The	  same	  dichotomy	  and	  series	  of	  mixed	  outcomes	  that	  marked	  the	  types	  of	  shelters	  accompanies	  activities	  within	  them	  as	  well.	  What	  actually	  occurred	  in	  shelters	  when	  German	  bombing	  raids	  hit?	  Were	  people	  able	  to	  sleep?	  Did	  people	  grow	  sick	  of	  their	  friends	  and	  families	  staying	  in	  shelters	  with	  them,	  or	  did	  they	  embrace	  some	  newfound	  sense	  of	  community?	  The	  experiences	  of	  Londoners	  while	  sheltering	  varied	  widely	  from	  person	  to	  person,	  home	  to	  home,	  and	  situation	  to	  situation.	  While	  there	  were	  real	  senses	  of	  community,	  often	  neglected	  are	  the	  voices	  of	  fear,	  anxiety,	  and	  complaint—about	  crowded	  conditions,	  boredom,	  and	  too	  much	  time	  spent	  with	  the	  same	  people,	  all	  indications	  of	  the	  tensions	  that	  underscored	  life	  in	  south	  London’s	  shelters.	  	  
	   One	  of	  the	  great	  disturbances	  of	  the	  Blitz,	  particularly	  for	  young	  adults,	  was	  the	  cessation	  of	  evening	  social	  activities.	  The	  change	  struck	  the	  younger	  demographic	  especially	  fast	  and	  hard	  since	  pre-­‐Blitz	  London	  had	  transformed	  itself	  into	  a	  space	  of	  great	  fun,	  a	  place	  where	  people	  of	  all	  types	  could	  relax	  and	  enjoy.	  Because	  bombing	  raids	  could	  
Baker	  	  	   28	  commence	  as	  early	  as	  6pm,	  frequenting	  cinemas,	  dance	  halls,	  or	  pubs	  no	  longer	  occurred	  in	  the	  evenings.	  Everyone	  had	  to	  head	  to	  shelter	  instead.	  Common	  among	  those	  in	  her	  age	  group,	  one	  young	  London	  woman,	  Elizabeth	  Wheeler,	  wrote	  that	  “all	  my	  evening	  activities,	  such	  as	  attending	  classes,	  concerts,	  visiting	  friends,	  etc.	  has	  been	  cut	  out	  completely.”14	  Another	  Londoner,	  a	  19	  year	  old	  male	  name	  D.S.	  Bell,	  reported	  that	  the	  only	  visitors	  he	  saw	  were	  those	  who	  came	  from	  nearby.	  Due	  to	  telephone	  line	  disruptions,	  calling	  others	  wasn’t	  possible	  either,	  forcing	  him	  to	  spend	  much	  of	  his	  time	  alone.15	  	  For	  many	  of	  south	  London’s	  socially	  acclimated	  young	  adults,	  the	  end	  of	  their	  leisure	  time	  took	  a	  toll	  on	  their	  mental	  states.	  Many	  felt	  socially	  isolated	  and	  alone,	  unable	  to	  see	  friends	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  “normal”	  flow	  of	  London	  life.	  Heading	  down	  to	  the	  shelters	  to	  spend	  the	  night	  stoically	  awaiting	  the	  arrival	  of	  Hitler’s	  raiders	  was	  seldom	  part	  of	  the	  calculus	  of	  everyday	  individuals.	  
	   Lacking	  their	  usual	  social	  occupations	  to	  keep	  them	  busy,	  many	  found	  that	  too	  much	  time	  alone	  in	  shelter	  to	  think	  led	  to	  intense	  anxieties	  about	  life	  and	  the	  future.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  Germans’	  preferred	  tactic	  of	  bombing	  by	  night,	  Londoners	  would	  be	  in	  shelter	  by	  6	  or	  6:30pm	  and	  not	  emerge	  until	  the	  following	  morning—more	  than	  enough	  time	  to	  grow	  intensely	  bored	  without	  any	  kind	  of	  pastime.	  One	  J.P.H.	  Walton,	  a	  young	  man	  in	  his	  late	  20s,	  liked	  (or	  perhaps	  was	  forced	  to,	  for	  lack	  of	  anything	  else	  to	  do)	  to	  think	  about	  his	  future	  during	  the	  long	  nights	  in	  shelter.	  He	  dreamed	  of	  going	  back	  to	  school,	  something	  that	  he	  never	  did	  in	  his	  younger	  years,	  and	  of	  what	  his	  future	  might	  look	  like	  after	  the	  war.	  Unfortunately,	  he	  quickly	  discovered	  what	  countless	  others	  did	  as	  well;	  that	  peace	  could	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Directive	  Reply	  1570,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  15	  Directive	  Reply	  2347,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  hard	  to	  come	  by	  through	  this	  method.	  As	  he	  thought	  about	  going	  back	  to	  school,	  he	  worried	  about	  spending	  his	  money	  so	  frivolously,	  adding	  a	  complex	  anxiety	  to	  his	  hopes	  and	  dreams.	  He	  did	  not	  worry	  about	  actually	  surviving	  the	  war—that	  was	  up	  to	  God—but	  had	  doubts	  that	  his	  home	  would	  escape	  intact.	  He	  wanted	  to	  save	  all	  of	  his	  money	  up	  to	  protect	  himself	  materially	  if	  the	  need	  arose.16	  One	  can	  clearly	  see	  that	  in	  Walton’s	  boredom	  emerged	  a	  frightening,	  sometimes	  even	  paralyzing	  sense	  of	  fear.	  These	  feelings	  were	  all	  too	  common	  in	  the	  often	  quiet	  and	  sullen	  shelters	  of	  south	  London.	  
	   Those	  who	  did	  not	  want	  to	  repeat	  Walton’s	  experience	  placed	  a	  renewed	  emphasis	  on	  finding	  ways	  to	  pass	  the	  time.	  	  This	  was	  accomplished	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  both	  individually	  and	  collectively.	  One	  common	  way	  to	  spend	  the	  time,	  particularly	  among	  women,	  was	  knitting.	  Elizabeth	  Wheeler	  reported	  that	  she	  liked	  to	  knit	  since	  she	  could	  no	  longer	  play	  piano	  in	  the	  basement	  and	  could	  not	  read	  in	  the	  noise	  of	  the	  shelter	  either.17	  Elizabeth	  didn’t	  adore	  knitting,	  but	  she	  found	  it	  more	  enjoyable	  than	  simply	  doing	  nothing	  at	  all.	  Boredom	  could	  become	  virtually	  maddening,	  and	  Londoners	  were	  more	  than	  willing	  to	  take	  up	  any	  activity	  to	  alleviate	  it.	  Another	  woman,	  J.C.	  Coombs,	  echoed	  Elizabeth’s	  support	  for	  knitting;	  Coombs	  wrote	  that,	  unable	  to	  partake	  in	  her	  favorite	  pre-­‐Blitz	  pastime,	  ice	  skating,	  she	  found	  knitting	  a	  good	  way	  to	  stay	  busy	  and	  keep	  her	  mind	  away	  from	  the	  anxieties	  of	  war.	  In	  a	  landscape	  marred	  with	  destruction	  and	  in	  need	  of	  distractions,	  many	  pastimes	  were	  reduced	  to	  the	  status	  of	  Elizabeth’s	  and	  Coombs’s—mere	  means	  to	  an	  end.18	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   Reading	  was	  another	  common	  shelter	  pastime	  in	  the	  south	  London	  Blitz	  experience,	  one	  that	  had	  far	  more	  power	  to	  reach	  across	  the	  gender	  divide	  than	  knitting.	  Unlike	  Elizabeth,	  who	  found	  shelters	  too	  noisy	  for	  effective	  reading,	  Mr.	  Walton	  (and	  many	  others)	  had	  no	  problem	  reading	  in	  the	  downstairs	  part	  of	  his	  house.	  Walton,	  like	  many	  other	  Londoners,	  wrote	  that	  he	  “read	  more	  for	  lack	  of	  other	  occupations.”19	  Perhaps	  most	  interesting	  is	  that	  just	  like	  Elizabeth’s	  affinity	  for	  knitting,	  Walton	  didn’t	  suggest	  that	  he	  loved	  reading	  or	  found	  it	  to	  be	  the	  ideal	  way	  to	  spend	  evenings	  (he	  didn’t;	  Walton	  liked	  to	  go	  out	  with	  his	  friends	  the	  most),	  but	  it	  was	  better	  than	  sitting	  at	  home	  with	  nothing	  to	  do.	  	  By	  allowing	  his	  books	  to	  take	  his	  mind	  off	  his	  circumstances,	  he	  found	  the	  ordeal	  easier.	  Any	  form	  of	  temporary	  escape	  was	  welcome;	  literature	  did	  it	  for	  Walton.	  Across	  virtually	  all	  forms	  of	  shelter	  leisure,	  a	  true	  prewar	  passion	  for	  a	  certain	  activity	  was	  not	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  its	  execution	  in	  a	  shelter	  environment.	  This	  demonstrates	  yet	  another,	  less	  obvious	  change	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  Blitz:	  how	  the	  bombing	  raids	  forced	  Londoners	  to	  become	  less	  picky	  about	  their	  leisure	  time	  activities.	  
Some	  paired	  reading	  with	  some	  form	  of	  reflection	  about	  the	  material	  as	  a	  way	  to	  add	  	  a	  much-­‐needed	  sense	  of	  personal	  agency	  to	  the	  pastime.	  Mr.	  R.	  Harpur,	  the	  elderly	  man	  of	  about	  70	  whom	  we	  have	  already	  met,	  liked	  reading	  works	  of	  famous	  mathematicians	  to	  pass	  his	  time	  in	  shelter.	  Harpur	  found	  the	  works	  of	  Leibnitz,	  Newton,	  and	  Bernoulli	  most	  interesting	  and	  frequently	  used	  his	  diary	  as	  a	  space	  to	  figure	  out	  algebraic	  calculations,	  filling	  pages	  upon	  pages	  with	  challenging	  or	  confounding	  calculations.	  An	  educated	  man	  and	  a	  retired	  electrical	  technician,	  Harpur’s	  obsession	  with	  mathematics	  became	  his	  means	  of	  escape	  from	  the	  wartime	  conditions	  in	  his	  Anderson	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  shelter.	  Though	  certainly	  not	  everyone’s	  choice	  of	  casual	  reading	  material,	  Harpur’s	  books	  on	  mathematics	  kept	  his	  mind	  off	  of	  the	  war	  and	  his	  algebraic	  formulas	  kept	  him	  mentally	  engaged	  in	  a	  way	  that	  books	  alone	  could	  not.20	  	  Pairing	  his	  love	  of	  reading	  and	  mathematics	  helped	  him	  get	  through	  the	  experience	  of	  staying	  in	  his	  Anderson	  shelter	  for	  so	  many	  hours.	  Many	  other	  Londoners	  paired	  activities	  as	  well;	  most	  common	  was	  the	  pairing	  of	  one	  pastime	  with	  conversation.	  
	   Not	  all	  shelter	  activities	  took	  place	  just	  by	  individuals.	  Group	  ethos	  became	  a	  key	  component,	  especially	  as	  the	  Blitz	  dragged	  on	  longer	  and	  longer.	  In	  many	  cases,	  families	  sheltering	  together	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  time	  to	  converse.	  In	  particular,	  smoking	  and	  small-­‐talk	  with	  family	  members	  often	  went	  hand	  in	  hand	  and	  became	  a	  marked	  feature	  of	  London’s	  social	  experience.	  Cigarette	  smoking,	  long	  a	  popular	  pastime	  in	  British	  society,	  continued	  in	  earnest	  during	  the	  war.	  Families	  would	  sit	  around	  in	  the	  shelters,	  smoke	  cigarettes,	  and	  chat	  with	  one	  another.	  The	  conversations	  themselves	  could	  vary	  as	  much	  as	  the	  spaces	  in	  which	  they	  were	  held.	  	  Sometimes	  discussions	  would	  focus	  on	  the	  war	  or	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  Germans	  (which,	  given	  the	  circumstances,	  were	  remarkably	  kind),	  but	  other	  times,	  it	  would	  be	  far	  less	  serious—a	  conversation	  about	  a	  favorite	  film	  or	  one’s	  casual	  walk	  on	  a	  clear,	  work-­‐free	  afternoon,	  for	  example.	  One	  south	  Londoner	  wrote	  that	  she	  found	  cigarettes	  and	  conversation	  particularly	  enjoyable	  pair	  because	  cigarettes	  “detach	  one’s	  mind	  from	  one’s	  body	  for	  a	  second	  or	  two	  after	  each	  breath,”	  allowing	  one	  the	  clear	  headedness	  required	  to	  engage	  meaningfully	  in	  conversation	  with	  others.	  While	  sitting	  in	  her	  home’s	  cellar,	  this	  woman	  reported	  that	  she	  and	  her	  family	  commonly	  smoked	  and	  enjoyed	  “plenty	  of	  light	  hearted	  chatter”	  to	  put	  their	  minds	  at	  ease	  before	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  going	  to	  sleep.21	  The	  lucky	  might	  even	  have	  a	  bit	  of	  alcohol	  to	  accompany	  the	  tobacco	  and	  talking,	  too.	  In	  a	  war	  marked	  by	  wanton	  destruction	  that	  could	  not	  be	  predicted,	  she	  remembered	  the	  time	  spent	  in	  the	  shelter	  as	  a	  strange	  mix	  of	  naturally	  frightening	  but	  also	  pleasantly	  relaxing.	  
Children	  in	  shelters	  occupied	  a	  rather	  contradictory	  position.	  It	  comes	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  many	  shelters	  had	  children	  in	  them,	  and	  they	  had	  to	  be	  entertained;	  adult	  conversation	  would	  not	  suffice	  for	  that.	  Children	  became	  frightened	  far	  more	  easily	  than	  adults	  and	  responded	  more	  dramatically	  to	  loud	  noises.	  For	  the	  sanity	  of	  everyone	  else,	  parents	  had	  a	  responsibility	  to	  keep	  their	  children	  calm—and	  ideally	  quiet—during	  bombing	  raids.	  To	  accomplish	  this,	  many	  parents	  would	  play	  simple	  games	  with	  children	  or	  bring	  their	  child’s	  favorite	  toys	  into	  shelters	  and	  use	  those	  to	  occupy	  the	  child’s	  mind	  until	  bedtime.	  Interestingly,	  parents	  don’t	  seem	  to	  have	  minded	  such	  activities	  even	  though	  they	  were	  both	  time	  and	  effort	  intensive.	  Though	  there	  existed	  pressure	  and	  stress	  to	  keep	  children	  quiet	  and	  under	  control,	  many	  parents	  loved	  having	  the	  extra	  time	  with	  their	  young	  children,	  understanding	  all	  too	  well	  that	  they	  would	  soon	  grow	  up	  and	  no	  longer	  spend	  so	  much	  time	  with	  their	  parents.	  For	  parents	  worried	  about	  their	  future	  relationships	  with	  their	  children,	  so	  much	  time	  in	  the	  shelters	  gave	  them	  time	  to	  enjoy	  the	  company	  of	  their	  children,	  even	  if	  the	  circumstances	  providing	  it	  were	  anything	  but	  ideal.22	  
The	  bombing	  campaign	  forced	  upon	  the	  city	  a	  number	  of	  interesting	  contradictions,	  not	  least	  of	  which	  was	  the	  Blitz-­‐driven	  tension	  between	  the	  need	  to	  sleep	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  it.	  In	  part	  because	  sleep	  was	  so	  essential	  to	  workplace	  performance	  and	  also	  because	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  social	  activities	  could	  be	  quite	  difficult	  in	  the	  noisy	  and	  cramped	  conditions	  of	  shelters,	  sleep	  became	  a	  high	  priority.	  The	  problem,	  however,	  was	  simple:	  though	  some	  Londoners	  slept	  well	  through	  the	  bombing	  raids	  and	  noise	  of	  the	  AA	  guns,	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  did	  not.	  The	  population	  found	  sleep	  elusive	  owing	  to	  any	  combination	  of	  exploding	  bombs,	  AA	  fire,	  and	  noise	  from	  other	  sheltermates,	  depending	  on	  the	  individual’s	  circumstances.	  On	  the	  night	  of	  November	  5,	  Mr.	  Harpur	  reported	  that	  he	  went	  into	  his	  Anderson	  shelter	  around	  6:30pm.	  In	  the	  ensuing	  twelve	  hours,	  Mr.	  Harpur	  logged	  not	  more	  than	  a	  couple	  hours’	  sleep	  owing	  to	  the	  insane	  noise	  from	  bombing	  raids	  and	  the	  sounds	  of	  antiaircraft	  gun	  fire.	  He	  found	  the	  noise	  outside	  practically	  maddening,	  and	  by	  morning,	  Harpur	  had	  had	  enough.	  Though	  the	  all-­‐clear	  did	  not	  sound	  until	  8:15am,	  he	  left	  his	  Anderson	  shelter	  well	  	  before	  that	  and	  headed	  for	  his	  actual	  bed	  in	  his	  house,	  eagerly	  sleeping	  for	  a	  couple	  more	  hours	  before	  beginning	  his	  day.	  He	  simply	  couldn’t	  take	  the	  lack	  of	  sleep	  any	  more.	  He	  appreciated	  protection	  from	  the	  raids,	  but	  he	  resented	  that	  this	  came	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  proper	  rest,	  a	  conflict	  that	  all	  too	  many	  other	  south	  Londoners	  had	  to	  address.	  The	  bombing	  raids	  forced	  upon	  society	  a	  need	  to	  sleep—to	  maintain	  productivity	  but	  also	  to	  alleviate	  boredom—yet	  simultaneously	  imposed	  upon	  society	  the	  exact	  conditions	  that	  were	  unfavorable	  to	  it.23	  	  	  
	   Lack	  of	  sleep	  exacerbated	  a	  number	  of	  problems,	  including	  complaints	  about	  shelter	  conditions.	  Shortly	  before	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Blitz,	  an	  observer	  noted	  that	  working	  class	  Londoners	  were	  already	  getting	  very	  little	  sleep,	  forced	  to	  stay	  in	  shelters	  from	  7pm	  onwards.24	  With	  the	  arrival	  of	  nightly	  bombing	  raids,	  however,	  the	  situation	  grew	  worse;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Diary	  5098,	  November	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  24	  File	  Report	  391,	  September	  6,	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  pressed	  into	  shelters	  with	  more	  and	  more	  people	  and	  surrounded	  by	  loud	  explosions	  which	  could	  come	  at	  all	  hours	  of	  the	  night,	  average	  sleep	  hours	  declined	  precipitously.	  By	  mid-­‐September,	  not	  uncommon	  was	  the	  south	  Londoner	  who	  averaged	  just	  a	  couple	  hours	  of	  sleep	  a	  night.	  Instead	  of	  relaxing	  in	  their	  homes	  or	  having	  a	  pint	  at	  the	  pub,	  Londoners	  got	  to	  spend	  hours	  crammed	  in	  next	  to	  others,	  often	  total	  strangers,	  waiting	  out	  bombing	  raids	  with	  aggravating	  noise	  and	  no	  sleep.	  The	  elusiveness	  of	  restful	  sleep	  exacerbated	  an	  already	  difficult	  situation	  made	  many	  complain	  more	  about	  their	  shelters	  as	  the	  war	  went	  on.25	  
	   One	  south	  London	  woman,	  Ms.	  Cockett,	  made	  clear	  in	  her	  writing	  the	  effects	  that	  lack	  of	  sleep	  could	  have	  on	  one’s	  attitudes	  towards	  sheltering	  and	  the	  war	  in	  general.	  Cockett	  started	  off	  by	  writing	  that	  “there’s	  no	  word	  I	  can	  start	  off	  with	  to	  give	  the	  mood	  of	  these	  ghastly	  days	  and	  nights	  of	  bombs	  on	  London”	  before	  going	  on	  to	  explain	  how	  her	  “house	  shudder[ed]”	  when	  bombs	  would	  come.	  Cockett	  immediately	  proceeded	  to	  detail	  how	  thanks	  to	  a	  combination	  of	  noise	  from	  her	  ten	  fellow	  shelter	  mates	  and	  the	  falling	  bombs,	  sleep	  eluded	  her	  night	  after	  night.	  For	  Cockett,	  the	  “terrible	  fires”	  that	  she	  saw	  out	  her	  home’s	  window	  when	  she	  could	  not	  sleep	  at	  night	  would	  “haunt”	  her,	  an	  effect	  surely	  intensified	  by	  her	  sleep	  deprivation.	  Cockett’s	  diary	  expresses	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  fear	  and	  anxiety	  about	  the	  war	  and	  the	  impacts	  that	  the	  Blitz	  had	  had	  on	  her	  life,	  and	  these	  tensions	  only	  increased	  as	  her	  nightly	  sleep	  average	  decreased.26	  	  
	   Mr.	  Nichols	  echoed	  the	  sleep	  problems	  of	  Harpur	  and	  Cockett	  in	  his	  diary.	  He	  reported	  that	  when	  the	  Blitz	  began	  in	  earnest	  on	  September	  7,	  1940,	  the	  bombing	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  File	  Report	  431,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  26	  Directive	  Reply	  1364,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  evening	  was	  “indescribable”	  and	  “incomprehensible”—quite	  strong	  terms	  for	  a	  man	  who	  had	  already	  endured	  his	  fair	  share	  of	  bombing	  raids.	  Because	  of	  the	  noise	  from	  the	  bombing	  raids	  and	  antiaircraft	  fire	  near	  his	  home,	  Nichols	  reported	  that	  he	  often	  rested	  in	  “spells	  of	  sleep”	  which	  could	  frequently	  be	  interrupted	  by	  the	  aerial	  attacks.	  Unable	  to	  sleep,	  all	  Nichols	  could	  do	  was	  stay	  close	  to	  the	  others	  sharing	  the	  shelter	  and	  wait	  for	  morning	  to	  come.27	  
	   Making	  up	  for	  lost	  sleep	  became	  a	  critical	  challenge	  and	  provided	  the	  city	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  resourcefulness.	  Londoners	  still	  had	  to	  go	  on	  with	  work	  the	  following	  day	  regardless	  of	  how	  much	  sleep	  they	  got.	  Thus,	  Londoners	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  time	  between	  the	  morning	  all-­‐clear	  and	  the	  time	  that	  they	  had	  to	  start	  getting	  ready	  for	  the	  day	  to	  go	  to	  their	  regular	  beds	  and	  catch	  a	  couple	  hours’	  uninterrupted	  sleep.	  After	  spending	  much	  of	  the	  night	  of	  November	  5	  awake	  in	  his	  Anderson	  shelter,	  Mr.	  Harpur	  strolled	  into	  his	  house	  around	  7am.	  He	  immediately	  went	  to	  bed	  and	  slept	  for	  an	  hour	  or	  so	  before	  beginning	  his	  daily	  routine.28	  Though	  not	  all	  Londoners	  had	  the	  time	  to	  go	  back	  to	  bed	  before	  going	  to	  work,	  enough	  did	  to	  make	  these	  ‘morning	  naps’	  a	  significant	  factor	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  south	  London	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  
	   Though	  south	  London’s	  population	  frequently	  complained	  about	  the	  cramped,	  boring,	  and	  sleepless	  conditions	  found	  within	  shelters,	  they	  also	  grew	  adept	  at	  finding	  ways	  to	  pass	  the	  time	  and	  enjoy	  a	  few	  spare	  hours	  with	  friends	  and	  family.	  For	  parents	  and	  families,	  spending	  time	  together	  was	  often	  seen	  as	  a	  small	  joy	  in	  a	  time	  of	  war;	  even	  young	  adults,	  a	  demographic	  which	  complained	  most	  about	  missing	  the	  social	  activities	  of	  city	  life,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Diary	  5163,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  28	  Diary	  5098,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  grew	  to	  appreciate	  the	  intimacy	  of	  some	  shelters.	  Occasional	  conversations	  with	  neighbors	  or	  friends	  utilizing	  one’s	  shelter	  could	  bring	  pleasure	  and	  happiness	  as	  well,	  helping	  pass	  the	  time.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  shelter	  experience	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  primarily	  uncomfortable,	  the	  small	  comforts	  cannot	  be	  ignored	  either,	  comforts	  that	  grew	  more	  significant	  as	  the	  Blitz	  progressed.	  How	  these	  comforts	  merged	  to	  form	  a	  changing	  consciousness	  of	  shelter	  life	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter.	  
***	  
	   As	  the	  Blitz	  progressed,	  the	  divergence	  among	  experiences	  in	  different	  shelter	  spaces—even	  those	  located	  geographically	  near	  each	  other	  and	  containing	  similar	  socioeconomic	  demographics—grew	  even	  greater.	  In	  some	  places,	  shelters	  took	  the	  place	  of	  second	  homes,	  reaching	  a	  status	  of	  near	  affection,	  while	  in	  others,	  they	  were	  still	  viewed	  as	  the	  isolating,	  boring,	  cramped,	  and	  grimy	  spaces	  that	  they	  had	  been	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Blitz.	  By	  early	  October,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  while	  many	  Londoners	  saw	  their	  shelters	  as	  a	  replacement	  for	  their	  no-­‐longer-­‐safe	  houses	  or	  apartments	  and	  viewed	  them	  as	  a	  second	  “home,”	  this	  was	  nowhere	  near	  universal.	  Smaller	  shelters	  tended	  to	  be	  viewed	  in	  a	  “homelike”	  manner	  by	  their	  inhabitants,	  but	  large	  shelters	  still	  held	  generally	  the	  same	  opinion	  among	  their	  shelterers	  as	  they	  had	  when	  the	  Blitz	  began.	  	  
	  For	  those	  individuals	  sleeping	  in	  smaller	  shelters	  or	  in	  their	  homes	  rather	  than	  large	  shelters,	  the	  sense	  of	  ownership	  over	  the	  shelter	  space	  was	  quite	  pronounced.	  As	  one	  south	  London	  woman	  explained,	  her	  psychological	  need	  to	  go	  to	  the	  same	  shelter	  each	  night	  led	  her	  to	  travel	  far	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  She	  traveled	  to	  another	  part	  of	  the	  city	  with	  her	  
Baker	  	  	   37	  family	  each	  night	  because,	  as	  she	  said,	  “we’ve	  got	  an	  Anderson	  there.”29	  Unwilling	  to	  shelter	  in	  a	  different	  place	  closer	  to	  her	  home,	  this	  unnamed	  woman	  refused	  to	  go	  anywhere	  else	  because	  the	  Anderson	  shelter	  (most	  likely	  at	  the	  home	  of	  a	  friend	  or	  family	  member)	  had	  become	  her	  nighttime	  home.	  After	  spending	  so	  much	  time	  amongst	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  bombing	  raids,	  she	  found	  a	  certain	  comfort	  in	  sleeping	  in	  to	  the	  same	  place	  night	  after	  night	  even	  if	  it	  made	  little	  rational	  sense	  to	  travel	  so	  far	  for	  protection.	  She	  could	  not	  bear	  to	  be	  separated	  from	  what	  she	  saw	  as	  her	  Anderson	  shelter	  because	  she	  saw	  it	  as	  safe—both	  physically	  and	  mentally.	  But	  what	  made	  her	  and	  so	  many	  others	  feel	  an	  attachment	  to	  spaces	  that	  were,	  by	  all	  standards,	  small,	  cramped,	  and	  uncomfortable?	  	  The	  answer	  illuminates	  not	  just	  life	  in	  the	  shelters	  but	  also	  individual	  consciousness	  in	  a	  time	  when	  the	  lines	  between	  civilians	  and	  combatants	  were	  blurred.	  
The	  degree	  to	  which	  one	  perceived	  ownership	  over	  a	  shelter	  made	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  “homey-­‐ness”	  of	  a	  shelter.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  Anderson	  shelters	  had	  a	  tendency	  to	  leak,	  a	  problem	  that	  could	  cause	  extensive	  flooding	  inside	  them	  and	  make	  conditions	  rather	  uncomfortable.	  Mr.	  Nichols	  had	  this	  problem	  with	  his	  Anderson	  shelter.	  To	  solve	  the	  problem,	  he	  got	  a	  little	  creative	  after	  breakfast	  one	  morning.	  Nichols	  hated	  the	  entering	  rain,	  so	  he	  rigged	  up	  a	  tarp	  in	  front	  of	  the	  entrance.	  That	  way,	  he	  could	  still	  get	  fresh	  air	  to	  enter	  the	  shelter	  but	  would	  have	  a	  way	  to	  keep	  the	  rain	  out.30	  Quite	  a	  clever	  idea!	  Though	  it	  seems	  like	  a	  small,	  unimportant	  detail,	  Nichols’s	  willingness	  to	  spend	  the	  time	  necessary	  to	  properly	  solve	  the	  water	  problem	  in	  his	  shelter	  demonstrates	  his	  own	  belief	  in	  the	  importance	  of	  taking	  control	  of	  the	  space	  that	  had	  become	  his	  home,	  even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  File	  Report	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  though	  it	  was	  still	  a	  cramped,	  often	  dirty	  Anderson	  shelter.	  If	  he	  couldn’t	  sleep	  in	  his	  actual	  house	  at	  night,	  Nichols	  figured	  that	  he	  might	  as	  well	  make	  his	  Anderson	  shelter	  as	  home-­‐like	  and	  comfortable	  as	  possible,	  a	  move	  which	  required	  him	  to	  own	  his	  shelter	  space	  in	  a	  way	  that	  government	  planners	  could	  never	  have	  predicted.	  Nichols’s	  decision	  to	  rig	  up	  the	  tarp	  indicates	  that	  he	  felt	  the	  shelter	  was	  his—after	  all,	  he	  could	  adapt	  it	  as	  he	  felt	  was	  appropriate.	  
The	  effects	  of	  creating	  homes	  in	  shelters	  were	  often	  far	  reaching,	  a	  point	  on	  which	  	  Nichols	  again	  proves	  a	  fairly	  typical	  south	  London	  case.	  	  In	  September	  1940,	  Mr.	  Nichols	  hated	  sleeping	  in	  the	  Anderson	  shelter	  out	  back.	  Noisy	  and	  uncomfortable,	  he	  longed	  for	  his	  bed	  in	  the	  house	  and	  an	  end	  to	  evenings	  like	  the	  “disturbing	  nights”	  of	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  Blitz.	  Not	  even	  the	  time	  spent	  with	  his	  family	  made	  any	  difference	  to	  him.	  Based	  on	  how	  he	  felt	  in	  early	  September,	  Nichols	  would	  be	  the	  last	  person	  an	  onlooker	  would	  expect	  to	  someday	  like	  his	  shelter.	  Yet	  by	  late	  September,	  that’s	  exactly	  what	  happened.	  One	  morning,	  the	  all-­‐clear	  sounded	  at	  around	  5am,	  at	  which	  point	  Nichols	  would	  ordinarily	  leave	  the	  shelter	  for	  the	  comfort	  of	  his	  bed	  in	  the	  house.	  But	  by	  late	  September,	  he	  would	  often	  stay	  in	  the	  Anderson	  even	  after	  the	  all-­‐clear	  sounded.	  For	  him,	  remaining	  in	  the	  Anderson	  shelter	  was	  preferable	  to	  walking	  the	  twenty	  yards	  back	  into	  the	  house,	  climbing	  one	  flight	  of	  stairs,	  and	  getting	  into	  his	  regular	  bed.	  	  Why?	  He	  saw	  the	  Anderson	  shelter	  as	  a	  second	  home,	  making	  him	  less	  inclined	  to	  leave	  and	  also	  easing	  the	  Blitz	  experience.	  He	  had	  taken	  ownership	  of	  the	  shelter,	  making	  it	  relatively	  comfortable	  and	  treating	  it	  as	  he	  would	  his	  home.	  It	  also	  had	  the	  added	  benefit	  of	  familial	  connections.	  Nichols	  was	  able	  to	  spend	  time	  with	  his	  wife,	  time	  that	  he	  may	  not	  have	  had	  in	  the	  hustle	  and	  bustle	  of	  prewar	  south	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  London	  life.	  The	  fact	  that	  Nichols	  and	  others	  stayed	  in	  shelters	  even	  when	  they	  didn’t	  have	  to	  is	  a	  remarkable	  reflection	  of	  how	  powerful	  home	  spaces	  could	  be.31	  
Unfortunately,	  the	  Blitz	  failed	  to	  impose	  upon	  all	  individuals	  this	  broader	  sense	  of	  community.	  South	  Londoners	  staying	  in	  large	  shelters	  only	  rarely	  viewed	  their	  shelters	  with	  the	  same	  affection	  that	  those	  in	  smaller,	  far	  more	  private	  shelters	  did.	  Unlike	  in	  smaller	  shelters,	  large	  public	  shelters	  did	  not	  grant	  the	  ability	  for	  individuals	  to	  feel	  as	  though	  they	  genuinely	  owned	  the	  shelter	  space,	  nor	  did	  they	  come	  with	  the	  close,	  intimate	  bonds	  that	  smaller	  shelters	  did.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  those	  taking	  refuge	  in	  them	  did	  not	  view	  them	  with	  the	  same	  light	  as	  those	  individuals	  sheltering	  with	  family	  and	  friends.	  The	  fact	  that	  large	  public	  shelters	  never	  gained	  the	  adoration	  that	  their	  smaller	  brethren	  did	  points	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  agency	  and	  local	  community	  in	  aerial	  bombardment.	  Men	  like	  Thomas	  Winters,	  the	  man	  forced	  out	  of	  his	  Southwark	  shelter	  by	  a	  bombing	  raid,	  did	  not	  see	  their	  shelters	  as	  anything	  more	  than	  a	  space	  of	  protection.	  Homelike	  feelings	  were	  not	  there	  because	  the	  shelterers	  could	  not	  take	  personal	  control	  the	  way	  they	  could	  in	  smaller	  shelters	  and	  could	  not	  share	  the	  time	  as	  intimately	  with	  loved	  ones.	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  universality	  of	  home-­‐like	  sensations	  in	  shelters,	  the	  abundance	  of	  smaller	  shelters	  in	  south	  London	  means	  that	  senses	  of	  agency	  and	  control	  in	  shelters	  were	  present	  for	  a	  great	  many	  south	  Londoners.	  Alas,	  because	  south	  London	  had	  a	  relatively	  higher	  proportion	  of	  smaller	  shelters	  than	  did	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  city,	  it	  is	  quite	  likely	  that	  senses	  of	  local	  community	  were	  more	  pronounced	  in	  south	  London	  than	  in	  other	  areas	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  of	  the	  city.	  	  While	  south	  Londoners	  rarely	  expressed	  feelings	  of	  solidarity	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country,	  many	  personal	  testimonies	  point	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  support	  networks	  within	  the	  shelters,	  networks	  created	  and	  amplified	  by	  the	  space	  and	  activities	  of	  the	  shelters	  themselves.	  The	  vastly	  different	  experiences	  of	  different	  individuals	  points,	  once	  again,	  to	  the	  extensive	  range	  of	  shelter	  options	  that	  dotted	  south	  London.	  
***	  
	   The	  beginning	  of	  the	  Blitz	  meant	  that	  Londoners	  had	  to	  adapt	  their	  nightly	  schedules	  not	  only	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  extensive	  blackout	  but	  also	  to	  ensure	  their	  own	  safety	  by	  often	  leaving	  their	  beds	  in	  search	  of	  safety.	  South	  London	  shelters	  came	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  forms,	  and	  what	  happened	  inside	  the	  shelters	  varied	  as	  widely	  as	  their	  physical	  characteristics.	  However,	  as	  September	  gave	  way	  to	  October	  and	  November,	  Londoners	  got	  used	  to	  their	  new	  lifestyles	  and	  made	  the	  best	  of	  difficult	  circumstances,	  suggesting	  that	  strategic	  bombing	  can	  have	  contradictory—and	  sometimes	  opposite—effects	  when	  viewed	  across	  time	  and	  space.	  Adjustment	  took	  time,	  but	  it	  did	  eventually	  happen,	  and	  the	  result	  was	  a	  sense	  of	  local	  community	  that	  contrasts	  sharply	  with	  the	  still	  uncomfortable	  conditions	  of	  shelter	  life.	  	  Senses	  of	  community	  came	  out	  of	  these	  shared	  experiences	  and	  attempts	  to	  create	  spaces,	  homes,	  and	  meanings	  out	  of	  war,	  a	  process	  that	  occurred	  very	  unevenly	  throughout	  the	  city.	  Yet	  even	  so,	  tensions	  between	  the	  discomfort	  of	  shelters	  and	  the	  sometimes	  robust	  life	  contained	  within	  them	  continued.	  
The	  emergence	  of	  home-­‐like	  attitudes	  among	  many	  Londoners	  towards	  shelters	  primarily	  represents	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  local	  consciousness	  about	  the	  position	  of	  London	  within	  the	  context	  of	  total	  war.	  Sheltering	  with	  and	  enduring	  nightly	  attacks	  alongside	  the	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  same	  people	  led	  not	  only	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  home	  but	  also	  to	  a	  true	  sense	  of	  community	  among	  those	  who	  passed	  the	  time	  together.	  Many	  Londoners	  saw	  their	  shelter	  mates	  as	  more	  than	  just	  fellow	  men	  but	  as	  people	  with	  whom	  they	  had	  endured	  and	  shared	  something	  truly	  special.	  But	  this	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  shelters	  were	  pleasant!	  Quite	  the	  contrary.	  	  Sheltering	  was	  an	  inherently	  uncomfortable	  process,	  marked	  by	  tight	  conditions,	  lack	  of	  social	  life,	  and	  extreme	  boredom.	  Thus,	  the	  picture	  of	  south	  London	  in	  shelters	  that	  emerges	  is	  one	  which	  at	  first	  seems	  contradictory:	  an	  area	  sheltering	  in	  discomfort	  but	  still	  finding	  a	  way	  to	  build	  communities	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  
	  Elizabeth	  Wheeler’s	  directive	  reply	  to	  Mass	  Observation	  summed	  up	  what	  it	  meant	  to	  shelter;	  she	  wrote	  that	  raids	  have	  “banished	  all	  private	  life	  entirely.	  We	  all	  live	  in	  a	  community	  now.”32	  Wheeler’s	  writing	  reflects	  the	  dichotomous	  results	  of	  strategic	  bombing:	  that	  it	  brought	  senses	  of	  local	  unity	  but	  also	  local	  dissention;	  homes	  amid	  discomfort;	  and	  social	  lives	  among	  the	  ongoing	  anxieties	  and	  boredom	  of	  war.	  Elizabeth’s	  prewar	  life	  had	  been	  totally	  destroyed	  by	  the	  bombs,	  yet	  those	  same	  weapons	  had	  given	  rise	  to	  a	  new	  one.	  The	  prewar	  way	  of	  life	  had	  been	  put	  on	  hold	  and	  supplanted	  by	  nightly	  sheltering	  and	  cramped	  conditions	  sometimes	  approaching	  squalor.	  Inside	  the	  shelters,	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  activities	  took	  place.	  Sometimes	  shelters	  were	  busy,	  full	  of	  conversation	  or	  the	  occasional	  game.	  Other	  times,	  they	  were	  frightening	  environments	  in	  which	  individuals	  confronted	  their	  hopes,	  dreams,	  fears,	  and	  distresses	  about	  the	  future.	  In	  south	  London,	  just	  about	  anything	  could	  be	  found	  in	  the	  shelters.	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  Of	  course,	  the	  Blitz	  had	  impacts	  beyond	  life	  in	  shelters.	  Londoners	  had	  to	  take	  to	  the	  streets	  to	  get	  on	  with	  their	  daily	  lives,	  and	  the	  confusing,	  conflicting	  effects	  of	  aerial	  warfare	  can	  be	  seen	  there,	  too.	  It	  is	  to	  London’s	  transportation	  structures	  that	  we	  shall	  now	  turn	  our	  focus.
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  CHAPTER	  TWO	  
Transport	  for	  London	  
	   The	  preceding	  chapter	  explored	  the	  complicated	  nature	  of	  shelter	  in	  southern	  London	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  However,	  even	  in	  a	  time	  of	  total	  war,	  the	  lives	  of	  Londoners	  could	  not	  be	  restricted	  to	  their	  safe	  shelters.	  People	  had	  to	  go	  to	  work.	  They	  had	  to	  go	  shopping	  to	  buy	  food	  and	  other	  basic	  supplies.	  They	  went	  to	  visit	  family	  and	  friends,	  sometimes	  next	  door	  or	  down	  the	  road	  but	  often	  across	  town	  as	  well.	  Though	  prewar	  social	  venues	  operated	  on	  limited	  hours	  during	  the	  Blitz,	  some	  Londoners	  went	  out	  for	  an	  afternoon	  movie	  or	  a	  trip	  to	  the	  pub,	  trying	  to	  maintain	  some	  sense	  of	  normalcy.	  Some	  brave	  south	  Londoners,	  mostly	  youth,	  would	  even	  go	  out	  for	  a	  pleasurable	  foray	  without	  any	  practical	  purpose	  besides	  clearing	  their	  minds,	  walking	  their	  city	  streets	  while	  hoping	  to	  avoid	  bombing	  raids.	  
	   Transportation	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  most	  neglected	  topics	  in	  Blitz	  historiography,	  perhaps	  because	  transportation	  networks	  fit	  poorly	  into	  the	  postwar	  mythology	  of	  London	  unity.	  When	  the	  war	  came	  to	  an	  end,	  fame	  fell	  above	  all	  else	  on	  shelters.	  The	  story	  of	  people	  supposedly	  working	  together	  in	  the	  depths	  of	  the	  city	  to	  sustain	  both	  physical	  and	  mental	  energy	  in	  a	  time	  of	  total	  war	  had	  a	  powerful	  appeal	  to	  postwar	  narratives	  constructing	  the	  Blitz	  as	  Britain’s	  heroic	  stance.	  Shelters	  fit	  neatly	  into	  a	  myth	  constructing	  Britain’s	  ultimate	  victory	  as	  the	  result	  of	  its	  citizens’	  superior	  willpower.	  With	  trains	  dysfunctional,	  buses	  barely	  moving,	  and	  walking	  and	  biking	  both	  immensely	  dangerous,	  it	  became	  difficult	  to	  create	  any	  great	  national	  story	  out	  of	  London’s	  transportation	  structures.	  The	  “heroic”	  moments	  (a	  mythology	  which	  has	  already	  been	  challenged)	  were	  superseded	  by	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  fear,	  something	  that	  transportation	  symbolized	  all	  too	  well.	  Yet	  this	  removal	  from	  postwar	  stories	  can	  be	  leveraged	  by	  modern	  scholars	  in	  a	  productive	  way	  because	  it	  tells	  something	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  getting	  around	  the	  city.	  The	  large	  silence	  of	  transportation	  structures	  suggests	  that	  trains,	  buses,	  and	  walking	  were	  areas	  of	  higher	  than	  normal	  anxiety	  and	  fear,	  even	  in	  a	  city	  full	  of	  both.	  As	  Judith	  Walkowitz	  pointed	  out	  in	  her	  pioneering	  study	  of	  the	  West	  End	  district	  of	  Soho,	  transportation	  in	  London	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  “a	  modern	  space	  open	  to	  all,”	  a	  description	  that	  applies	  just	  as	  well	  to	  south	  London.1	  Yet	  when	  the	  Blitz	  came,	  transportation	  became	  an	  area	  of	  increased	  tensions,	  the	  result	  of	  few	  communities	  with	  which	  to	  share	  the	  experience.	  
	   Virtually	  every	  means	  of	  mobility	  underwent	  change	  after	  the	  commencement	  of	  regular	  bombing	  raids	  in	  late	  August	  and	  early	  September	  1940,	  and	  these	  changes	  tell	  much	  about	  south	  London’s	  population.	  Most	  impacted	  by	  the	  destruction	  were	  trains	  and	  various	  forms	  of	  light	  rail	  such	  as	  trams.	  Railways,	  stations,	  and	  even	  the	  vehicles	  themselves	  were	  vulnerable	  to	  attack,	  particularly	  those	  located	  nearest	  the	  River	  Thames.	  However,	  destruction	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  these.	  Bus	  transportation	  endured	  a	  variety	  of	  service	  interruptions	  throughout	  the	  Blitz	  as	  well,	  generally	  owing	  to	  poor	  road	  conditions	  or	  arrival	  of	  new	  air	  raids	  but	  also	  sometimes	  due	  to	  destruction	  of	  buses.	  And	  finally	  (and	  perhaps	  most	  often	  overlooked)	  are	  our	  own	  natural	  forms	  of	  transportation:	  walking	  and	  biking.	  The	  mere	  act	  of	  walking	  the	  city	  streets	  could	  frighten	  many	  a	  cautious	  Londoner,	  and	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  new	  air	  raid	  could	  force	  one	  to	  rapidly	  take	  shelter	  in	  uncomfortable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Walkowitz,	  Judith.	  Nights	  Out:	  Life	  in	  Cosmopolitan	  London	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  image	  7,	  p.	  178-­‐179.	  Walkowitz	  does	  a	  fantastic	  job	  discussing	  the	  urban	  space	  of	  Soho,	  and	  her	  emphasis	  on	  one	  distinct	  area	  of	  London	  maintains	  the	  understanding	  that	  Londoners	  had	  of	  their	  city.	  However,	  readers	  should	  note	  that	  Walkowitz’s	  book	  is	  rather	  thin	  on	  Blitz-­‐era	  material.	  This	  thesis	  takes	  the	  local	  which	  Walkowitz	  so	  succeeds	  at	  and	  investigates	  a	  very	  short	  time	  period	  in	  greater	  depth	  and	  detail.	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  locations.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  danger,	  walking	  remained	  an	  important	  of	  mobility	  and	  is	  therefore	  necessary	  to	  explore	  with	  more	  precision.	  Biking,	  a	  common	  sight	  across	  prewar	  London,	  also	  maintained	  its	  importance	  throughout	  the	  Blitz,	  though	  not	  without	  challenges	  of	  its	  own.	  Bikers	  faced	  problems	  from	  road	  damage	  as	  well	  as	  from	  the	  oppressive	  darkness	  of	  blackout	  conditions,	  making	  their	  journeys	  challenging.	  
	   By	  1939,	  public	  transportation,	  primarily	  trains,	  trams,	  and	  buses	  had	  become	  the	  dominant	  means	  of	  transportation	  in	  south	  London.	  As	  a	  primarily	  working	  class	  area,	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  automobile	  had	  not	  yet	  reached	  the	  laboring	  population	  south	  of	  the	  Thames;	  only	  a	  rare	  few	  in	  inner	  south	  London	  could	  afford	  to	  own	  a	  vehicle	  or	  hire	  a	  taxi.	  But	  fortunately	  for	  most,	  trains	  remained	  relatively	  inexpensive	  and	  were	  ubiquitous.	  A	  cursory	  look	  at	  the	  map	  of	  London	  south	  of	  the	  River	  Thames	  shows	  the	  dominance	  of	  railroads	  in	  this	  area	  of	  the	  city;	  it	  was	  these	  networks	  that	  moved	  south	  London.	  By	  1940,	  more	  Londoners	  went	  to	  work	  by	  train	  and	  tram	  than	  by	  any	  other	  means,	  meaning	  that	  any	  disruptions	  to	  trains	  or	  trams	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  lives	  of	  millions.	  Buses,	  more	  common	  along	  shorter	  transit	  routes,	  had	  similarly	  become	  popular	  before	  the	  war.	  Roadway	  damage	  as	  well	  as	  blackout	  conditions	  were	  the	  main	  impediments	  to	  buses	  during	  the	  Blitz;	  however,	  because	  buses	  could	  use	  alternate	  roadways	  whereas	  trains	  and	  trams	  could	  not,	  the	  Blitz	  impacted	  bussing	  marginally	  less	  than	  it	  did	  rail.	  
Though	  commonly	  ignored	  in	  the	  scholarship,	  transportation	  disruptions	  were	  so	  severe	  that	  they	  became	  the	  most	  commonly	  complained	  about	  feature	  of	  life	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  Disruption	  became	  not	  just	  an	  occasional	  incident	  that	  one	  experienced	  every	  so	  often	  but	  rather	  a	  new	  status	  quo.	  London’s	  previously	  well-­‐organized,	  on	  time	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  transportation	  structures	  were	  no	  longer	  the	  standard.	  This	  observation	  suggests	  that	  crowding,	  delays,	  danger,	  and	  anxiety	  were	  the	  rule,	  and	  a	  rule	  that	  was	  not	  well	  loved.	  It	  also	  points	  to	  the	  ever	  changing	  nature	  of	  transportation.	  Whereas	  sleeping	  venues	  typically	  changed	  just	  once	  (at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Blitz)	  or	  in	  response	  to	  destruction	  transportation	  disruptions	  shifted	  week	  to	  week,	  day	  to	  day,	  and	  hour	  to	  hour.	  By	  exploring	  the	  history	  of	  transportation	  in	  Blitz-­‐era	  south	  London,	  this	  chapter	  will	  argue	  that	  transportation	  represented	  the	  lowest	  depths	  of	  the	  Blitz,	  a	  space	  in	  which	  Londoners	  came	  face	  to	  face	  with	  the	  immense	  power	  of	  aerial	  warfare	  in	  a	  way	  which	  seldom	  allowed	  for	  claims	  of	  collective	  or	  individual	  heroism.	  It	  was	  the	  space	  where	  the	  Blitz	  was	  always	  altering	  the	  normal	  flow	  of	  life	  and	  exposing	  Londoners	  to	  the	  gravest	  dangers	  without	  the	  communities	  found	  in	  shelters	  to	  soothe	  the	  problem.	  However,	  as	  with	  shelter,	  this	  picture	  is	  not	  all-­‐encompassing.	  Some	  forms	  of	  transportation	  caused	  more	  problems	  than	  others.	  Challenging	  a	  notion	  of	  transportation	  solely	  as	  a	  harrowing	  subject,	  some	  saw	  activities	  like	  walking	  not	  as	  frightening	  but	  as	  liberating.	  And	  as	  in	  shelters,	  locally	  driven	  actions	  helped	  alleviate	  some—though	  fewer	  than	  with	  shelters—of	  the	  problems.	  
	   Like	  the	  preceding	  chapter,	  exploration	  of	  south	  London’s	  transportation	  networks	  shall	  be	  subdivided	  into	  its	  component	  parts.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  explores	  various	  public	  transportation,	  emphasizing	  the	  changes	  to	  train	  and	  bus	  networks.	  It	  examines	  what	  life	  on	  a	  London	  train,	  tram,	  or	  bus	  might	  have	  been	  like	  and	  shows	  how	  Londoners	  handled	  the	  uncertainties	  of	  mobility.	  It	  also	  demonstrates	  how	  public	  transportation	  felt	  to	  Londoners	  very	  unsafe—not	  an	  unreasonable	  impression	  to	  have—and	  how	  public	  transportation	  led	  to	  feelings	  of	  anxiety	  and	  vulnerability.	  But	  it	  shall	  also	  show	  the	  challenges	  to	  these	  feelings—how	  the	  city’s	  people	  took	  small,	  generally	  localized	  and	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  individualized,	  steps	  to	  give	  themselves	  a	  feeling	  of	  control	  and	  keep	  life	  running	  as	  normally	  as	  they	  could.	  The	  picture	  that	  emerges,	  thus,	  is	  much	  more	  complicated	  than	  one	  might	  initially	  think:	  of	  a	  city	  certainly	  frightened	  but	  also	  one	  with	  strains	  of	  resistance.	  Where	  it	  existed,	  south	  London’s	  sense	  of	  resistance	  was,	  like	  in	  shelters,	  usually,	  though	  not	  always,	  based	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  lone	  individuals	  or	  small	  groups	  rather	  than	  massed	  popular	  or	  governmental	  responses.	  
	   In	  spite	  of	  increased	  mechanization,	  however,	  Londoners	  still	  had	  to	  take	  to	  the	  streets	  privately	  to	  get	  around,	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  second	  half	  of	  this	  chapter.	  In	  a	  city	  where	  many	  shopped,	  lived,	  and	  worked	  near	  each	  other,	  walking	  and	  biking	  were	  already	  very	  efficient	  ways	  of	  getting	  around	  in	  the	  prewar	  period.	  With	  the	  public	  transit	  disruptions	  that	  accompanied	  the	  Blitz,	  the	  prominence	  and	  vital	  importance—as	  well	  as	  the	  danger—of	  both	  increased	  dramatically.	  This	  fact	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  many	  who	  implored	  their	  loved	  ones	  to	  avoid	  the	  streets	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  However,	  for	  some,	  walking	  retained	  its	  prewar	  appeal;	  many	  south	  Londoners,	  particularly	  young	  adults,	  saw	  walking	  in	  the	  same	  relaxing	  spirit	  that	  they	  had	  seen	  it	  in	  before	  the	  war.	  The	  danger	  seems	  not	  to	  have	  bothered	  them	  much,	  suggesting	  that,	  like	  with	  shelter,	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  bombing	  campaign	  was	  very	  mixed	  even	  in	  a	  relatively	  small	  geographic	  space.	  These	  smaller	  transportation	  systems	  thus	  add	  yet	  another	  layer	  of	  complexity	  to	  the	  story	  of	  south	  London’s	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  
***	  
	   On	  Monday,	  September	  2,	  1940,	  a	  bystander	  of	  the	  city	  may	  have	  seen	  S.	  J.	  Cartley	  set	  off	  from	  his	  Deptford	  home	  for	  work.	  He	  arrived	  at	  the	  train	  station	  around	  8am;	  ten	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  minutes	  later,	  the	  train	  pulled	  up	  to	  the	  station	  just	  as	  the	  air	  raid	  siren	  sounded.	  Suddenly,	  no	  one	  seemed	  to	  know	  what	  was	  going	  on.	  Few	  of	  the	  train	  station	  staff	  knew	  what	  was	  happening,	  and	  no	  one	  opened	  up	  the	  shelter	  near	  the	  station.	  	  And	  to	  make	  an	  already	  confusing	  situation	  even	  worse,	  patrons	  of	  the	  train	  station	  did	  not	  go	  to	  the	  shelter,	  instead	  standing	  around	  on	  the	  platform	  assessing	  the	  imminent	  danger	  and	  blocking	  the	  way	  of	  those	  trying	  to	  find	  protection.2	  	  
	   The	  chaos	  which	  Cartley	  experienced	  became	  a	  hallmark	  of	  train	  transportation	  around	  south	  London	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  Trains	  could	  cease	  running	  altogether,	  and	  if	  they	  did	  run,	  they	  could	  be	  late	  or	  skip	  over	  stations	  due	  to	  bomb	  damage.	  Since	  railroads	  were	  often	  located	  in	  large,	  vulnerable	  open	  areas,	  they	  usually	  suffered	  more	  than	  roads	  when	  bombs	  came.3	  Assuming	  they	  were	  running	  at	  all,	  trains	  and	  the	  stations	  supporting	  them	  could	  be	  very	  busy,	  particularly	  during	  rush	  hours	  when	  many	  Londoners	  were	  traveling	  to	  or	  from	  work,	  creating	  claustrophobic	  environments	  amplified	  by	  the	  delay-­‐driven	  crowding.	  And	  of	  course,	  in	  a	  city	  facing	  constant	  aerial	  assault,	  exposure	  out	  in	  the	  open	  or	  being	  stuck	  on	  a	  train	  created	  obvious	  safety	  problems	  as	  well,	  a	  facet	  of	  transportation	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  population	  either.	  
	   Taking	  a	  train	  meant	  getting	  to	  a	  train	  station,	  a	  proposition	  that	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  fast	  proved	  problematic	  and	  demonstrated	  the	  Blitz’s	  power	  to	  disrupt	  without	  killing.	  A	  great	  many	  Londoners	  could	  not	  even	  start	  their	  journeys,	  unable	  to	  reach	  the	  station	  due	  to	  air	  raids.	  One	  day	  in	  mid-­‐August,	  Ms.	  O.E.	  Cockett	  prepared	  to	  head	  off	  to	  the	  train	  station	  to	  head	  home	  from	  work.	  Right	  as	  she	  was	  about	  to	  leave	  her	  work	  as	  a	  civil	  servant,	  however,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Directive	  Reply	  5039.3,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  3	  The	  London	  County	  Council:	  Bomb	  Damage	  Maps,	  1939-­‐1945,	  London	  Metropolitan	  Archives.	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  the	  air	  raid	  siren	  went	  off,	  forcing	  her	  to	  temporarily	  delay	  her	  departure.	  When	  the	  all	  clear	  finally	  sounded,	  Ms.	  Cockett	  “raced	  off	  to	  the	  station”	  trying	  desperately	  to	  catch	  the	  next	  train	  back	  to	  her	  home.	  Unable	  to	  make	  the	  train	  in	  time,	  she	  had	  to	  wait	  15	  minutes	  for	  the	  next	  train	  to	  come.	  Such	  was	  a	  day	  in	  the	  life	  of	  south	  London	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  Waiting	  around	  for	  trains,	  especially	  after	  the	  long	  work	  days	  required	  by	  the	  war,	  became	  common	  and	  particularly	  irksome	  for	  those	  in	  a	  city	  accustomed	  to	  well-­‐regulated	  transit	  services.4	  In	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  conditions	  of	  the	  Blitz,	  many	  small	  issues	  combined	  to	  form	  big	  ones,	  just	  as	  Cartley	  and	  Cockett	  discovered.	  
	   Even	  assuming	  that	  trains	  were	  running,	  many	  did	  not	  go	  all	  the	  way	  to	  their	  intended	  destinations	  due	  to	  rail	  destruction,	  a	  further	  frustration	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	  invoking	  ire	  due	  to	  the	  delays,	  exposed	  Londoners	  to	  danger	  for	  even	  longer.	  Ms.	  Corfe	  had	  family	  living	  in	  Buxton,	  and	  she	  liked	  to	  try	  to	  visit	  them	  (yet	  another	  reminder	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  friends	  and	  family	  during	  the	  Blitz).	  However,	  when	  the	  Blitz	  came,	  Ms.	  Corfe	  found	  it	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  do	  so	  because	  on	  any	  given	  day,	  the	  chances	  of	  the	  trains	  actually	  going	  all	  the	  way	  to	  her	  final	  destination	  could	  be	  slim	  to	  none.	  Corfe’s	  words	  themselves	  put	  it	  nicely:	  with	  “no	  trains,	  no	  trams,	  very	  few	  crowded	  buses	  running	  quite	  likely	  not	  to	  go	  the	  whole	  way,”	  traveling	  by	  train	  became	  extremely	  difficult	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  And	  because	  some	  of	  the	  delays	  took	  place	  once	  trains	  had	  already	  left	  the	  station,	  not	  uncommon	  was	  the	  train	  left	  idling	  on	  the	  tracks,	  exposed	  to	  any	  danger	  that	  might	  come	  overhead.5	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Diary	  5278,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  5	  Diary	  1543,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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   Thanks	  to	  service	  disruptions,	  trains	  and	  their	  stations	  often	  ended	  up	  completely	  packed.	  	  One	  day	  in	  late	  August,	  O.E.	  Cockett’s	  crowded	  train	  pulled	  into	  London’s	  Waterloo	  Station.	  Ms.	  Cockett	  then	  wrote	  that	  she	  had	  to	  push	  through	  crowds	  of	  commuters	  just	  to	  get	  off	  the	  train;	  meanwhile,	  the	  loudspeaker	  overhead	  blared	  that	  commuters	  should	  try	  to	  use	  the	  London	  Underground	  when	  possible	  because	  it	  had	  been	  less	  disrupted	  by	  air	  raids.6	  One	  can	  practically	  sense	  the	  confusion	  and	  disorder	  in	  Waterloo	  Station	  that	  day.	  Cramped,	  filled	  with	  stinking,	  stale	  air	  and	  noisy,	  Ms.	  Cockett	  and	  her	  fellow	  Londoners	  missed	  the	  more	  normal	  train	  travels	  of	  prewar	  days	  as	  they	  pushed	  and	  sweated	  their	  ways	  through	  rush	  hour	  crowds	  trying	  to	  get	  home	  to	  friends	  and	  family.	  	  
	   This	  strange,	  often	  random-­‐feeling	  train	  crowding	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  main	  irritants	  during	  the	  Blitz,	  an	  irritant	  actually	  amplified	  by	  one’s	  experience	  on	  empty	  trains.	  As	  Ms.	  Cockett’s	  example	  shows,	  many	  trains	  were	  packed	  to	  the	  gills,	  creating	  a	  claustrophobic	  environment.	  But	  this	  was	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  A	  train	  could	  be	  packed	  today	  only	  to	  be	  nearly	  empty	  tomorrow.	  One	  day,	  Ms.	  O.	  E.	  Cockett	  went	  into	  London	  on	  a	  crowded	  train,	  yet	  the	  following	  day,	  that	  same	  train	  had	  barely	  a	  third	  of	  the	  previous	  day’s	  passengers.7	  The	  gross	  variation	  along	  the	  same	  train	  line	  from	  one	  day	  to	  the	  next	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  Cockett	  or	  the	  other	  passengers.	  The	  variance	  reminded	  individuals	  that	  one	  simply	  had	  no	  way	  of	  knowing	  if	  a	  train	  would	  be	  full	  or	  empty	  until	  actually	  heading	  to	  the	  train	  station	  to	  find	  out.	  In	  a	  city	  that	  prided	  itself	  on	  predictable	  and	  reliable	  transportation	  networks,	  the	  absence	  of	  order	  was	  resented	  indeed.	  Not	  only	  did	  Londoners	  not	  know	  if	  the	  train	  would	  be	  running	  on	  time	  (or	  running	  at	  all),	  but	  they	  also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Diary	  5278,	  August	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  7	  Diary	  5278,	  August	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  didn’t	  know	  how	  comfortable	  the	  trip	  might	  be.	  Would	  the	  train	  be	  smashed	  full?	  Or	  would	  it	  be	  completely	  empty?	  The	  answer	  was	  anyone’s	  guess.	  While	  it	  seems	  like	  Londoners	  would	  have	  appreciated	  the	  variation	  since	  it	  sometimes	  produced	  empty	  trains,	  the	  shifting	  nature	  of	  train	  loads—even	  when	  it	  did	  produce	  empty	  trains—caused	  more	  angst	  than	  it	  did	  pleasure	  because	  of	  what	  it	  represented.	  
	   In	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  the	  strategic	  bombing	  narratives	  normally	  told	  of	  all	  Londoners	  “pitching	  in”	  for	  the	  good	  of	  all,	  train	  and	  tram	  conductors	  often	  made	  themselves	  part	  of	  these	  problems	  when	  trouble	  arose	  instead	  of	  the	  solution,	  particularly	  towards	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Blitz.	  Often	  unaware	  of	  what	  to	  do	  during	  a	  raid,	  it	  was	  not	  uncommon	  for	  a	  conductor	  to	  suddenly	  end	  a	  journey	  because	  of	  a	  raid,	  a	  problem	  amplified	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  credible	  training.	  One	  tram	  conductor	  described	  the	  issue	  nicely	  to	  a	  South	  London	  Press	  reporter.	  He	  stated	  that	  “[conductors]	  have	  been	  given	  no	  definite	  instructions	  what	  to	  do	  in	  a	  raid.	  It	  is	  up	  to	  us	  to	  decide	  whether	  we	  continue	  the	  journey	  or	  take	  shelter.”8	  This	  meant	  that	  passengers	  at	  stops	  farther	  along	  the	  line	  were	  stuck	  waiting	  either	  for	  the	  next	  one	  or	  forced	  to	  take	  a	  bus	  or	  walk.	  	  
	   And	  of	  course,	  the	  frequent	  danger	  of	  train	  travel	  during	  the	  Blitz	  cannot	  be	  neglected,	  a	  danger	  that	  underscored	  the	  limits	  of	  what	  Londoners	  would	  do	  to	  keep	  life	  running	  as	  it	  had	  before.	  Once	  trains	  left	  their	  stations	  and	  began	  their	  routes	  to	  the	  next	  station,	  they	  were	  particularly	  vulnerable.	  They	  often	  could	  not	  simply	  stop	  and	  allow	  their	  passengers	  to	  get	  off	  in	  the	  event	  that	  an	  air	  raid	  came	  overhead.	  Though	  most	  train	  stations	  ostensibly	  had	  a	  bomb	  shelter	  nearby	  and	  an	  evacuation	  plan	  in	  place	  in	  the	  event	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  “Tram	  Driver’	  Refusal,”	  South	  London	  Press,	  August	  30,	  1940,	  Southwark	  Archives.	  
Baker	  	  	   52	  of	  a	  raid,	  such	  plans	  usually	  fell	  to	  the	  wayside	  in	  practice.	  As	  experienced	  at	  Cartley’s	  train	  station,	  the	  most	  common	  reaction	  to	  an	  approaching	  raid	  was	  not	  mass	  participation	  but	  rather	  inactivity!	  More	  often	  than	  not,	  no	  one	  or	  just	  a	  couple	  of	  individuals	  would	  step	  forward	  to	  open	  a	  shelter	  or	  give	  directions	  to	  passengers.	  Ms.	  O.	  E.	  Cockett,	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  vulnerability	  that	  railroad	  travel	  faced	  from	  bombing	  raids,	  refused	  to	  take	  the	  train	  over	  long	  distances	  alone	  during	  the	  Blitz,	  fearful	  of	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  a	  raid	  came	  overhead	  while	  she	  was	  in	  transit.	  While	  Cockett	  liked	  to	  head	  up	  to	  Essex	  to	  visit	  friends	  and	  catch	  some	  fresh	  air,	  her	  anxieties	  about	  traveling	  there	  alone	  in	  a	  railroad	  situation	  whose	  service	  and	  safety	  could	  be	  severely	  compromised	  kept	  her	  from	  doing	  so.	  Protecting	  herself	  was	  worth	  the	  sacrificed	  time	  with	  friends	  and	  family—for	  her,	  not	  even	  her	  own	  social	  networks	  were	  strong	  enough	  to	  make	  her	  get	  on	  a	  longer	  train	  ride.9	  
	   Ms.	  Cockett’s	  anxieties	  were	  not	  without	  basis	  either.	  Destruction	  of	  transportation	  networks	  wasn’t	  just	  a	  myth—it	  was	  a	  reality	  reinforced	  by	  the	  experiences	  of	  everyday	  individuals.	  On	  September	  17,	  an	  incendiary	  bomb	  fell	  on	  the	  Heme	  Hill	  Railroad	  Station	  in	  the	  London	  Borough	  of	  Lambeth.	  An	  unfortunate	  tram	  waiting	  in	  the	  station	  caught	  fire.	  Miraculously,	  all	  the	  passengers	  on	  the	  tram	  were	  able	  to	  evacuate	  to	  safety	  before	  it	  went	  alight,	  but	  for	  many,	  it	  was	  a	  particularly	  close	  call.	  The	  experience	  was	  an	  apt	  reminder	  that	  one	  could	  never	  totally	  know	  when	  bombs	  might	  fall	  or	  when	  one	  might	  be	  the	  victim	  of	  a	  falling	  bomb.10	  
	   We	  have	  seen	  unpredictability	  used	  multiple	  times	  as	  a	  catchword	  for	  disruption,	  and	  Londoners	  living	  through	  the	  Blitz	  hated	  this	  element	  of	  life	  most	  of	  all.	  After	  the	  week	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Diary	  5278,	  August	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  10	  Lambeth	  Civil	  Defense	  File	  386,	  September	  17,	  1940,	  Lambeth	  Archives.	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  of	  service	  disruptions	  described	  above,	  Nichols	  explained	  how	  one	  could	  not	  know	  what	  the	  train	  service	  status	  might	  be	  until	  one	  actually	  set	  off	  from	  home	  to	  find	  out.	  If	  Nichols	  got	  lucky,	  trains	  would	  be	  running	  on	  time.	  If	  unlucky,	  they	  wouldn’t	  be	  running	  to	  his	  station	  at	  all,	  a	  frustrating	  experience	  for	  someone	  trying	  to	  get	  to	  work	  on	  time	  every	  day.11	  To	  compensate,	  one	  had	  to	  leave	  home	  with	  enough	  time	  to	  get	  to	  one’s	  destination	  (typically	  work)	  by	  some	  other	  means	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  normal	  transit	  services	  were	  not	  running	  properly.	  Given	  how	  many	  south	  Londoners	  liked	  to	  go	  back	  to	  bed	  after	  a	  night	  of	  sleeping	  in	  the	  shelters	  (explained	  in	  chapter	  one),	  leaving	  home	  earlier	  to	  get	  to	  work	  meant	  more	  than	  just	  a	  frustrating	  commute:	  it	  meant	  a	  loss	  of	  precious	  hours	  of	  uninterrupted	  sleep.	  And	  above	  that,	  one	  never	  knew	  if	  the	  train	  would	  be	  crowded	  or	  relatively	  open—a	  factor	  which	  controlled	  the	  level	  of	  comfort	  with	  which	  an	  individual	  traveled.	  Full	  trains	  could	  be	  claustrophobic	  and	  uncomfortable;	  empty	  trains	  far	  more	  peaceful	  and	  relaxing.	  And	  the	  arrival	  of	  an	  air	  raid	  overhead	  could	  put	  safety	  in	  jeopardy	  and	  create	  an	  anxious	  citizenry,	  further	  complicating	  an	  already	  difficult	  situation.	  Only	  later	  in	  the	  Blitz	  did	  train	  staff	  learn	  how	  to	  properly	  handle	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  set	  of	  challenges	  posed	  by	  the	  assault,	  meaning	  that	  frustration	  truly	  did	  reign.	  These	  frustrations	  were	  made	  all	  the	  more	  intense	  by	  the	  feeling	  of	  “alone-­‐ness”	  so	  commonly	  felt	  on	  trains.	  Physically	  separated	  from	  loved	  ones,	  Londoners	  too	  often	  had	  to	  sit	  in	  silence,	  busied	  only	  by	  the	  (generally	  anxious)	  thoughts	  of	  their	  minds.	  
	   South	  London	  was	  clearly	  an	  area	  of	  substantial	  disruption	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  What	  factors	  made	  disruption	  better,	  and	  what	  factors	  made	  it	  worse?	  How	  could	  improvements	  be	  made?	  	  Not	  surprisingly,	  geography	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  indicators	  of	  disruption.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Diary	  5163,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  gross	  overcrowding	  of	  Cockett’s	  particular	  train	  at	  Waterloo	  indicated	  how	  service	  disruptions	  across	  southern	  London	  were	  based	  largely	  on	  where	  exactly	  the	  train	  was	  within	  the	  city.	  Because	  large	  train	  stations	  such	  as	  Waterloo	  Station	  were	  normally	  located	  in	  the	  more	  heavily	  bombed	  areas	  near	  the	  river,	  train	  delays	  at	  Waterloo	  and	  stations	  like	  it	  tended	  to	  be	  worse	  than	  those	  farther	  south,	  away	  from	  the	  targeted	  river.	  The	  closeness	  of	  railroad	  tracks	  to	  one	  another	  as	  they	  approached	  the	  major	  junctures	  near	  the	  river	  intensified	  the	  effect.	  One	  bomb	  near	  the	  river—where	  tracks	  were	  closer	  together—had	  a	  higher	  chance	  of	  causing	  disruption	  than	  if	  it	  fell	  further	  to	  the	  south,	  away	  from	  the	  tight	  crowding	  of	  tracks.	  And	  because	  so	  many	  Londoners	  passed	  through	  the	  major	  stations	  near	  the	  river,	  the	  physical	  arrangement	  of	  railroads	  combined	  with	  the	  river-­‐targeted	  German	  bombing	  campaign	  made	  for	  even	  more	  disruption.	  The	  general	  picture	  that	  emerges,	  thus	  is	  that	  those	  farther	  away	  from	  the	  River	  faced	  fewer	  disruptions.	  Though	  bomb	  aiming	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  was	  inaccurate,	  the	  German	  emphasis	  on	  the	  Thames	  meant	  that	  more	  bombs	  fell	  near	  it	  than	  farther	  away	  from	  it,	  and	  the	  greater	  spacing	  of	  tracks	  and	  less	  crowding	  farther	  south	  reduced	  the	  damage	  done	  when	  a	  bomb	  did	  land	  in	  these	  areas.	  
Proper	  planning,	  which	  was	  almost	  always	  done	  on	  a	  small,	  local	  scale,	  also	  helped	  keep	  the	  system	  running.	  Platform	  staff,	  many	  acting	  on	  their	  own	  volition	  and	  without	  instructions	  from	  superiors,	  opened	  shelters	  to	  passengers.	  Some	  trains	  were	  able	  to	  depart	  or	  leave	  a	  bit	  earlier	  to	  avoid	  bombing	  raids.	  Train	  stations	  without	  shelters	  equipped	  themselves	  with	  them—or	  found	  a	  suitable	  shelter	  nearby	  and	  arranged	  for	  it	  to	  absorb	  stranded	  passengers	  should	  danger	  approach.	  Conductors	  operating	  a	  train	  during	  a	  raid	  could	  stop	  near	  a	  large	  shelter	  and	  allow	  their	  passengers	  to	  disembark	  and	  seek	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  protection	  there	  or	  continue	  on	  to	  the	  next	  station,	  where	  protection	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  available.	  These	  initiatives	  were	  all	  about	  local	  individuals	  in	  small-­‐scale	  circumstances	  making	  decisions	  largely	  disconnected	  from	  the	  national	  picture.	  And	  as	  the	  various	  individuals	  keeping	  the	  train	  system	  operating	  understood	  the	  nature	  and	  impact	  of	  raids	  better	  and	  better,	  the	  process	  worked	  ever	  more	  effectively.	  
	   Perhaps	  the	  best	  relief	  from	  the	  stresses	  of	  transportation	  was	  finding	  a	  spontaneous	  “community”	  on	  the	  trains	  to	  offset	  feelings	  of	  loneliness.	  On	  September	  18,	  Mr.	  Cartley	  found	  himself	  on	  a	  particularly	  full	  train	  on	  his	  way	  into	  the	  city.	  But	  instead	  of	  sitting	  quietly,	  Cartley	  made	  small	  talk	  with	  those	  around	  him,	  later	  remarking	  that	  people	  seemed	  to	  be	  in	  good	  spirits	  thanks	  to	  the	  conversation.	  It	  helped	  pass	  the	  time	  and	  kept	  everyone’s	  minds	  off	  the	  crowding,	  delays,	  and	  safety	  issues.12	  Even	  when	  conversation	  was	  of	  a	  sadder	  nature,	  it	  still	  helped	  Londoners	  with	  their	  own	  anxieties.	  While	  on	  a	  train	  himself	  one	  September	  day,	  R.	  J.	  Nichols	  came	  across	  a	  family	  whose	  home	  had	  been	  destroyed.	  The	  family	  was	  in	  transit	  to	  a	  relative’s	  house	  where	  they	  intended	  to	  stay.	  While	  such	  stories	  normally	  reminded	  Londoners	  of	  how	  badly	  their	  co-­‐locals’	  lives	  had	  been	  impacted	  by	  the	  war,	  it	  seems	  to	  have	  had	  the	  opposite	  effect	  on	  Nichols.	  He	  found	  the	  conversation	  nice.	  It	  was	  admittedly	  sad,	  yes,	  but	  it	  gave	  him	  someone	  to	  talk	  about	  and	  added	  a	  much-­‐needed	  personal	  aspect	  to	  transportation	  networks	  so	  often	  lacking	  any	  sense	  of	  humanity.13	  	  
	   The	  other	  primary	  form	  of	  public	  transportation	  used	  by	  Londoners	  again	  demonstrated	  the	  same	  mix	  of	  anxieties	  and	  local	  solutions:	  buses.	  Used	  by	  countless	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Diary	  5039.3,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  13	  Diary	  5163,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  Londoners	  on	  a	  daily	  basis,	  the	  bus	  system	  complimented	  the	  existing	  train	  systems,	  particularly	  over	  shorter	  distances.	  But	  when	  the	  Blitz	  came,	  bus	  systems	  changed	  dramatically.	  Because	  they	  had	  to	  pick	  up	  excess	  passengers	  neglected	  by	  train	  services,	  they	  became	  much	  more	  crowded	  than	  most	  Londoners	  were	  used	  to.	  Since	  much	  of	  south	  London’s	  working	  population	  had	  to	  commute	  into	  the	  city	  center	  to	  work,	  it	  was	  essential	  to	  keep	  at	  least	  some	  form	  of	  public	  transportation	  running,	  and	  the	  relative	  flexibility	  of	  buses	  made	  them	  ideal	  for	  the	  role.	  And	  like	  with	  trains,	  their	  routes	  changed	  with	  alarming	  frequency	  in	  response	  to	  bomb	  damage	  and	  road	  closures.	  Given	  the	  initial	  slowness	  to	  find	  solutions	  to	  train	  delays,	  figuring	  out	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  disruptions	  to	  bus	  service—trains’	  main	  replacements—became	  key.14	  
	  	   Largely	  owing	  to	  their	  role	  as	  train	  replacements,	  buses	  saw	  their	  importance	  in	  south	  London’s	  transportation	  structures	  greatly	  increase	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  This	  meant	  that	  their	  scheduling	  became	  haphazard.	  Because	  buses	  were	  recruited	  into	  service	  on	  an	  as-­‐needed	  basis,	  things	  taken	  for	  granted	  in	  peacetime	  could	  become	  major	  issues	  during	  wartime.	  Pressed	  into	  service	  so	  hastily,	  buses	  often	  did	  not	  even	  have	  their	  destinations	  written	  on	  them,	  a	  problem	  which	  Mr.	  Harpur	  experienced	  on	  November	  15.	  Harpur	  intended	  to	  go	  to	  Croydon	  and	  lined	  up	  in	  the	  correct	  spot	  to	  catch	  the	  bus	  going	  there,	  but	  to	  his	  surprise,	  the	  bus	  that	  pulled	  up	  did	  not	  indicate	  its	  destination!	  Unable	  to	  tell	  where	  the	  bus	  was	  actually	  headed,	  everyone	  else	  lined	  up	  began	  asking	  the	  bus	  driver	  where	  he	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Most	  of	  the	  roads	  used	  by	  buses	  in	  south	  London	  during	  the	  Blitz	  came	  from	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  transformations	  of	  the	  city’s	  urban	  landscape.	  In	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  her	  book	  Nights	  Out:	  Life	  in	  Cosmopolitan	  London	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  Judith	  Walkowitz	  discusses	  the	  changing	  layout	  of	  Soho,	  an	  area	  of	  London’s	  West	  End,	  during	  the	  late	  19th	  century.	  Jerry	  White	  also	  extensively	  tackles	  the	  issue	  of	  late	  Victorian	  London	  road	  restructuring	  across	  the	  entire	  city	  in	  his	  book	  London	  in	  the	  19th	  Century:	  A	  Human	  Awful	  Wonder	  of	  God	  (London:	  Random	  House,	  2007).	  While	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  discuss	  either	  topic	  in	  great	  detail,	  both	  Walkowitz	  and	  White	  have	  contributed	  much-­‐needed	  research	  to	  the	  study	  of	  London	  history.	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  was	  heading.	  Both	  a	  waste	  of	  time	  an	  inconvenience,	  even	  small	  disruptions	  like	  this	  could	  take	  their	  toll	  on	  the	  transportation	  networks.15	  	  And	  with	  buses	  changing	  their	  “routes”	  so	  frequently,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  why	  even	  just	  keeping	  the	  signage	  on	  the	  vehicle	  straight,	  far	  less	  anything	  else,	  became	  a	  challenge.	  	  
Busing	  faced	  many	  of	  the	  same	  problems	  encountered	  by	  trains.	  Most	  buses	  operated	  along	  major	  roadways;	  unfortunately,	  these	  also	  tended	  to	  be	  the	  roads	  that	  suffered	  the	  worst	  damage	  due	  to	  bombing—again	  a	  reflection	  of	  geography.	  To	  make	  buses	  faster,	  routes	  operated	  on	  major	  thoroughfares.	  During	  the	  Blitz,	  this	  became	  a	  liability.	  Major	  roads	  generally	  had	  fewer	  buildings	  nearby	  to	  contain	  the	  power	  of	  an	  explosive,	  so	  bombs	  hitting	  on	  major	  roadways	  caused	  greater	  damage—and	  greater	  disruption—than	  if	  they	  fell	  on	  a	  smaller	  side	  street,	  endangering	  the	  lives	  of	  bus	  passengers	  in	  the	  process.16.	  	  When	  buses	  came	  upon	  damaged	  or	  destroyed	  roadways,	  they	  had	  to	  navigate	  around,	  delaying	  the	  trip.	  Since	  road	  closures	  diverted	  more	  than	  just	  buses,	  traffic	  jams	  ensued.	  This	  problem	  was	  exacerbated	  if	  debris	  happened	  to	  fall	  in	  the	  roadway	  (very	  common)	  or	  if	  emergency	  vehicles,	  which	  typically	  used	  main	  thoroughfares	  to	  make	  their	  way	  through	  the	  city,	  came	  through	  and	  delayed	  traffic.	  And	  buses	  themselves	  could	  be	  hit	  by	  bombs,	  usually	  killing	  all	  on	  board.	  For	  fear	  of	  causing	  a	  panic,	  newspapers	  seldom	  reported	  on	  bus	  bombing	  incidents	  that	  caused	  death,	  but	  civil	  defense	  files	  make	  clear	  that	  when	  confronted	  with	  bombing,	  south	  London’s	  overloaded	  buses	  usually	  saw	  at	  least	  one	  death.	  Just	  like	  how	  trains	  and	  trams	  engendered	  negativity,	  buses	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Diary	  5098,	  November	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  16	  The	  London	  County	  Council:	  Bomb	  Damage	  Maps,	  1939-­‐1945,	  London	  Metropolitan	  Archives.	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  had	  a	  similar	  effect	  due	  to	  a	  similar	  combination	  of	  factors,	  delays,	  crowding,	  and	  safety	  chief	  among	  them.	  
The	  only	  way	  to	  offset	  the	  combined	  issues	  of	  rail	  and	  road	  was	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  use	  both	  systems	  fluidly,	  substituting	  one	  for	  another	  on	  an	  individual	  basis.	  On	  September	  18,	  Mr.	  R.	  J.	  Nichols	  found	  that	  the	  trains	  from	  his	  home	  were	  not	  running;	  typically	  when	  this	  occurred,	  he	  would	  walk	  to	  work	  instead.	  But	  on	  this	  day,	  Nichols	  got	  particularly	  lucky—the	  bus	  services	  still	  operated.	  This	  enabled	  him	  to	  substitute	  one	  form	  of	  transportation	  for	  another,	  not	  requiring	  a	  substantial	  expenditure	  of	  energy	  on	  his	  part	  either.	  Nichols	  remarked	  how	  happy	  he	  was	  to	  have	  some	  form	  of	  actual	  transport	  instead	  of	  trekking	  off	  on	  foot,	  a	  sentiment	  shared	  by	  many	  other	  Londoners	  happy	  to	  finally	  be	  provided	  with	  alternative	  transportation.	  It	  was	  often	  individuals	  just	  making	  their	  way	  about	  the	  city	  who	  figured	  out	  how	  to	  best	  get	  to	  their	  respective	  destinations,	  a	  process	  done	  without	  advice	  from	  officials	  from	  government	  or	  transportation	  authorities.17	  
	   In	  spite	  of	  the	  danger	  and	  reminders	  of	  randomness,	  south	  London’s	  population	  appreciated	  the	  bus	  replacement	  schemes.	  This	  suggests	  that	  Londoners	  understood	  both	  the	  importance	  and	  impact	  of	  local	  efforts	  to	  organize	  transportation.	  On	  September	  9,	  S.	  J.	  Cartley	  had	  to	  take	  a	  combination	  of	  trains	  and	  buses	  to	  get	  home	  from	  work.	  He	  remarked	  that	  the	  transit	  system	  was	  running	  so	  late	  that	  “it	  was	  getting	  dark	  [by	  the	  time	  the	  bus	  got	  to	  the	  next	  train	  station],”	  from	  which	  he	  had	  to	  then	  re-­‐board	  a	  train	  to	  complete	  his	  trek	  home.18	  He	  was	  not	  happy	  about	  the	  constantly	  changing	  nature	  of	  transportation	  systems,	  but	  at	  least	  public	  transit	  was	  operating	  all	  the	  way	  to	  his	  destination.	  Because	  he	  did	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Diary	  5163,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  18	  Diary	  5039.3,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  have	  to	  spend	  time	  walking	  home,	  Cartley	  arrived	  sooner	  and	  was	  able	  to	  spend	  more	  time	  “resting”	  (owing	  to	  shelter	  challenges,	  how	  much	  sleep	  he	  got	  could	  was	  anyone’s	  guess)	  than	  figuring	  a	  way	  home.	  Official	  records	  indicate	  that	  local	  authorities	  did	  indeed	  implement	  extensive	  bus	  substitutions	  throughout	  the	  Blitz;	  these	  worked	  remarkably	  well	  as	  a	  compliment	  to	  trains,	  and	  they	  were	  popular	  with	  the	  citizens	  for	  their	  simplicity	  and	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  official	  attempts	  to	  keep	  life	  orderly.	  	  
	   But	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  it	  was	  again	  local	  tendencies	  rather	  than	  centralized	  planning	  that	  kept	  the	  bus	  system	  running.	  On	  the	  November	  day	  that	  Mr.	  Harpur’s	  bus	  failed	  to	  indicate	  its	  destination,	  prompting	  a	  wave	  of	  inquiries	  directed	  at	  the	  driver,	  Londoners	  showed	  odd—and	  often	  overlooked—creativity.	  To	  make	  clear	  where	  the	  bus	  was	  going,	  Harpur	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  bus’s	  dirt-­‐covered	  body	  to	  scrawl	  the	  destination	  on	  what	  he,	  probably	  in	  an	  understatement,	  described	  as	  a	  “dusty	  window.”19	  What	  motivated	  him	  was	  a	  local	  sensibility	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  help	  those	  in	  his	  social	  circle.	  Others	  in	  the	  immediate	  area—on	  the	  bus	  and	  at	  the	  bus	  stations—benefitted	  because	  a	  stranger	  wrote	  the	  route	  number	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  bus.	  Taking	  small	  steps	  to	  make	  life	  easier	  for	  oneself	  and	  those	  in	  one’s	  immediate	  vicinity	  was	  much	  less	  about	  providing	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  nation	  or	  turning	  small	  actions	  into	  nationalistic	  symbolism	  than	  it	  was	  simply	  taking	  care	  of	  those	  sharing	  a	  transport	  space.	  In	  these	  efforts,	  bus	  drivers	  gradually	  started	  to	  pitch	  in,	  too.	  Because	  so	  many	  roadways	  were	  put	  out	  of	  commission	  temporarily	  when	  bombing	  raids	  came	  in,	  drivers	  used	  their	  knowledge	  of	  the	  local	  area	  to	  redirect	  their	  buses	  around	  bomb	  incidents.	  Though	  it	  cost	  the	  passengers	  precious	  time	  and	  forced	  them	  to	  stay	  on	  overcrowded	  buses	  even	  longer,	  it	  nonetheless	  contributed	  to	  keeping	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Diary	  5098,	  November	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  system	  running	  as	  efficiently	  as	  it	  did.	  The	  drivers	  shared	  similar	  ideologies:	  they	  felt	  that	  at	  least	  part	  of	  their	  job	  was	  to	  help	  the	  local	  population	  get	  around,	  a	  sentiment	  firmly	  affixed	  in	  a	  desire	  to	  help	  those	  in	  their	  geographic	  area,	  both	  friend	  and	  stranger.	  
	   As	  with	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  Blitz,	  however,	  the	  experiences	  of	  some	  lie	  far	  outside	  the	  norms.	  There	  were	  a	  few	  individuals,	  most	  among	  young	  adults	  seeing	  the	  war	  as	  an	  exciting	  break	  from	  the	  monotony	  of	  everyday	  life,	  even	  managed	  to	  enjoy	  parts	  of	  their	  travel	  disruptions.	  In	  1989,	  fifty	  years	  after	  the	  start	  of	  the	  war,	  Britain	  went	  into	  a	  year	  of	  re-­‐living	  and	  sharing	  the	  experiences	  of	  it.	  When	  looking	  back	  on	  his	  experiences	  as	  a	  young	  man	  in	  south	  London,	  Donald	  Beale	  remembered	  that	  on	  one	  day,	  he	  had	  seen	  the	  East	  End	  docklands	  burning	  while	  on	  a	  train	  ride	  home	  through	  Southwark.	  Beale	  remembered	  the	  experience	  as	  “awesome”—as	  a	  “memory	  that	  will	  remain	  with	  me	  to	  the	  end	  of	  my	  days.”20	  In	  his	  young	  years,	  Beale	  felt	  that	  there	  was	  something	  exotic	  and	  thrilling	  amidst	  the	  terror	  of	  the	  war.	  It	  was	  a	  time	  which	  he	  saw	  as	  the	  making	  of	  history,	  and	  he	  was	  intrigued	  to	  live	  it,	  a	  sentiment	  reflected	  in	  his	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “awesome”	  to	  mean	  “awe	  inspiring.”	  Of	  all	  the	  memories	  that	  Beale	  could	  have	  chosen	  to	  recall	  fifty	  years	  later,	  he	  felt	  it	  necessary	  to	  point	  out	  just	  how	  “awesome”	  he	  thought	  the	  fires	  were—a	  stunning	  reflection	  of	  one	  man’s	  introspective	  experience	  aboard	  a	  south	  London	  train	  one	  day,	  watching	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  the	  fascinating	  yet	  terrifying	  destruction	  of	  a	  city.	  
	   The	  evidence	  from	  south	  London’s	  public	  transport	  systems	  points	  towards	  a	  few	  different	  conclusions,	  often	  running	  against	  one	  another.	  Most	  notably,	  transportation	  disruptions	  impacting	  train	  schedules	  aggravated	  and	  irritated	  south	  London’s	  population	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  “War	  Work	  Starts	  in	  Earnest,”	  South	  London	  Press,	  September	  5,	  1989,	  Lambeth	  Archives	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  largely	  because	  the	  train	  system	  had	  become	  so	  vitally	  important	  to	  keeping	  the	  region	  moving.	  Losing	  it	  meant	  the	  loss	  of	  ability	  to	  travel	  throughout	  the	  city	  rapidly	  and	  affordably.	  In	  spite	  of	  upset,	  however,	  Londoners	  proved	  fairly	  willing	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  changes,	  if	  for	  no	  other	  reason	  than	  they	  had	  no	  choice.	  While	  Londoners	  did	  often	  pitch	  in	  to	  help	  keep	  the	  operation	  running	  as	  smoothly	  as	  possible,	  it	  was	  done	  out	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  “south	  London-­‐ness”—of	  a	  feeling	  of	  connection	  to	  those	  sharing	  the	  transportation	  system.	  The	  connections	  between	  and	  among	  individuals	  in	  the	  same	  geographic	  area	  were	  primarily	  responsible	  for	  the	  corrective	  action	  taken	  by	  citizens.	  As	  with	  shelter,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  senses	  of	  nation	  did	  not	  exist	  at	  all	  but	  rather	  to	  argue	  that	  they	  were	  not	  always	  the	  most	  salient	  features	  of	  south	  London’s	  experience	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  
	   In	  spite	  of	  local	  actions	  to	  combat	  the	  challenges	  of	  trains,	  trams,	  and	  buses	  during	  the	  Blitz,	  transportation	  remained	  the	  lowest	  point	  of	  life	  for	  many	  south	  Londoners.	  Why?	  Because	  it	  was	  a	  place	  largely	  devoid	  of	  community.	  Though	  Cartley	  was	  able	  to	  make	  basic	  conversation	  on	  his	  travel,	  most	  were	  not.	  Sitting	  in	  fearful	  silence	  on	  a	  bus	  or	  train,	  away	  from	  friends	  and	  family,	  meant	  internalizing	  one’s	  own	  stresses	  and	  anxieties.	  There	  was	  no	  one	  to	  talk	  to;	  no	  one	  to	  distract	  one’s	  mind;	  no	  one	  with	  whom	  to	  feel	  connected.	  Local	  efforts	  to	  keep	  public	  transportation	  running	  safely	  and	  efficiently	  no	  doubt	  helped	  lessen	  tensions,	  but	  they	  were	  not	  able	  to	  erase	  them.	  For	  many,	  the	  commute	  was	  the	  worst	  part	  of	  the	  day	  and	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  destructive	  potential	  of	  modern	  war.	  
***	  
	   But	  what	  happened	  when	  the	  trains,	  buses,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  public	  transportation	  could	  not	  run	  or	  did	  not	  run	  efficiently	  enough	  to	  make	  them	  worth	  the	  while?	  Or	  how	  did	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  one	  get	  around	  on	  short	  distance	  treks,	  journeys	  where	  public	  transit	  made	  little	  sense?	  In	  both	  cases,	  walking	  or	  biking	  answered	  the	  question.	  Before	  the	  war,	  walking	  had	  established	  itself	  as	  the	  easiest	  and	  fastest	  way	  to	  traverse	  short	  distances.	  The	  advent	  of	  bombing	  and	  the	  train,	  tram,	  and	  bus	  disruptions	  that	  accompanied	  it	  only	  increased	  the	  importance	  of	  non-­‐mechanized	  transportation.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  thus,	  explores	  this	  non-­‐mechanized	  mode	  of	  transportation	  both	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  mechanized	  transportation	  but	  also	  as	  a	  form	  of	  mobility	  that	  could	  stand	  on	  its	  own.	  Walking	  and	  biking	  contain	  many	  of	  the	  same	  contradictions	  and	  challenges	  faced	  by	  public	  transportation,	  namely	  the	  balance	  between	  necessity	  and	  danger.	  But	  it	  also	  offers	  a	  unique	  insight	  because	  it	  was	  perhaps	  the	  only	  means	  of	  transportation	  by	  which	  south	  London’s	  population	  could	  feel	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership	  and	  agency—a	  sense	  of	  control	  which,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  was	  hotly	  debated	  among	  Londoners.	  
The	  process	  of	  walking	  in	  a	  city	  under	  attack	  carried	  with	  it	  a	  host	  of	  different	  problems.	  Most	  notably,	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  air	  raids	  meant	  that	  one	  could	  easily	  be	  forced	  into	  any	  nearby	  shelter	  when	  bombers	  suddenly	  came	  overhead.	  One	  day	  while	  out	  walking,	  R.	  J.	  Nichols	  happened	  upon	  two	  bombing	  raids.	  With	  the	  arrival	  of	  planes	  overhead,	  Nichols	  both	  times	  made	  his	  way	  into	  public	  shelters	  to	  avoid	  bombings.	  Inside,	  he	  “had	  to	  stand	  as	  beds	  were	  lying	  around	  with	  women	  and	  children	  on	  them.”	  Nichols	  had	  fallen	  on	  bad	  luck	  to	  be	  twice	  interrupted	  on	  his	  trip,	  and	  the	  air	  raids	  caused	  him	  to	  be	  delayed,	  holed	  up	  in	  a	  cramped,	  dirty	  public	  shelter	  with	  young	  children	  and	  their	  caretakers.	  Inside	  these	  cramped	  quarters	  came	  the	  same	  anxieties	  and	  fears	  of	  shelters:	  fears	  about	  the	  safety	  of	  oneself	  and	  one’s	  family;	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  life	  during	  war;	  and	  the	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  of	  destruction.	  When	  caught	  in	  a	  raid,	  walking	  served	  not	  only	  as	  a	  physical	  sign	  of	  danger	  but	  also	  as	  a	  time	  of	  fear	  and	  angst	  as	  well.21	  
Once	  inside	  a	  shelter,	  one	  could	  have	  no	  way	  of	  knowing	  how	  long	  the	  raid	  would	  last,	  transforming	  the	  ordinarily	  fast	  act	  of	  walking	  into	  a	  very	  slow	  way	  around.	  	  Though	  more	  common	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  September,	  the	  frequency	  of	  major	  daylight	  raids	  dwindled	  rapidly	  as	  the	  Blitz	  wore	  on.	  This	  meant	  that	  as	  September	  gave	  to	  October	  and	  into	  November,	  getting	  caught	  in	  a	  shelter	  while	  traveling	  occurred	  more	  often	  in	  the	  evenings	  and	  at	  night	  than	  it	  did	  during	  the	  day.	  It	  was	  not	  uncommon,	  therefore,	  for	  an	  individual	  forced	  into	  a	  shelter	  to	  have	  to	  stay	  there	  for	  many	  hours	  or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  major	  attacks,	  the	  whole	  night.	  As	  was	  demonstrated	  in	  chapter	  one,	  spending	  the	  night	  in	  a	  public	  shelter—with	  others	  away	  from	  their	  normal	  shelter	  due	  to	  transportation	  disruptions,	  it	  bears	  mentioning—was	  in	  no	  way	  an	  enjoyable	  experience.	  Because	  it	  meant	  that	  an	  individual	  was	  stuck	  away	  from	  home	  without	  friends	  or	  family,	  it	  was	  lonely.	  And	  in	  this	  loneliness	  came	  worries	  about	  loved	  ones—a	  return	  to	  south	  Londoners’	  desires	  to	  maintain	  the	  stability	  of	  their	  local	  connections.	  Ms.	  Corfe,	  who	  lived	  just	  five	  minutes	  from	  work	  and	  walked	  there	  every	  day	  as	  a	  result,	  echoed	  these	  concerns.	  Corfe	  worked	  a	  long	  job,	  meaning	  that	  she	  had	  to	  walk	  home	  at	  night.	  By	  8pm,	  when	  Corfe	  was	  able	  to	  leave	  work,	  German	  raids	  had	  generally	  started,	  and	  this	  meant	  that	  Ms.	  Corfe	  had	  to	  guess	  the	  right	  moment	  to	  leave	  work.	  Guess	  incorrectly,	  and	  she	  could	  find	  herself	  ushered	  into	  a	  shelter	  by	  a	  warden	  as	  bombs	  fell	  nearby—or	  worse.22	  Under	  such	  conditions,	  it	  is	  no	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  Diary	  5163,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  22	  Diary	  5285,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  that	  Corfe	  described	  her	  trips	  home	  in	  heavily	  euphemistic	  language	  as	  “a	  bit	  unnerving”.23	  	  
Given	  how	  many	  more	  people	  were	  walking	  during	  the	  Blitz,	  the	  time	  delays	  from	  raids	  steadily	  ate	  into	  rest	  time.	  R.	  J.	  Nichols	  made	  note	  of	  the	  marked	  increase	  in	  walking	  in	  his	  diary	  on	  September	  18.	  He	  noted	  that	  owing	  to	  transportation	  disruptions,	  most	  of	  the	  city	  had	  to	  simply	  fall	  back	  on	  its	  feet	  to	  get	  around,	  not	  a	  particularly	  comfortable	  arrangement.24	  Alluding	  to	  the	  sometimes	  considerable	  distances	  that	  Londoners	  had	  to	  walk,	  Nichols	  went	  on	  to	  say	  that	  while	  some	  simply	  get	  stuck	  waiting	  for	  delayed	  trains	  to	  arrive,	  “others	  have	  to	  walk	  to	  and	  from	  their	  work.”25	  Nichols’s	  diary	  entry	  mentions	  how	  tiring	  this	  could	  be;	  expecting	  long	  days	  of	  work	  already,	  many	  Londoners	  missed	  having	  their	  normal	  ways	  to	  get	  around	  intact	  because	  walking	  required	  both	  physical	  and	  mental	  exertion—physically	  to	  move	  one’s	  body	  over	  sometimes	  considerable	  distances	  and	  mentally	  as	  Londoners	  worried	  about	  impending	  bombing	  raids	  during	  their	  journeys.	  
Cycling	  faced	  many	  of	  the	  same	  problems	  as	  walking.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  usual	  complement	  of	  bombing	  raids	  and	  unenviable	  delays,	  biking	  faced	  additional	  problems	  from	  blocked	  roads	  and	  blackout	  conditions.	  Londoners	  cycling	  around	  the	  city	  had	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  road	  closures,	  many	  of	  which	  made	  passage	  by	  bicycle	  impossible.	  On	  September	  13,	  St.	  Thomas’s	  Hospital	  near	  the	  River	  Thames	  was	  bombed,	  knocking	  debris	  onto	  the	  street	  below.	  While	  such	  a	  road	  was	  likely	  passable	  by	  foot,	  riding	  a	  bike	  over	  broken	  glass	  and	  past	  extensive	  ruins	  became	  impossible.	  Londoners	  trying	  to	  bike	  across	  the	  river	  from	  Westminster	  had	  to	  walk	  their	  bikes	  over	  or	  around	  the	  damage	  in	  the	  roadway,	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Diary	  5285,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  24	  Diary	  5163,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  25	  Diary	  5163,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  inconvenience	  indeed.	  And	  when	  night	  fell,	  the	  blackout	  conditions	  made	  seeing	  the	  pavement	  near	  impossible,	  descending	  the	  city	  into	  an	  eerie	  darkness.26	  
	   In	  spite	  of	  the	  obvious	  danger,	  Londoners	  walked	  onwards.	  For	  most,	  this	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  necessity—someone	  had	  to	  go	  to	  work	  or	  go	  to	  the	  store,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  other	  way	  to	  get	  there.	  But	  sometimes,	  walking	  did	  not	  have	  any	  clear	  link	  to	  survival	  and	  instead	  became	  tied	  to	  local	  communities	  and	  shared	  socializing.	  On	  Christmas	  Day	  1940,	  much	  of	  south	  London	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  reduced	  bombing	  intensity	  to	  catch	  a	  casual	  stroll.	  While	  out	  walking	  that	  evening,	  Ms.	  Corfe	  reported	  that	  it	  was	  “very	  dark	  but	  not	  cold,	  and	  we	  kept	  meeting	  other	  gangs	  of	  people.”27	  Like	  Corfe,	  much	  of	  the	  city	  took	  the	  day	  as	  a	  time	  of	  relaxation,	  and	  in	  the	  strolls	  around	  south	  London	  that	  day,	  there	  were	  surely	  countless	  groups	  of	  passer-­‐bys	  exchanging	  hellos	  or	  running	  into	  acquaintances	  and	  sharing	  a	  brief	  conversation.	  These	  events	  made	  the	  danger	  worthwhile	  as	  they	  lessened	  the	  burden	  of	  life	  during	  wartime.	  
	   It	  is	  easy	  in	  hindsight	  to	  declare	  Christmas	  a	  safe	  day	  for	  a	  walk—there	  were	  few	  raids	  on	  Christmas	  Day	  1940,	  though	  this	  was	  obviously	  a	  fact	  which	  Londoners	  could	  not	  	  predict	  at	  the	  time.	  But	  what	  about	  other	  days?	  South	  London’s	  population,	  particularly	  the	  young,	  still	  took	  occasional	  walks	  around	  town	  just	  for	  pleasure.	  The	  willingness	  of	  some	  to	  do	  so	  suggests	  that	  the	  German	  aerial	  assault	  failed	  to	  terrify	  the	  city’s	  population	  as	  was	  intended	  and	  that	  for	  many,	  the	  social	  bonding	  of	  walking	  with	  a	  friend	  or	  family	  member	  outweighed	  the	  potential	  danger.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Lambeth	  Civil	  Defense	  File	  275,	  September	  13,	  1940,	  Lambeth	  Archives.	  27	  Diary	  5285,	  December	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  However,	  the	  response	  from	  those	  opposed	  to	  this	  unnecessary	  excess	  walking	  revealed	  the	  fracture	  lines	  within	  local	  communities	  even	  while	  the	  activity	  of	  casual	  walking	  was	  seen	  as	  reinforcing	  community	  to	  those	  participating.	  Particularly	  for	  the	  young,	  walking	  as	  a	  form	  of	  defiance	  granted	  a	  sense	  of	  agency	  and	  control	  which	  could	  be	  hard	  to	  come	  by	  in	  a	  city	  under	  attack.	  It	  created	  a	  time	  and	  place	  to	  meet	  and	  spend	  time	  with	  friends.	  And	  it	  allowed	  people	  out	  of	  the	  rigid	  confines	  of	  shelters	  or	  work,	  adding	  some	  variety	  to	  an	  otherwise	  regimented	  lifestyle.	  But	  when	  viewed	  by	  others,	  it	  was	  an	  act	  of	  suicidal	  stupidity.	  Ms.	  E.	  B.	  Cockett	  was	  in	  the	  latter	  category,	  claiming	  that	  it	  was	  not	  only	  senseless	  but	  actually	  selfish	  of	  people	  to	  go	  out	  for	  leisure	  in	  the	  evenings	  since	  doing	  so	  forced	  apprehension	  on	  family	  members	  awaiting	  the	  return	  of	  their	  loved	  ones.28	  This	  contrasted	  with	  the	  strong	  desire	  shown	  by	  young	  going	  out	  for	  walks	  as	  a	  way	  to	  catch	  up	  with	  their	  friends.	  It	  points	  to	  an	  underlying	  conflict	  between	  different	  members	  of	  like	  families	  and	  communities	  regarding	  the	  appropriate	  balance	  between	  accepting	  danger	  and	  embracing	  resistance.	  While	  some	  individuals	  saw	  walking	  as	  a	  legitimate	  social	  activity	  and	  as	  a	  way	  of	  maintaining	  dignity	  in	  a	  time	  when	  Londoners	  were	  packed	  into	  shelters,	  their	  relatives	  disagreed.	  	  The	  dichotomy	  demonstrates	  that	  even	  in	  small	  social	  groups	  composed	  of	  supposedly	  similar	  individuals,	  disagreements	  emerged	  over	  the	  correct	  way	  to	  run	  one’s	  life	  and	  the	  types	  of	  communities	  considered	  “appropriate”	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  war.	  
	   A	  discussion	  of	  transit	  during	  the	  Blitz	  can	  hardly	  be	  considered	  complete	  without	  examining	  this	  most	  fundamental	  form	  of	  mobility.	  Walking	  and	  cycling,	  important	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  millions	  of	  south	  Londoners	  before	  the	  war,	  remained	  equally	  important	  when	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Diary	  5277,	  August	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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  bombing	  raids	  commenced.	  Often	  used	  alone	  but	  also	  used	  in	  complement	  with	  (or	  to	  replace)	  public	  transportation,	  walking	  and	  biking	  gave	  the	  ability	  to	  go	  to	  work,	  to	  make	  trips	  to	  the	  store,	  to	  see	  family,	  or	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  way	  to	  stand	  up	  to	  German	  aircraft.	  	  But	  for	  some,	  the	  act	  was	  more	  than	  that;	  it	  was	  a	  legitimate	  way	  to	  squeeze	  a	  few	  much	  needed	  minutes	  of	  social	  time—or	  even	  just	  time	  to	  relax	  and	  think—into	  the	  day.	  This	  view	  was	  often	  hated	  by	  family	  members,	  not	  least	  because	  it	  caused	  the	  latter	  intense	  anguish	  as	  they	  awaited	  their	  loved	  one’s	  return	  from	  the	  streets.	  Though	  clearly	  a	  dangerous	  activity	  that	  could	  lead	  one	  to	  significant	  bodily	  harm	  or	  death,	  the	  desire	  to	  maintain	  social	  circles	  outweighed	  the	  risk	  for	  some.	  
***	  
	   South	  London	  proved	  remarkably	  willing	  to	  shift	  from	  one	  transportation	  method	  to	  another	  as	  circumstances	  themselves	  changed,	  though	  the	  vehicle	  for	  these	  changes	  was	  far	  more	  often	  localized,	  individual	  reactions	  to	  changing	  circumstances	  than	  it	  was	  either	  massed	  public	  responses	  or	  intervention	  from	  above.	  For	  many,	  trains	  and	  their	  close	  relatives	  trams	  were	  the	  primary	  forms	  of	  transportation,	  but	  as	  trains	  relied	  on	  carefully	  planned	  railroad	  links	  and	  had	  to	  run	  on	  specific	  tracks	  to	  avoid	  other	  traffic,	  even	  slight	  bomb	  damage	  could	  cause	  immediate	  problems.	  	  The	  same	  held	  true	  for	  buses—when	  roads	  suffered	  bomb	  damage,	  authorities	  would	  close	  them	  for	  repairs,	  forcing	  buses	  to	  route	  around	  them.	  Compensating	  for	  these	  changes	  could	  mean	  waiting	  for	  another	  train,	  taking	  a	  bus,	  walking,	  taking	  shelter,	  or	  even	  abandoning	  the	  journey	  altogether.	  Considering	  that	  Londoners	  got	  up	  each	  morning	  not	  knowing	  which	  combination	  they	  might	  have	  to	  take	  to	  reach	  their	  intended	  destinations	  or	  if	  they	  would	  even	  reach	  their	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  destinations	  at	  all,	  it	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  transportation	  became	  the	  most	  loathed	  aspect	  of	  Blitz	  life.	  For	  most	  south	  Londoners,	  stepping	  onto	  a	  train	  or	  bus	  in	  the	  morning	  represented	  the	  worst	  part	  of	  their	  day	  because	  it	  was	  most	  dangerous	  and	  offered	  the	  least	  significant	  communities	  to	  help	  combat	  the	  angst.	  
	   It	  is	  no	  hyperbole	  to	  state	  that	  the	  Blitz	  heavily	  disrupted	  south	  London’s	  transportation.	  Though	  the	  railways	  near	  the	  River	  Thames	  typically	  receive	  the	  most	  mention	  in	  official	  histories	  of	  the	  Blitz,	  areas	  south	  of	  the	  river	  were	  far	  from	  immune.	  Roads	  both	  wide	  and	  narrow	  (though	  wide	  suffered	  worse)	  had	  massive	  holes	  ripped	  in	  them,	  further	  exacerbated	  by	  debris	  and	  water	  main	  breaks	  which	  clouted	  the	  streets.	  	  While	  some	  of	  these	  problems,	  such	  as	  major	  bomb	  damage,	  were	  handled	  by	  authorities,	  most	  of	  the	  immediate	  changes—the	  ones	  that	  actually	  kept	  the	  city	  running—came	  from	  a	  much	  more	  organic	  amalgamation	  of	  individuals.	  Most	  of	  the	  citizens	  who	  stepped	  forward	  to	  help	  held	  personal	  desires	  to	  ensure	  the	  best	  for	  their	  fellow	  community	  members.	  Was	  the	  thought	  of	  “nation”	  in	  their	  minds?	  Perhaps.	  But	  it	  was	  almost	  certainly	  not	  the	  salient	  feature	  since	  these	  individuals	  could	  only	  influence	  transportation	  networks	  in	  a	  much	  more	  localized	  way.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  since	  south	  London’s	  transportation	  structures	  never	  locked	  up	  completely	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  hatred	  and	  fear	  held	  inside	  Londoners	  within	  them,	  some	  factor	  must	  have	  been	  at	  play	  holding	  the	  machinery	  all	  together.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  in	  fact	  ties	  to	  local	  communities	  and	  the	  individuals	  around	  one,	  whether	  known	  or	  anonymous,	  that	  encouraged	  enough	  individual	  action	  to	  keep	  the	  system	  functional.	  
	   Individuals	  going	  from	  shelter	  out	  into	  the	  transportation	  structures	  of	  south	  London	  had	  to	  have	  a	  second	  destination,	  too.	  For	  most,	  this	  was	  work,	  one	  of	  the	  most	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  varied	  and	  interesting	  aspects	  of	  London	  life	  and	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  final	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis.
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CHAPTER	  THREE	  
A	  Day	  at	  the	  Office?	  Work	  in	  Wartime	  South	  London	  
	   The	  final	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis	  builds	  upon	  the	  previous	  two	  chapters’	  work	  illuminating	  life	  at	  home	  and	  out	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  wartime	  south	  London.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  Blitz	  could	  not	  end	  the	  need	  to	  go	  to	  work	  and	  earn	  a	  living.	  Even	  in	  a	  time	  of	  war,	  shops	  had	  to	  open,	  industry	  had	  to	  continue,	  and	  various	  services	  had	  to	  still	  function.	  How	  exactly	  this	  came	  about	  and	  the	  implications	  that	  it	  had	  for	  the	  city’s	  population	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  this	  chapter.	  What	  exactly	  could	  one	  expect	  to	  see	  and	  hear	  while	  at	  work?	  What	  happened	  if	  a	  bombing	  raid	  came	  through	  during	  work	  hours,	  and	  what	  role	  would	  employees	  play	  in	  the	  cleanup	  after	  a	  bombing	  raid?	  Would	  employees	  be	  protected	  from	  raids,	  both	  physically	  and	  financially?	  And	  how	  did	  business	  owners	  respond	  to	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  operating	  in	  a	  city	  which	  could	  be	  bombed	  at	  any	  moment?	  	  But	  more	  importantly,	  how	  did	  bombing	  impact	  the	  lives	  of	  individual	  Londoners?	  When	  one	  lost	  work	  owing	  to	  bombing,	  what	  could	  he	  or	  she	  expect	  to	  think	  or	  feel?	  This	  chapter	  explores	  places	  of	  employment	  as	  spaces	  of	  economic	  activity	  but	  also	  as	  easily	  (and	  frequently)	  disrupted	  locations	  and	  as	  spaces	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  personal	  importance	  to	  workers.	  Especially	  with	  smaller	  businesses,	  work	  as	  a	  place	  with	  personal	  meaning	  to	  the	  owners,	  staff,	  and	  patrons	  was	  particularly	  pronounced.	  
	   Perhaps	  more	  so	  than	  in	  any	  other	  arena,	  authorities	  in	  the	  late	  1930s	  anticipated	  that	  work	  would	  be	  impacted	  with	  the	  coming	  of	  war.	  The	  government	  augured	  that	  German	  aerial	  assault	  would	  target	  industrial	  areas	  of	  the	  country,	  trying	  to	  disrupt	  industrial	  production	  and	  demoralize	  the	  population	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  Both	  were	  causes	  
	   Baker	  71	  
of	  immense	  concern.	  The	  Blitz	  proved	  some	  of	  the	  government’s	  prewar	  expectations	  correct.	  Industrial	  enterprises,	  particularly	  those	  located	  near	  the	  easy-­‐to-­‐locate	  River	  Thames	  endured	  heavy	  bombing,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  most	  of	  south	  London’s	  industrial	  areas	  near	  the	  river	  were	  listed	  by	  postwar	  bomb	  survey	  maps	  as	  having	  suffered	  “total	  destruction.”1	  However,	  aerial	  bombing	  was	  extraordinarily	  inaccurate,	  and	  German	  bomber	  crews	  often	  made	  few	  attempts	  to	  hit	  strategic	  targets.	  The	  result—far	  more	  random	  bombing—created	  havoc	  for	  a	  wider	  portion	  of	  London’s	  workforce	  than	  might	  initially	  be	  assumed.	  This	  meant	  that	  even	  work	  spaces	  further	  south,	  away	  from	  the	  more	  easily	  and	  deliberately	  targeted	  River	  Thames,	  had	  to	  confront	  bombing	  disruptions	  as	  well.	  Often,	  these	  disruptions	  proved	  just	  as	  onerous	  on	  the	  workers	  as	  near	  the	  river.	  Yet	  the	  intended	  demoralization	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  calls	  for	  Britain	  to	  make	  peace.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  tension	  that	  one	  finds	  personal	  interests	  and	  local	  loyalties	  play	  the	  key	  role	  in	  keeping	  places	  of	  employment	  running.	  
	   South	  London’s	  primary	  forms	  of	  large	  work	  sites	  were	  various	  types	  of	  industrial	  production	  as	  well	  as	  healthcare	  institutions,	  notably	  hospitals	  and	  ambulance	  services.	  Many	  of	  these,	  not	  least	  the	  Southwark	  docklands	  and	  St.	  Thomas’s	  Hospital,	  sat	  near	  the	  river.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  the	  highly	  targeted	  nature	  of	  the	  River	  Thames	  meant	  that	  industries	  along	  the	  shoreline	  suffered	  badly.	  However,	  any	  large	  work	  space,	  even	  if	  not	  located	  near	  the	  industrial	  enterprises	  that	  dotted	  the	  riverbanks,	  could	  be	  equally	  dangerous.	  When	  attacked,	  hospitals	  could	  have	  entire	  sections	  collapse.	  	  Industrial	  offices	  and	  factories	  could	  be	  all	  but	  leveled.	  Or	  damage	  could	  be	  much	  more	  moderate.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  explores	  the	  intersection	  of	  bombing	  and	  large	  places	  of	  employment,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  London	  County	  Council:	  Bomb	  Damage	  Map,	  1939-­‐1945,	  London	  Metropolitan	  Archives.	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focusing	  first	  on	  industry	  and	  then	  on	  healthcare	  professions,	  the	  two	  main	  forms	  of	  large	  employment	  in	  the	  area.	  As	  the	  government	  created	  explicit	  regulations	  for	  businesses	  with	  more	  than	  thirty	  workers,	  this	  first	  section	  shall	  also	  follow	  that	  standard.2	  This	  section	  shall	  first	  demonstrate	  that	  large	  places	  of	  employment	  had	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  variation.	  However,	  even	  in	  the	  changing	  and	  varied	  conditions	  of	  the	  Blitz,	  work	  places	  had	  to	  keep	  running,	  and	  this	  chapter	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  a	  feeling	  of	  local	  loyalty	  which	  contributed	  to,	  complimented,	  and	  sometimes	  even	  superseded	  broader	  notions	  of	  citizenship	  and	  national	  identity.	  The	  important	  factor	  in	  Londoners’	  minds	  was	  not	  only	  the	  health	  and	  safety	  of	  the	  nation	  but	  of	  the	  local	  area	  to	  which	  an	  individual	  belonged	  as	  well.	  
	   Much	  of	  south	  London	  to	  this	  day	  is	  composed	  of	  small	  shops,	  owned	  and	  operated	  by	  local	  residents	  and	  employing	  far	  fewer	  than	  thirty	  people.	  The	  same	  situation	  held	  true	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  The	  Blitz	  impacted	  their	  businesses	  perhaps	  even	  more	  dramatically	  than	  it	  did	  large	  work	  places,	  and	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  explore	  these	  environments.	  Smaller,	  typically	  tighter	  knit,	  and	  less	  regulated	  by	  the	  government,	  small	  spaces	  of	  work	  had	  some	  distinct	  differences	  from	  the	  larger	  work	  spaces.	  Because	  of	  their	  smaller	  scope	  and	  scale,	  local	  businesses	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  significantly	  impacted	  if	  hit	  by	  an	  air	  raid.	  	  But	  the	  smaller	  scale	  and	  more	  intimate	  atmosphere	  for	  both	  employees	  and	  patrons	  meant	  that	  destruction	  had	  a	  deeper	  personal	  impact.	  Destruction	  of	  one’s	  shop	  felt	  intensely	  personal	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  destruction	  of	  no	  other	  work	  place	  could	  match.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  explore	  in	  greater	  depth	  how	  personal	  motivations	  and	  local	  loyalties	  upset	  individual	  lives	  but	  also	  how	  they	  kept	  the	  stores	  and	  shops	  of	  south	  London	  working	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  “A.R.P.	  in	  Industry,”	  July	  1939,	  Lambeth	  Archives.	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***	  
	   On	  November	  20,	  1940,	  the	  Blitz	  hit	  the	  newspaper	  the	  News	  Chronicle	  during	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  night.	  Reported	  the	  air	  raid	  personnel	  who	  responded	  to	  the	  incident,	  a	  high	  explosive	  bomb	  “penetrated	  [the]	  roof,	  knocking	  out	  [the]	  side	  wall	  and	  putting	  printing	  machinery	  on	  [the]	  ground	  floor	  out	  of	  action”—surely	  an	  event	  that	  would	  have	  caused	  death	  had	  anyone	  been	  inside.	  But	  it	  didn’t	  require	  death	  for	  fear	  to	  come	  through.	  Anyone	  witnessing	  the	  destruction	  that	  night	  could	  not	  have	  escaped	  the	  reality	  that,	  had	  anyone	  been	  working	  within,	  serious	  injury	  or	  death	  were	  the	  only	  likely	  outcomes.	  
For	  the	  people	  of	  nearby	  Southwark,	  the	  Blitz	  opened	  on	  a	  much	  more	  ominous	  note	  with	  the	  utter	  destruction	  of	  perhaps	  its	  largest	  industrial	  employer,	  the	  Surrey	  Commercial	  Docks,	  in	  what	  is	  now	  one	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  single	  bomb	  incidents	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Located	  across	  the	  River	  Thames	  from	  the	  docklands	  of	  the	  East	  End,	  the	  Surrey	  Commercial	  Docks	  were	  a	  major	  shipping	  port	  for	  the	  city	  of	  London	  that	  were	  gutted	  by	  fire	  on	  the	  first	  night	  of	  the	  Blitz.	  Recalled	  Thomas	  Winter,	  who	  was	  sheltering	  nearby	  at	  the	  time	  the	  inferno	  began,	  “outside	  all	  hell	  had	  been	  let	  loose	  upon	  us,	  […]	  the	  docks	  surrounding	  us	  […]	  a	  raging	  inferno	  as	  fire,	  many	  hundreds	  of	  them,	  were	  spreading	  and	  building	  up	  to	  one	  gigantic	  conflagration.”3	  Another	  observer,	  Cornelius	  Carson,	  who	  was	  out	  on	  the	  streets	  when	  the	  bombing	  of	  the	  Docks	  began,	  wrote	  that	  “bombs	  were	  constantly	  falling”	  and	  “on	  several	  occasions	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  throw	  oneself	  flat	  on	  the	  roadway	  to	  avoid	  being	  injured.”4	  The	  next	  morning,	  workers	  found	  their	  place	  of	  employment	  destroyed,	  never	  to	  return	  to	  its	  former	  self	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  war.	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Thomas	  S.	  Winter,	  “A	  Shout	  from	  the	  Night,”	  March	  1995,	  Southwark	  Archives.	  4	  Statement	  of	  Witness,	  London	  Metropolitan	  Police,	  October	  19,	  1940,	  Southwark	  Archives.	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that	  single	  evening,	  the	  livelihoods	  of	  hundreds	  of	  workers	  had	  been	  utterly	  transformed,	  a	  traumatic	  change	  only	  adding	  to	  the	  stress	  of	  life	  under	  bombardment.	  Fortunately	  uncommon,	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  docklands	  was	  more	  than	  just	  a	  major	  economic	  blow	  to	  south	  London.	  The	  destruction	  cost	  thousands	  of	  workers	  their	  incomes,	  leaving	  them	  on	  their	  own	  to	  find	  new	  work	  and	  seek	  the	  assistance	  of	  friends	  and	  family	  in	  the	  meantime.	  
	   One	  immediately	  notices	  a	  stark	  difference	  between	  the	  relatively	  mild	  destruction	  of	  the	  News	  Chronicle	  building	  and	  the	  complete	  ruin	  of	  the	  Southwark	  docks.	  This	  intense	  variation	  in	  the	  level	  of	  destruction	  was	  one	  of	  the	  overarching	  themes	  of	  south	  London’s	  experience	  with	  industry	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  Yet	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  workers,	  the	  scale	  of	  destruction	  didn’t	  always	  matter	  so	  much.	  Large	  or	  small,	  bomb	  damage	  served	  as	  a	  reminder	  of	  one’s	  own	  mortality—that	  one	  could	  be	  killed	  virtually	  at	  any	  moment	  by	  a	  raid.	  In	  a	  way	  not	  seen	  in	  shelter	  or	  transportation,	  the	  heavy	  burden	  borne	  by	  industry	  also	  made	  workers	  realize	  in	  a	  particularly	  pointed	  way	  that	  they	  were	  the	  intended	  targets.	  It	  was	  comparably	  easier	  to	  sleep	  in	  a	  shelter	  and	  hear	  the	  bombs	  go	  off	  nearby	  knowing	  that	  they	  were	  directed	  at	  one	  only	  in	  an	  indirect	  way;	  while	  working	  in	  large	  industries,	  there	  was	  no	  escaping	  the	  sensation	  of	  being	  targeted.	  Workers	  were	  fair	  game,	  and	  they	  knew	  it.	  The	  unsurprising	  result	  was	  anxiety	  and	  concern	  for	  themselves,	  their	  friends,	  and	  their	  families.	  
South	  London	  bore	  witness	  to	  numerous	  other	  occasions	  when	  large	  factories	  or	  other	  industrial	  enterprises	  were	  entirely	  destroyed	  by	  raids,	  an	  incident	  which	  usually	  meant	  an	  end	  to	  employment	  for	  workers,	  too.	  Early	  in	  the	  morning	  of	  September	  26,	  1940,	  incendiary	  bombs	  hit	  Hydes	  Bird	  Seed	  Factory,	  gutting	  the	  building	  and	  rendering	  the	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factory	  a	  total	  loss.	  Because	  the	  bombs	  fell	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  night	  (the	  typical	  time	  for	  major	  German	  raids),	  no	  one	  was	  at	  the	  factory	  and	  thus	  caused	  no	  casualties.	  But	  the	  next	  morning,	  workers	  who	  typically	  had	  a	  place	  to	  go	  to	  work	  no	  longer	  did.	  As	  reported	  by	  an	  observer,	  the	  building	  was	  “completely	  burnt	  out,”	  and	  with	  it,	  so	  too	  was	  a	  “normal”	  work	  day	  for	  the	  factory’s	  employees.	  When	  this	  happened,	  workers	  typically	  had	  to	  find	  new	  jobs	  in	  different	  factories.	  Fortunately,	  because	  of	  the	  demands	  for	  workers	  during	  the	  war,	  finding	  new	  work	  typically	  wasn’t	  terribly	  difficult,	  but	  it	  nonetheless	  disrupted	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  employees	  in	  ways	  that	  south	  London	  had	  not	  experienced	  before.	  In	  the	  memories	  of	  many,	  total	  destruction	  of	  one’s	  own	  space—a	  place	  that	  ensured	  an	  individual	  financial	  stability—was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  anxiety-­‐provoking	  experiences	  of	  all.5	  
Most	  bombing	  raids	  caused	  only	  minor	  damage	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  industries	  hit,	  but	  even	  without	  total	  destruction,	  the	  lives	  of	  workers	  could	  still	  change.	  Just	  causing	  damage	  was	  enough	  to	  disrupt	  the	  flow	  of	  an	  organization	  sufficiently	  to	  add	  a	  burden	  to	  the	  workers.	  A	  return	  to	  the	  News	  Chronicle	  demonstrates	  this.	  The	  News	  Chronicle	  bombing	  incident	  failed	  to	  knock	  the	  paper	  out	  of	  commission	  since	  even	  with	  some	  bomb	  damage,	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  building	  could	  still	  operate	  and	  function	  as	  usual.	  Printing	  delays	  were	  expected	  after	  the	  bombing	  raid	  but	  not	  a	  total	  closure	  of	  the	  facility.	  	  However,	  because	  the	  operation	  did	  not	  run	  as	  it	  had	  before,	  work	  hours	  and	  activities	  changed.	  Some	  workers	  had	  to	  leave	  their	  ordinary	  jobs	  to	  repair	  bomb	  damage.	  Other	  cases	  of	  only	  partial	  destruction	  highlight	  the	  largest	  disruption	  of	  all:	  sending	  staff	  home	  in	  response	  to	  an	  attack.	  On	  September	  15,	  a	  high	  explosive	  bomb	  fell	  near	  a	  major	  electric	  power	  station	  in	  south	  London,	  creating	  an	  eight	  foot	  deep	  crater.	  While	  the	  incident	  did	  only	  minor	  damage	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Lambeth	  Civil	  Defense	  File	  518,	  September	  26,	  1940,	  Lambeth	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to	  the	  building	  and	  did	  not	  kill	  or	  maim	  any	  workers,	  the	  cleanup	  and	  danger	  posed	  by	  the	  incident	  meant	  that	  the	  power	  company	  kept	  some	  of	  its	  workers	  out	  of	  work	  that	  day.	  Much	  of	  south	  London’s	  working	  class	  population	  relied	  on	  working	  every	  day	  to	  make	  ends	  meet.	  The	  loss	  of	  work	  time	  and	  the	  pay	  that	  accompanied	  it	  caused	  great	  anxiety	  among	  the	  workers	  involved	  if	  the	  business	  did	  not	  pay	  its	  employees	  for	  lost	  work	  time	  (many	  did,	  but	  not	  all),	  as	  most	  south	  Londoners	  did	  not	  have	  enough	  money	  saved	  up	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  families	  during	  a	  long	  period	  of	  underemployment.6	  
	   Just	  the	  threat	  of	  damage	  and	  destruction	  was	  enough	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  reminder	  of	  how	  indistinguishable	  the	  lines	  between	  civilians	  and	  combatants	  had	  become	  with	  regards	  to	  industry.	  On	  September	  18,	  an	  unexploded	  antiaircraft	  shell	  landed	  on	  the	  south	  bank	  of	  the	  River	  Thames	  right	  next	  to	  the	  Royal	  Flour	  Mills,	  causing	  no	  damage	  at	  all.	  When	  a	  worker	  spotted	  the	  shell	  and	  reported	  it	  around	  9am,	  the	  air	  raid	  worker	  receiving	  the	  message	  noted	  that	  the	  shell	  had	  to	  be	  removed	  by	  12pm	  or	  the	  tide	  of	  the	  river	  would	  come	  in,	  burying	  it	  and	  thus	  making	  it	  impossible	  to	  remove	  and	  possibly	  detonating	  it.	  The	  shell	  was	  removed	  successfully	  and	  did	  not	  detonate,	  meaning	  that	  workers	  nearby	  could	  stay	  on	  the	  job,	  and	  no	  property	  damage	  resulted	  from	  the	  episode.	  For	  a	  city	  used	  to	  destruction,	  the	  safe	  removal	  of	  an	  unexploded	  antiaircraft	  shell	  was	  lucky	  indeed.	  Yet	  even	  amongst	  the	  luck,	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  population	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  great	  outcome	  had	  been	  largely	  a	  matter	  of	  luck.	  The	  shell	  could	  have	  landed	  right	  on	  top	  of	  the	  Royal	  Flour	  Mills	  just	  as	  easily	  as	  it	  had	  on	  the	  shore	  of	  the	  Thames,	  potentially	  igniting	  the	  flammable	  flour	  dust.	  Such	  incidents	  were	  yet	  another	  reminder	  of	  how	  random	  the	  situation	  was	  and	  how	  the	  Blitz	  could	  strike	  anyone’s	  life	  at	  a	  moment’s	  notice.	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  Lambeth	  Civil	  Defense	  File	  333,	  September	  15,	  1940,	  Lambeth	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   Given	  the	  danger	  faced	  by	  workers	  in	  large	  enterprises,	  ensuring	  safety	  at	  work	  places	  was	  essential	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  government,	  employers,	  and	  employees	  alike.	  How	  was	  this	  accomplished?	  The	  government	  mandated	  that	  all	  work	  places	  with	  greater	  than	  fifty	  workers	  have	  a	  full	  shelter	  facility	  available	  for	  use	  in	  raids.	  It	  further	  required	  that	  all	  businesses	  employing	  thirty	  or	  more	  workers	  take	  action	  to	  ensure	  the	  safety	  of	  their	  employees	  (the	  nature	  of	  such	  requirements	  was	  often	  poorly	  explained).	  Wrote	  the	  government	  mandate,	  employers	  had	  to	  ensure	  that	  a	  “suitable	  proportion	  of	  the	  employees	  are	  trained	  and	  equipped	  in	  first	  aid	  and	  in	  fire-­‐fighting	  and	  anti-­‐gas	  measures,”	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  prewar	  assumptions	  that	  both	  poison	  gas	  and	  high	  explosive	  bombs	  would	  fall	  on	  the	  metropolis.	  Businesses	  did	  follow	  these	  requirements,	  and	  their	  employees	  had	  a	  place	  to	  take	  shelter	  if	  an	  air	  raid	  came	  overhead	  (though	  not	  necessarily	  just	  because	  the	  air	  raid	  sirens	  sounded).7	  But	  just	  because	  businesses	  had	  shelter	  facilities	  and	  emergency	  plans	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  were	  always	  followed.	  Workers	  often	  carried	  on	  through	  raids,	  either	  because	  the	  workers	  themselves	  saw	  no	  need	  to	  take	  shelter	  or	  because	  employers	  held	  a	  strong	  desire	  to	  maintain	  production	  for	  as	  many	  hours	  per	  day	  as	  possible,	  placing	  the	  staff	  in	  harm’s	  way.	  
When	  bombing	  caused	  physical	  damage,	  it	  was	  generally	  up	  to	  the	  workers	  of	  the	  business	  to	  fix	  it.	  Hit	  by	  a	  high	  explosive	  bomb	  on	  September	  20,	  the	  Schweppes	  factory	  in	  south	  London	  suffered	  a	  damaged	  roof.	  The	  bomb	  blast	  buried	  three	  workers	  beneath	  rubble,	  and	  the	  owners	  had	  to	  fix	  the	  hole	  torn	  above.	  That	  job,	  thus,	  fell	  to	  the	  workers.	  They	  had	  to	  climb	  up	  high	  above	  the	  factory	  floor,	  fix	  the	  gap	  in	  the	  roof,	  and	  continue	  on	  with	  their	  jobs	  afterwards.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  workers	  were	  undoubtedly	  friends	  with	  the	  three	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  “A.R.P.	  in	  Industry,”	  July	  1939,	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trapped	  workers	  and	  had	  to	  continue	  to	  work	  even	  while	  worrying	  about	  the	  fate	  of	  their	  coworkers	  and	  their	  families.	  This	  is	  a	  common	  narrative	  across	  virtually	  all	  of	  south	  London’s	  industries.	  With	  few	  exceptions,	  damage	  done	  meant	  cleanup	  work	  for	  the	  staff,	  performed	  as	  anxiety	  about	  the	  fate	  of	  fellow	  workers	  raged.	  Government	  services	  to	  help	  those	  who	  had	  suffered	  from	  bomb	  damage	  seldom	  helped	  factories	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  large	  industry.	  	  
Why,	  given	  the	  danger	  and	  angst	  that	  came	  with	  workplace	  bombing,	  did	  workers	  actually	  put	  themselves	  in	  harm’s	  way	  as	  much	  as	  they	  did?	  It	  seems	  more	  likely	  that	  workers	  went	  up	  there	  because	  they	  had	  a	  personal	  interest	  in	  doing	  so—an	  interest	  in	  keeping	  their	  jobs	  so	  that	  they	  could	  provide	  for	  their	  families	  as	  well	  as	  care	  for	  the	  nation.	  Workers	  wanted	  their	  factories	  to	  work	  well	  for	  the	  simple,	  practical	  reason	  that	  they	  wanted	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  they	  had	  access	  to	  a	  steady	  income!	  Workers	  wanted	  to	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  friends	  and	  families;	  given	  the	  uncertainties	  of	  life	  during	  the	  Blitz,	  it	  was	  unsurprising	  that	  many	  Londoners	  opted	  to	  take	  the	  risk	  of	  climbing	  atop	  a	  bomb-­‐damaged	  building	  if	  it	  meant	  providing	  stability	  for	  their	  loved	  ones.	  The	  cleanup	  work	  fell	  to	  workers,	  and	  it	  was	  their	  sense	  of	  caring	  for	  their	  homes,	  families,	  and	  livelihoods—all	  of	  which	  depended	  upon	  factory	  pay—as	  well	  as	  the	  safety	  of	  strangers	  that	  motivated	  them	  to	  push	  onwards.	  It	  was	  not	  just	  one	  particular	  loyalty	  that	  pushed	  the	  workers;	  rather,	  it	  was	  a	  varied	  and	  complicated	  process	  with	  the	  specific	  loyalties	  different	  from	  worker	  to	  worker,	  factory	  to	  factory.	  
	   Factories	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  industry	  were	  not	  the	  only	  large	  facilities	  that	  employed	  Londoners,	  however.	  One	  of	  south	  London’s	  other	  large	  employers	  of	  people	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were	  hospitals	  and	  ambulance	  services,	  facilities	  which	  logged	  increased	  employment	  throughout	  the	  war	  thanks	  to	  high	  demand	  from	  both	  the	  city’s	  population	  and	  the	  military.	  Though	  also	  housed	  in	  large	  facilities	  like	  the	  bigger	  industries	  detailed	  above,	  hospitals	  notoriously	  required	  all	  of	  their	  buildings	  be	  in	  operation	  in	  order	  to	  function	  properly.	  This	  formed	  a	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  industry,	  where	  damage	  to	  some	  of	  a	  building	  still	  meant	  ongoing	  production	  throughout	  the	  undamaged	  parts	  of	  the	  facility.	  Thus,	  bombing	  raids	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  cause	  more	  significant	  disruption	  to	  healthcare	  than	  to	  factories.	  Because	  of	  the	  vulnerability	  and	  necessity	  of	  having	  all	  or	  almost	  all	  of	  a	  structure	  in	  operation,	  hospitals	  and	  ambulance	  services	  in	  south	  London	  suffered	  particularly	  badly,	  creating	  unsafe	  and	  frightening	  conditions	  for	  the	  workers	  and	  impacting	  the	  delivery	  of	  healthcare	  to	  the	  population.	  
	   St.	  Thomas’s	  Hospital,	  which	  rests	  just	  across	  the	  River	  Thames	  from	  the	  Houses	  of	  Parliament,	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  famous	  example	  of	  hospital	  bombing	  in	  south	  London	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  St.	  Thomas’s	  was	  bombed	  so	  badly	  during	  the	  war	  that	  it	  had	  to	  be	  completely	  rebuilt	  in	  the	  late	  1940s.	  Just	  two	  days	  into	  the	  Blitz,	  St.	  Thomas	  saw	  its	  first	  of	  many	  bombing	  attacks.	  The	  raid	  knocked	  out	  all	  power	  to	  the	  hospital,	  making	  the	  work	  of	  the	  staff	  incredibly	  difficult.	  Damage	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  power	  facilities,	  however.	  One	  observer	  reported	  that	  the	  bomb	  damage	  had	  demolished	  the	  entire	  east	  wing	  of	  the	  building,	  dropping	  masonry	  onto	  the	  nearby	  roads	  and	  making	  them	  impassable.	  The	  high	  explosive	  bombs	  made	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  building	  “unsafe”	  and	  killed	  a	  dozen,	  including	  a	  few	  hospital	  workers.	  8	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During	  incidents,	  the	  work	  required	  of	  hospital	  staff	  was	  very	  intense.	  When	  the	  hospital	  was	  yet	  again	  bombed	  on	  September	  15,	  the	  main	  central	  part	  of	  the	  hospital	  caved	  in,	  causing	  42	  casualties.	  An	  observer	  noted	  that	  the	  hospital	  was	  “disorganized	  owing	  to	  electricity	  mains,	  water,	  and	  gas	  trouble.”	  In	  addition	  to	  cleaning	  up	  the	  mess,	  staff	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  maladies.	  A	  woman	  named	  Miss	  Ross	  sustained	  “small	  multiple	  cuts	  to	  the	  head”	  while	  another	  woman,	  Miss	  Horton,	  was	  dealing	  with	  “multiple	  cuts	  on	  head”	  and	  “injuries	  to	  eyes.”	  Finally,	  to	  make	  the	  situation	  worse,	  hospital	  staff	  had	  to	  function	  under	  the	  mental	  pressure	  of	  losing	  one	  of	  their	  own.	  Nurse	  Yorks,	  a	  staff	  member	  at	  the	  hospital,	  passed	  away	  in	  the	  raid.9	  Cleaning	  up	  after	  such	  an	  attack	  was	  to	  be	  no	  easy	  task.	  
Just	  like	  in	  the	  factory	  industries,	  it	  was	  up	  to	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  hospital	  to	  clean	  up	  the	  mess	  left	  behind	  by	  the	  raids,	  a	  job	  which	  local	  loyalties	  pushed	  them	  to	  do.	  When	  St.	  Thomas’s	  Hospital	  was	  bombed,	  the	  staff,	  not	  government	  or	  emergency	  response	  personnel,	  had	  to	  get	  the	  facility	  back	  in	  operation.	  Midwives	  and	  other	  medical	  staff	  no	  doubt	  did	  not	  enjoy	  cleaning	  up	  after	  bomb	  damage,	  nor	  was	  the	  danger	  of	  cleaning	  up	  a	  tall,	  stricken	  building	  located	  on	  the	  banks	  of	  the	  Thames	  lost	  on	  them.	  Yet	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  obstacles,	  they	  did	  so	  anyways.	  Why?	  The	  employees	  needed	  the	  money,	  and	  just	  as	  importantly,	  they	  wanted	  to	  be	  sure	  that	  if	  needed,	  medical	  care	  would	  be	  available	  for	  their	  loved	  ones	  and	  their	  communities—as	  a	  sense	  of	  solidarity	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  As	  with	  industrial	  workers,	  it	  was	  about	  doing	  what	  was	  “right”	  for	  King	  and	  Country	  but	  also,	  and	  often	  more	  importantly,	  about	  what	  was	  best	  for	  the	  individual	  and	  right	  for	  his	  or	  her	  local	  community.	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And	  while	  the	  staff	  cleaned	  up	  one	  day,	  there	  was	  never	  any	  saying	  if	  they	  would	  simply	  have	  to	  repeat	  the	  ordeal	  again	  the	  next	  day,	  calling	  again	  on	  the	  same	  motivations	  to	  step	  in.	  Alas,	  St.	  Thomas’s	  was	  again	  bombed	  just	  four	  days	  later	  on	  September	  13;	  this	  time,	  the	  top	  three	  floors	  of	  the	  hospital	  were	  rendered	  inoperable,	  launching	  debris	  onto	  the	  ground	  surrounding	  the	  hospital.	  As	  always,	  the	  staff	  had	  to	  set	  to	  cleaning	  up	  the	  mess—a	  ritual	  that	  they	  would	  repeat	  at	  least	  a	  dozen	  more	  times	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Blitz.	  Still,	  an	  air	  raid	  warden	  reporting	  on	  the	  incident	  wrote	  that	  there	  was	  “no	  panic”	  among	  the	  patients	  or	  staff.	  Everyone	  kept	  at	  their	  business,	  doing	  their	  best	  to	  keep	  the	  hospital	  running	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  damage.	  But	  this	  relative	  calm	  came	  because	  the	  workers	  felt	  a	  personal	  need	  to	  pitch	  in—for	  the	  sake	  of	  themselves,	  their	  loved	  ones,	  and	  their	  co-­‐nationals.	  The	  story	  of	  hospital	  cleanup	  is	  just	  one	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  whole,	  underscoring	  the	  variety	  of	  loyalties	  which	  Londoners	  felt	  during	  the	  Blitz.10	  
Ambulance	  services	  were	  not	  immune	  from	  the	  disruption	  of	  the	  war	  either	  and	  serve	  as	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  how	  the	  war	  changed	  medical	  work	  in	  different	  and	  interesting	  ways.	  The	  primary	  change	  to	  happen	  upon	  ambulance	  workers	  were	  their	  shift	  hours.	  Most	  ambulance	  stations	  in	  south	  London	  employed	  around	  thirty-­‐five	  full	  time	  and	  an	  additional	  ten	  part	  time	  workers.11	  But	  as	  Ms.	  Corfe,	  an	  ambulance	  station	  employee,	  discovered,	  this	  did	  not	  mean	  regularity	  to	  work	  schedules.	  Ms.	  Corfe	  reported	  to	  Mass	  Observation	  that	  her	  shifts	  changed	  to	  two	  16-­‐hour	  night	  shifts	  (running	  5pm	  to	  9am)	  as	  well	  as	  two	  8	  hour	  days	  (running	  9am	  to	  5pm)	  each	  week.	  	  Though	  Ms.	  Corfe	  liked	  the	  changed	  work	  schedule	  as	  it	  allowed	  her	  three	  days	  off	  per	  week	  to	  do	  her	  shopping	  and	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keep	  her	  home	  up	  and	  running,	  not	  everyone	  agreed	  with	  her	  assessment.	  Many	  other	  ambulance	  workers	  found	  the	  shifting	  work	  schedules	  annoying	  and	  did	  not	  appreciate	  the	  lack	  of	  stability	  in	  their	  lives.	  Change,	  while	  not	  universally	  resented,	  was	  far	  from	  universally	  loved,	  either,	  as	  it	  got	  in	  the	  way	  of	  how	  one	  “normally”	  ran	  one’s	  life.12	  
For	  Corfe	  and	  her	  fellow	  health	  workers	  whose	  schedules	  had	  been	  impacted,	  spending	  more	  nights	  at	  the	  station	  meant	  sleeping	  at	  work.	  The	  experience	  of	  staying	  overnight	  at	  work	  placed	  severe	  strains	  on	  the	  local	  communities	  so	  vital	  to	  material	  and	  mental	  survival	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  In	  compliance	  with	  government	  regulations	  mandating	  shelter	  be	  provided	  for	  workers,	  overnight	  staff	  slept	  in	  shelters,	  as	  they	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  experience	  a	  raid	  while	  on	  duty.	  In	  Corfe’s	  case,	  the	  “shelter”	  was	  the	  basement	  of	  the	  station.	  She	  shared	  that	  shelter	  with	  the	  motley	  assortment	  of	  her	  co-­‐workers	  who	  might	  be	  on	  duty	  that	  night,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  as	  peace-­‐loving	  as	  home	  shelters	  tended	  to	  be.	  A	  strong	  sense	  of	  community	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  work	  shelters	  the	  same	  way	  that	  it	  did	  at	  home	  and	  with	  one’s	  friends.	  Though	  Corfe	  spoke	  favorably	  of	  some	  experiences	  in	  her	  home	  shelter,	  she	  shared	  none	  of	  the	  same	  enthusiasm	  for	  nights	  spent	  at	  work,	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  tension	  that	  must	  have	  existed	  underneath	  her	  ambulance	  station	  during	  raids.	  Sleeping	  not	  with	  friends	  and	  worried	  about	  family	  at	  home,	  it	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  tensions	  ran	  high	  at	  work.13	  
The	  lack	  of	  meaningful	  social	  networks	  at	  work	  made	  dealing	  with	  the	  immense	  danger	  imposed	  upon	  emergency	  workers	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  handle.	  Ambulance	  drivers	  had	  to	  work	  through	  the	  bombing	  raids,	  traveling	  to	  bomb	  sites	  as	  more	  warheads	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Diary	  5285,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	  13	  Diary	  5285,	  September	  1940,	  Mass	  Observation	  Archive.	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fell,	  an	  extremely	  dangerous	  situation.	  But	  even	  for	  people	  like	  Ms.	  Corfe	  who	  worked	  at	  the	  district	  posts	  and	  did	  not	  travel	  out	  during	  the	  raids,	  danger	  at	  work	  was	  a	  constant,	  an	  occurrence	  that	  engendered	  concerns	  about	  safety.	  When	  the	  Germans	  bombed	  her	  post	  in	  mid-­‐November,	  Corfe	  noted	  a	  change	  in	  many	  of	  her	  coworkers.	  The	  incident	  hit	  her	  post	  hard,	  leaving	  “soot	  littered	  everywhere,	  the	  ambulances	  blasted	  to	  bits”	  outside.	  But	  it	  also	  destroyed	  a	  sense	  of	  safety	  and	  security	  that	  had	  sustained	  the	  post	  since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  war.	  Many	  of	  her	  coworkers	  began	  expressing	  fears	  about	  safety	  and	  survival,	  and	  Corfe	  reported	  a	  dull,	  boring,	  and	  emotionally	  draining	  mentality	  around	  the	  station.	  Just	  like	  how	  it	  opened	  up	  the	  roof	  to	  allow	  water	  to	  leak	  through,	  the	  episode	  brought	  to	  light	  underlying	  concerns	  about	  fear,	  danger,	  and	  the	  randomness	  of	  survival	  itself	  among	  a	  population	  that	  did	  such	  a	  job	  keeping	  the	  city	  running	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  These	  problems	  were	  made	  worse	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  employees	  at	  Corfe’s	  station	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  talked	  	  about	  their	  experiences.	  To	  Corfe,	  the	  bomb	  coming	  through	  the	  roof	  had	  shattered	  more	  than	  just	  metal	  and	  glass:	  it	  had	  shattered	  a	  confidence	  and	  exposed	  the	  limits	  of	  community	  as	  well.14	  
Air	  raid	  wardens	  and	  various	  other	  emergency	  personnel,	  treated	  extensively	  in	  the	  literature	  of	  the	  Blitz	  and	  thus	  discussed	  only	  briefly	  here,	  also	  faced	  similar	  conditions	  to	  Corfe	  and	  her	  ambulance	  workers.	  Air	  raid	  wardens,	  firefighters,	  and	  ambulance	  drivers	  all	  had	  to	  respond	  to	  bomb	  incidents	  when	  dispatched,	  frequently	  finding	  raging	  fires	  or	  unexploded	  bombs	  nearby.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  such	  chaos,	  these	  individuals	  were	  expected	  to	  maintain	  order,	  issue	  clear	  directions,	  and	  protect	  the	  citizens	  as	  much	  as	  possible—a	  stressful	  job	  indeed.	  The	  clarity	  with	  which	  these	  personnel	  worked	  suggests	  that	  in	  spite	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	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  5285,	  November	  1940,	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of	  the	  trauma	  of	  war	  and	  limits	  of	  community	  at	  work,	  south	  London’s	  emergency	  personnel	  still	  had	  a	  sense	  of	  service	  to	  their	  fellow	  south	  Londoners,	  a	  sentiment	  that	  carried	  them	  through	  the	  stress	  of	  the	  job.	  Prewar	  government	  fears	  of	  panic	  and	  disorder	  did	  not	  materialize	  in	  the	  streets	  of	  south	  London	  in	  large	  part	  thanks	  to	  the	  stressful,	  dangerous	  work	  of	  emergency	  personnel,	  almost	  all	  of	  whom	  came	  from	  the	  areas	  in	  which	  they	  worked	  and	  thus	  had	  personal	  ties	  to	  their	  particular	  area	  of	  the	  city.	  
Working	  in	  a	  large	  industry	  or	  hospital	  setting	  required	  the	  willingness	  to	  work	  during	  and	  around	  air	  raids.	  Employers	  expected	  their	  workers	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  cleanup	  after	  air	  raids,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  workers	  resisted	  these	  calls	  to	  action.	  They	  pitched	  in	  and	  did	  a	  good	  job	  of	  it,	  primarily	  because	  personal	  ties	  to	  the	  city	  and	  its	  people	  urged	  them	  to	  do	  so.	  Still,	  Ms.	  Corfe’s	  account	  demonstrates	  how	  constant	  action	  by	  workers	  mixed	  with	  fear,	  upset,	  and	  trepidation	  in	  complex	  ways.	  There	  seems	  little	  doubt	  that	  south	  London	  still	  feared	  its	  circumstances	  even	  while	  working	  through	  them.	  
***	  
	   For	  all	  its	  fame	  as	  an	  industrial	  powerhouse	  and	  a	  city	  of	  large	  places	  of	  employment,	  smaller	  work	  spaces	  remained	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  south	  London’s	  economy	  then	  as	  well	  as	  now.	  The	  area	  had	  a	  remarkable	  array	  of	  different	  businesses,	  ranging	  from	  small	  corner	  stores	  selling	  any	  manner	  of	  goods	  to	  pubs,	  cinemas,	  and	  banks.	  	  What	  would	  happen	  when	  a	  bomb	  hit	  a	  store?	  Would	  it	  stay	  open,	  or	  would	  it	  close?	  How	  often	  were	  shops	  totally	  destroyed	  (meaning	  the	  loss	  of	  work	  for	  employees),	  and	  how	  often	  did	  they	  just	  suffer	  minor	  damage,	  such	  as	  broken	  windows?	  And	  how	  did	  the	  Blitz	  intersect	  with	  the	  personal	  lives	  of	  not	  just	  employees	  but	  patrons	  as	  well?	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Most	  common	  in	  cases	  of	  store	  bomb	  damage	  was	  just	  that:	  damage.	  Exposed	  to	  the	  open	  streets	  and	  easily	  destructible,	  windows	  not	  surprisingly	  suffered	  badly	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  In	  far	  more	  cases	  than	  not,	  any	  store	  near	  a	  bomb	  incident	  had	  window	  damage.15	  However,	  other	  forms	  of	  damage	  could	  also	  take	  place.	  Storerooms	  and	  walls	  could	  fall	  to	  destruction	  as	  could	  entire	  stores,	  closing	  them	  until	  repairs	  could	  be	  made.	  Small	  business	  owners	  did	  try	  to	  keep	  their	  stores	  open,	  but	  this	  was	  challenging	  owing	  partly	  to	  bomb	  damage	  and	  partly	  to	  societal	  anxiety	  about	  shopping	  in	  a	  store	  that	  had	  just	  suffered	  attack.	  The	  latter	  observation	  suggests	  that	  physical	  destruction	  to	  a	  shop	  had	  a	  psychological	  effect	  not	  only	  on	  its	  workers	  but	  on	  its	  patrons	  as	  well.	  
The	  damage	  done	  to	  small	  shops	  generally	  shut	  the	  store	  temporarily,	  depending	  on	  the	  level	  of	  damage,	  a	  reflection	  of	  destructiveness	  of	  the	  air	  raids	  on	  small	  places	  of	  employment	  but	  also	  assumptions	  about	  the	  population	  at	  large.	  	  One	  September	  day,	  an	  incendiary	  bomb	  raid	  hit	  a	  brewery	  as	  well	  as	  a	  few	  shops	  nearby.	  The	  brewery	  suffered	  minimal	  damage	  and	  remained	  closed	  for	  a	  short	  while,	  but	  the	  flames	  gutted	  the	  stores	  nearby.	  Unable	  to	  keep	  their	  shops	  open,	  the	  owners	  had	  to	  affix	  signs	  to	  the	  front	  of	  their	  buildings	  informing	  customers	  that	  they	  would	  not	  be	  opening	  for	  some	  time,	  their	  stores	  completely	  ruined	  beyond	  repair.16	  But	  anxiety	  about	  the	  willingness	  of	  customers	  to	  visit	  a	  recently	  bombed	  shop	  also	  came	  through.	  Over	  the	  first	  weekend	  of	  November	  1940,	  a	  series	  of	  high	  explosive	  bombs	  fell	  on	  a	  major	  department	  store	  in	  south	  London,	  damaging	  the	  store,	  a	  nearby	  cinema,	  and	  a	  small	  shop	  nearby	  as	  well.	  The	  little	  shop	  was	  utterly	  destroyed,	  killing	  the	  store	  owner	  and	  his	  family,	  but	  the	  others	  were	  not	  badly	  damaged.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  “Control	  Room	  Diary,”	  1940,	  Lambeth	  Archives.	  16	  “The	  Week	  of	  Wanton	  Murder,”	  The	  Free	  Press,	  September	  1940,	  Lambeth	  Archives.	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However,	  the	  shops	  closed	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  day,	  reopening	  the	  in	  the	  morning.	  Even	  though	  they	  did	  not	  have	  to	  close	  their	  shops	  to	  rebuild,	  the	  owners	  did	  so	  anyways	  because	  they	  believed	  that	  no	  one	  would	  want	  to	  shop	  at	  a	  place	  that	  had	  so	  recently	  been	  hit.	  This	  reflects	  concerns	  on	  the	  part	  of	  store	  owners	  about	  resolve	  and	  morale	  within	  the	  general	  population—that	  people	  would	  be	  too	  scared	  to	  shop	  somewhere	  that	  had	  just	  been	  bombed.17	  One	  store	  owner	  summed	  his	  anxieties	  up	  well.	  Donald	  Beale,	  a	  worker	  in	  a	  south	  London	  shop,	  recalled	  in	  a	  later	  interview	  that	  after	  bombs	  had	  fallen	  nearby,	  the	  owner	  declared	  that	  “we	  would	  close	  early	  because	  there	  would	  not	  be	  any	  customers	  around	  after	  what	  had	  just	  happened.”18	  
Unless	  retained	  at	  work	  to	  participate	  in	  cleanup	  duties	  or	  given	  pay	  for	  days	  of	  work	  missed	  from	  attacks,	  a	  bombing	  raid	  meant	  time	  off	  from	  work	  and	  lost	  income	  as	  well.	  	  This	  became	  a	  major	  problem	  for	  those	  living	  paypacket	  to	  paypacket,	  reliant	  upon	  steady	  work	  to	  feed	  their	  families.	  For	  those	  who	  worked	  in	  small	  shops,	  for	  example,	  the	  destruction	  of	  their	  place	  of	  employment	  meant	  finding	  new	  work	  altogether.	  This	  placed	  an	  added	  burden	  on	  workers	  already	  struggling	  to	  keep	  their	  homes	  intact,	  families	  together,	  and	  lives	  normal.	  
	   Opening	  shops	  following	  a	  raid	  was	  important	  for	  more	  than	  just	  employees.	  Given	  the	  abundance	  of	  looters	  in	  wartime	  south	  London,	  fixing	  shops	  quickly	  to	  keep	  out	  potential	  profiteers	  was	  essential	  for	  business	  owners,	  too.	  Without	  being	  open,	  business	  owners	  clearly	  had	  no	  way	  to	  make	  money.	  But	  a	  more	  insidious	  problem	  taunted	  destroyed	  businesses	  as	  well.	  South	  London’s	  news	  services	  and	  civil	  defense	  records	  are	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  “Shops,	  Churches,	  and	  Hospital,”	  British	  Free	  Press,	  November	  1,	  1940,	  Lambeth	  Archives.	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  Press,	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littered	  with	  cases	  of	  looters	  arriving	  at	  bombed-­‐out	  stores	  to	  take	  whatever	  valuables	  they	  could	  find	  before	  disappearing.	  Though	  wardens	  or	  observers	  sometimes	  managed	  to	  call	  police,	  this	  was	  not	  always	  the	  case,	  and	  it	  seems	  that	  most	  looters	  escaped	  without	  facing	  prosecution.	  Barbara	  Underwood,	  a	  29	  year	  old	  widow,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  unlucky	  looters	  caught	  by	  the	  authorities.	  After	  stealing	  two	  blouses	  valued	  at	  about	  12	  shillings	  from	  a	  Brixton	  store,	  a	  magistrate	  fined	  Underwood	  40	  shillings.19	  But	  more	  common	  were	  the	  looters	  who	  targeted	  a	  bombed	  out	  pharmacy	  in	  Bermondsey.	  Though	  a	  witness	  notified	  police	  and	  police	  dispatch	  was	  noted	  in	  the	  civil	  defense	  logbook,	  no	  record	  of	  arrest	  or	  prosecution	  exists.	  Like	  countless	  others,	  the	  pharmacy	  thief	  was	  never	  located,	  hidden	  as	  anonymously	  as	  many	  others	  in	  the	  damaged	  landscape	  of	  south	  London.	  These	  individuals	  eroded	  the	  economic	  vitality	  of	  shops	  as	  well	  as	  whatever	  sense	  of	  security	  both	  workers	  and	  patrons	  alike	  had	  left	  when	  their	  place	  of	  employment	  or	  neighborhood	  store	  had	  been	  bombed.20	  	  
	   The	  widespread	  existence	  of	  shop	  looters	  points	  to	  the	  limits	  on	  communal	  unity	  in	  wartime	  south	  London.	  While	  a	  great	  many	  citizens	  felt	  a	  sense	  of	  duty	  to	  do	  what	  they	  could	  to	  help	  their	  friends	  and	  family,	  the	  temptation	  to	  make	  profit	  with	  little	  chance	  of	  detection	  motivated	  a	  not	  insignificant	  minority	  to	  actively	  work	  against	  the	  common	  good	  of	  friends	  and	  neighbors	  and	  steal.	  Looting	  signals	  that	  the	  German	  bombing	  campaign	  was	  unable	  to	  come	  anywhere	  close	  to	  forming	  any	  totally	  unified	  community	  within	  the	  city—not	  even	  on	  a	  local	  level,	  where	  personal	  loyalties	  ran	  deep.	  The	  Blitz	  certainly	  contributed	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  Press,	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  Archives.	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to	  (or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  exposed)	  local	  unity	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  “togetherness”	  with	  others,	  but	  looting	  reminds	  us	  of	  the	  stark	  limits	  of	  such	  loyalties.	  
Even	  for	  those	  working	  at	  un-­‐bombed	  shops,	  the	  war	  still	  affected	  their	  lives.	  Most	  stores	  opened	  later	  in	  the	  mornings	  and	  closed	  by	  6pm	  to	  avoid	  bombing	  raids,	  reducing	  the	  workforce	  needed	  to	  keep	  them	  running.21	  Alternatively,	  stores	  could	  open	  on	  reduced	  hours;	  cinemas	  across	  the	  city,	  for	  example,	  were	  forced	  to	  close	  by	  9pm	  to	  give	  patrons	  sufficient	  time	  to	  get	  home	  before	  the	  likelihood	  of	  bombing	  raids	  increased	  dramatically.	  To	  offset	  the	  earlier	  closing	  time,	  cinemas	  were	  permitted	  to	  open	  earlier,	  changing	  the	  work	  schedules	  for	  employees.22	  Such	  changes	  made	  workers	  resentful	  of	  the	  raids	  because	  they	  disrupted	  the	  normal	  flow	  of	  life	  and	  demanded	  alterations	  to	  notions	  of	  “normalcy.”	  
In	  a	  time	  of	  exceptional	  trouble,	  however,	  some	  store	  owners	  kept	  a	  sense	  of	  humor	  about	  them.	  Unwilling	  to	  let	  the	  German	  bomber	  pilots	  have	  the	  last	  laugh,	  one	  of	  the	  store	  owners	  affixed	  a	  sign	  to	  the	  outside	  of	  his	  store	  claiming	  that	  the	  shop	  was	  “closed	  for	  alterations	  (to	  Berlin).”	  At	  once	  a	  humorous	  distraction	  from	  the	  war	  and	  a	  sinister	  reminder	  of	  the	  terrifying	  power	  of	  Second	  World	  War	  aerial	  bombardment,	  the	  sign	  represented	  the	  owner’s	  attempt	  to	  distract	  from	  the	  damage	  that	  had	  been	  done	  to	  him.	  For	  a	  man	  unable	  to	  resist	  the	  power	  of	  the	  bombs,	  he	  was	  at	  least	  able	  to	  resist	  the	  psychological	  effects	  of	  them—plenty	  good	  enough	  for	  him!	  Similar	  signs	  popped	  up	  elsewhere	  across	  south	  London,	  applying	  crude	  humor	  to	  offset	  feelings	  of	  vulnerability.	  Such	  signs	  must	  have	  been	  important	  because	  years	  later,	  those	  who	  survived	  the	  Blitz	  in	  south	  London	  frequently	  remembered	  shops	  near	  their	  homes	  that	  sported	  such	  signs.	  The	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  “Shops	  Open	  Later,	  Close	  Earlier:	  Duplicate	  Stocks	  in	  Safe	  Basements,”	  South	  London	  Press,	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  Archives.	  22	  London	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  proceedings,	  October	  22,	  1940,	  London	  Metropolitan	  Archives.	  
	   Baker	  89	  
signs	  helped	  the	  owners	  feel	  a	  sense	  of	  agency	  over	  their	  lives,	  but	  they	  also	  served	  as	  one	  of	  many	  ways	  to	  hold	  a	  community	  together	  that	  was	  riddled	  with	  angst	  and	  uncertainty.23	  	  
There	  were,	  however,	  some	  refused	  to	  give	  in	  to	  the	  German	  raids	  at	  all,	  resolving	  to	  stay	  open	  no	  matter	  the	  circumstances.	  When	  the	  war	  began	  in	  September	  1939,	  Matthews	  posted	  a	  sign	  outside	  his	  shop	  stating	  that	  he	  would	  remain	  open	  from	  9am	  to	  11pm	  regardless	  of	  what	  the	  Germans	  did.	  The	  press	  played	  up	  these	  stories,	  making	  them	  seem	  regular	  and	  standard—reflecting	  official	  attempts	  to	  maintain	  high	  morale	  around	  the	  workplace	  in	  a	  time	  when	  government	  planners	  had	  anxieties	  about	  the	  willingness	  of	  workers	  to	  carry	  on	  during	  war.	  Men	  like	  Matthews	  became	  the	  love	  of	  government	  officials	  and	  the	  press	  since	  they	  provided	  stories	  of	  grand	  triumph	  over	  the	  German	  onslaught,	  acting	  as	  a	  respectable,	  tough	  Englishman	  even	  if	  they	  too	  were	  not	  particularly	  common.24	  
Shops	  were	  not	  the	  only	  small	  places	  of	  employment,	  nor	  were	  they	  the	  spaces	  with	  the	  most	  powerful	  meanings	  to	  their	  patrons,	  either.	  Cinemas	  and	  pubs,	  the	  two	  most	  common	  social	  spaces	  throughout	  the	  region,	  faced	  damage	  and	  destruction	  alongside	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  city.	  While	  such	  attacks	  caused	  workers	  many	  of	  the	  same	  concerns	  as	  store	  damage	  and	  destruction	  did,	  the	  danger	  to	  these	  social	  spaces	  had	  a	  powerful	  meaning	  to	  the	  citizens	  of	  the	  city	  as	  well.	  It	  again	  underscored	  how	  close	  the	  war	  really	  was	  to	  each	  individual’s	  life	  by	  demonstrating	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  one’s	  local	  community,	  a	  community	  intrinsically	  tied	  up	  with	  the	  places	  of	  entertainment	  in	  one’s	  neighborhood.	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  “The	  Week	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  Murder,”	  The	  Free	  Press,	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  1940,	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  Archives.	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As	  alluded	  to	  previously,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  common	  places	  of	  leisure	  in	  south	  London	  was	  the	  cinema.	  British	  cinema	  had	  reached	  a	  point	  of	  popularity	  in	  the	  1930s	  that	  was	  never	  to	  be	  surpassed,	  and	  with	  a	  wide	  selection	  of	  films	  to	  choose	  from	  available	  at	  cheap	  prices,	  it	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  Londoners	  took	  full	  advantage	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  see	  a	  movie.	  Newspapers	  implored	  people	  to	  visit	  with	  synopses	  of	  new	  films	  and	  easy-­‐to-­‐understand	  cinema	  locations—and	  visit	  they	  did.25	  However,	  it	  was	  common	  for	  movie	  theaters	  to	  send	  patrons	  into	  shelters	  when	  raids	  came	  by,	  or	  at	  least	  to	  offer	  it	  as	  a	  possibility.	  Mr.	  R.	  Harpur’s	  mid-­‐November	  trip	  to	  the	  cinema	  with	  his	  wife	  was	  repeatedly	  interrupted	  by	  alert	  announcements	  made	  by	  cinema	  staff	  about	  air	  raids	  with	  the	  cinema	  offering	  shelter	  to	  those	  who	  wanted	  it.26	  Though	  Harpur	  refused,	  choosing	  instead	  to	  keep	  watching	  the	  movie,	  many	  others	  chose	  to	  go.	  Being	  forced	  into	  a	  shelter	  at	  the	  cinema	  had	  a	  psychological	  impact	  on	  guests.	  The	  experience	  served	  as	  a	  reminder	  that	  the	  war	  made	  no	  distinction	  between	  “war	  industries”	  and	  the	  social	  relaxation	  of	  Londoners.	  Everyone—and	  everything—was	  at	  risk.	  
Any	  visitor	  to	  London	  today	  can	  scarcely	  miss	  the	  abundance	  of	  pubs—short	  for	  public	  house,	  or	  a	  traditional	  meeting	  place	  of	  locals—in	  the	  city.	  This	  surfeit	  of	  pubs	  is	  not	  new;	  south	  London	  was	  dotted	  with	  pubs,	  run	  by	  families	  or	  business	  partners,	  during	  the	  war.	  For	  many,	  however,	  damage	  done	  to	  pubs	  served	  as	  a	  constant	  reminder	  of	  how	  close	  the	  war	  (and	  the	  death	  that	  followed	  it)	  was	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  patrons	  and	  staff	  alike.	  The	  Blitz	  removed	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  stressful	  real	  world	  and	  the	  relaxation	  of	  the	  pub,	  making	  the	  latter	  no	  longer	  immune	  from	  the	  former.	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  Press,	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  Archives.	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One	  Sunday	  night	  in	  mid-­‐October,	  patrons	  of	  a	  south	  London	  pub	  gathered	  as	  they	  normally	  did,	  drinking	  whatever	  alcohol	  could	  be	  procured	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  material	  diversions	  and	  calls	  to	  limit	  alcohol	  consumption	  during	  the	  war.	  	  In	  the	  back	  of	  the	  pub,	  a	  darts	  match	  kept	  a	  few	  men	  happily	  engaged,	  free	  from	  the	  worries	  of	  wartime.	  Then,	  suddenly,	  the	  pub	  took	  a	  direct	  hit	  from	  a	  high	  explosive	  bomb.	  The	  pub	  was	  leveled	  immediately,	  killing	  several	  and	  injuring	  more.	  For	  the	  survivors—staff	  and	  patrons	  alike—such	  incidents	  underscored	  that	  even	  the	  formerly	  safe	  space	  of	  a	  pub	  was	  no	  longer	  safe.	  Public	  houses,	  a	  space	  in	  which	  the	  troubles	  of	  modern	  life	  could	  be	  temporarily	  forgotten	  for	  a	  pint	  with	  friends,	  no	  longer	  seemed	  safe	  to	  those	  who	  witnessed	  their	  destruction.	  The	  sense	  of	  communal	  ownership	  over	  a	  pub	  could	  be	  shattered	  in	  one	  unlucky	  bombing	  incident.27	  
For	  those	  cleaning	  up	  after	  the	  destruction	  of	  pubs,	  this	  division	  made	  itself	  quite	  clear.	  One	  November	  weekend,	  Constantine	  Fitzgibbon,	  a	  south	  London	  woman,	  was	  asked	  by	  a	  friend	  to	  help	  dig	  out	  a	  pub	  which	  had	  been	  hit	  by	  a	  high	  explosive	  bomb.	  Recalled	  Fitzgibbon,	  “in	  [the	  back	  of	  the	  pub]	  sat	  a	  man	  with	  an	  unspilled	  pint[…]	  he	  was	  split,	  stone	  dead.”	  	  The	  man	  at	  the	  back	  of	  the	  pub	  had	  never	  seen	  it	  coming,	  happily	  enjoying	  his	  beer	  just	  moments	  before	  the	  high	  explosive	  bomb	  killed	  him	  instantly.	  Constantine	  seems	  to	  have	  recalled	  the	  moment	  particularly	  strongly,	  choosing	  to	  spend	  her	  limited	  newspaper	  space	  recalling	  it	  over	  other	  events.	  It	  reminded	  her	  that	  death	  could	  come	  randomly,	  at	  any	  time	  at	  all,	  and	  without	  any	  sort	  of	  warning	  at	  all.	  Fitzgibbon	  realized	  that	  the	  randomness	  of	  death	  could	  hit	  anyone	  at	  anytime,	  a	  realization	  that	  became	  all	  too	  clear	  as	  she	  cleaned	  out	  the	  decimated	  bar,	  a	  place	  that	  she	  had	  perhaps	  enjoyed	  a	  pint,	  too.	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  Damage	  from	  the	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The	  destruction	  of	  pubs,	  while	  not	  any	  worse	  materially	  than	  the	  destruction	  of	  other	  types	  of	  stores,	  hit	  home	  with	  people	  in	  a	  way	  that	  other	  bombing	  incidents	  didn’t.	  Pubs	  were	  supposed	  to	  be	  spaces	  of	  great	  merriment	  and	  fun	  in	  which	  individuals	  felt	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership;	  if	  they,	  too,	  were	  being	  hit	  by	  bombs,	  there	  hardly	  seemed	  a	  space	  in	  the	  city	  safe.28	  The	  South	  London	  Press	  published	  stories	  of	  destroyed	  pubs	  virtually	  every	  day,	  reflecting	  societal	  interest	  in	  the	  pub	  as	  a	  space	  of	  relaxation	  and	  enjoyment	  as	  well	  as	  a	  space	  of	  income	  for	  the	  employees.	  The	  pub	  became	  a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  city	  as	  a	  whole;	  the	  formerly	  fun	  place	  had	  been	  turned	  into	  a	  ghost	  town.	  For	  a	  society	  adjusting	  to	  fewer	  social	  outlets	  during	  the	  war	  (a	  theme	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  one),	  the	  loss	  of	  pubs	  had	  both	  symbolic	  and	  literal	  meaning.	  The	  reminder	  hit	  even	  more	  poignantly	  than	  with	  cinemas,	  not	  least	  because	  of	  how	  personal	  pubs	  felt	  to	  many	  south	  Londoners.	  Destroyed	  pubs	  represented	  the	  not	  always	  glamorous	  side	  of	  local	  communities—that	  sometimes	  one’s	  sense	  of	  a	  local	  community	  meant	  more	  hurt	  than	  relief.	  
The	  memories	  of	  stores	  and	  small	  work	  spaces	  were	  so	  powerful	  that	  they	  lasted	  well	  beyond	  the	  Blitz	  itself,	  as	  one	  girl’s	  memory	  of	  the	  war	  describes.	  While	  walking	  home	  from	  school	  one	  day,	  a	  young	  south	  London	  girl	  and	  a	  friend	  got	  trapped	  outside	  in	  an	  air	  raid.	  Just	  as	  a	  fighter	  swept	  low	  over	  south	  London	  to	  strafe	  the	  shops	  with	  machine	  gun	  fire,	  Mrs.	  Violet	  Jones,	  owner	  of	  a	  pickle	  shop	  and	  remembered	  lovingly	  as	  “the	  pickle	  onion	  lady,”	  snagged	  the	  girl	  and	  her	  friend,	  pulling	  them	  into	  her	  shop.	  As	  Jones	  slammed	  the	  door	  behind	  her,	  machine	  gun	  bullets	  sliced	  through	  the	  wood,	  exploding	  the	  pickling	  onion	  barrels	  and	  spraying	  the	  young	  girl	  with	  pickle	  juice.	  Though	  the	  girl	  professed	  to	  never	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Constantine	  Fitzgibbon,	  “Memories	  of	  the	  Blitz,”	  Lambeth	  Archives.	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able	  to	  eat	  pickled	  onions	  again	  and	  always	  felt	  ill	  at	  the	  smell	  of	  them,	  she	  ended	  her	  testimony	  with	  a	  simple	  note	  of	  thanks	  to	  Mrs.	  Jones	  and	  her	  pickled	  onion	  store:	  “thank	  you	  dear	  lady	  for	  my	  life	  and	  that	  of	  my	  friend.”	  In	  the	  spirit	  of	  Mrs.	  Jones,	  not	  all	  shop	  experiences	  were	  bad.29	  
***	  
	   The	  changes	  brought	  to	  workplaces	  by	  the	  Blitz	  underscored	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  whole	  experience	  perhaps	  more	  than	  any	  other.	  Full	  destruction	  was	  not	  necessary	  to	  remind	  employees	  just	  how	  near	  death	  and	  danger	  were	  during	  the	  Blitz.	  Disruption	  to	  factories,	  known	  for	  their	  timely	  performance	  and	  streamlined	  procedures,	  reminded	  the	  workers	  that	  even	  London’s	  large	  industries	  were	  not	  immune	  from	  the	  damage	  (and	  of	  course,	  reading	  the	  news	  about	  the	  docks	  burning	  didn’t	  help	  either).	  And	  for	  small	  shop	  owners,	  blasted	  in	  windows	  and	  the	  fragments	  left	  on	  the	  floor	  were	  a	  somber	  reminder	  that	  the	  Blitz	  had	  shattered	  more	  than	  just	  store	  windows;	  it	  had	  shattered	  lives.	  Many	  store	  owners	  were	  not	  lucky	  enough	  to	  have	  their	  shops	  survive	  the	  Blitz;	  many	  were	  destroyed,	  some	  to	  be	  rebuilt	  later	  and	  others	  gone	  for	  good.	  Nearly	  eighty	  years	  later,	  the	  destruction	  wrought	  on	  workplaces	  by	  the	  Blitz	  stands	  as	  a	  somber	  reminder	  of	  the	  true	  human	  cost	  of	  war.	  
	   In	  the	  final	  assessment,	  how	  did	  workers	  respond	  to	  these	  changes?	  Most	  worked	  through	  them,	  pitching	  in	  as	  necessary	  to	  clean	  up	  bomb	  damage	  and	  keep	  their	  places	  of	  employment	  running	  as	  normally	  as	  it	  could.	  Employers	  expected	  them	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  there	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  significant	  cases	  of	  workers	  doing	  otherwise.	  While	  a	  few	  reveled	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  “The	  Pickle	  Onion	  Lady	  from	  Peckham,”	  May	  8,	  2013,	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in	  the	  experience,	  many	  saw	  cleanup	  and	  a	  “carry	  on”	  mentality	  as	  an	  essential	  facet	  of	  their	  own	  personalities	  and	  did	  so	  mainly	  for	  the	  good	  of	  themselves,	  their	  loved	  ones,	  and	  their	  communities.	  The	  majority	  of	  workers	  carried	  on	  first	  because	  their	  livelihoods	  depended	  on	  it	  and	  because	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  duty	  to	  others,	  both	  known	  acquaintances	  and	  to	  strangers.	  Again,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  in	  work	  places	  there	  weren’t	  real	  senses	  of	  community	  and	  nation;	  as	  in	  shelters,	  people	  at	  work	  did	  often	  have	  close	  bonds	  with	  their	  fellow	  employees.	  But	  as	  Ms.	  Corfe’s	  testament	  to	  depressed	  attitudes	  and	  the	  occasional	  spar	  with	  a	  coworker	  showed,	  even	  these	  connections	  had	  their	  limits	  that	  could	  not	  be	  easily	  assembled.	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Conclusion:	  the	  Blitz	  in	  World	  History	  
	   This	  thesis	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  unity	  exercised	  and	  the	  sorts	  of	  communities	  that	  mattered	  most	  in	  south	  London	  throughout	  the	  Blitz	  were	  not	  simply	  those	  at	  the	  national	  level	  but	  also	  those	  at	  the	  local.	  Blitz-­‐era	  south	  London	  saw	  variation	  become	  the	  norm,	  a	  norm	  reinforced	  by	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  local	  and	  national	  networks	  at	  work	  within	  the	  city.	  For	  millions	  of	  Londoners,	  the	  Blitz	  underscored	  that	  which	  made	  their	  specific	  area	  of	  the	  city	  distinct	  from	  others,	  in	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  ways.	  This	  thesis	  has	  attempted	  to	  restore	  those	  distinctive	  voices	  to	  a	  historiography	  which	  almost	  always	  addresses	  the	  city	  of	  London	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  often	  failed	  to	  incorporate	  the	  	  
	   Life	  during	  the	  Blitz	  was	  far	  more	  complicated	  and	  filled	  with	  far	  more	  anxieties	  and	  differences	  among	  individuals	  than	  one	  might	  initially	  think.	  Our	  popular	  memory	  is	  of	  stories	  of	  heroic	  Londoners	  posting	  humorous	  signs	  on	  their	  store	  fronts	  or	  “carrying	  on”	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  bombing	  going	  on	  around	  them.	  To	  be	  fair,	  these	  stories	  did	  happen,	  and	  we	  are	  justified	  in	  including	  them	  in	  memories	  of	  the	  Blitz.	  But	  they	  were	  relatively	  uncommon	  and	  do	  not	  represent	  the	  complete	  reality	  of	  life	  during	  war	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population.	  They	  remain	  the	  notions	  of	  a	  fringe,	  and	  this	  thesis	  has	  restored	  the	  silenced	  voices	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population.	  Life	  during	  the	  Blitz	  usually	  was	  not	  filled	  with	  any	  many	  heroic	  tales	  such	  as	  these,	  and	  this	  thesis	  addresses	  the	  feelings	  of	  the	  common	  south	  Londoner	  to	  the	  story	  and	  to	  explore	  how	  diverse	  his	  experience	  could	  be.	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   In	  the	  closing	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  worth	  returning	  to	  a	  rather	  old	  question:	  if	  the	  Blitz	  was	  a	  relatively	  tame	  example	  of	  Second	  World	  War	  bombing,	  why	  does	  it	  command	  such	  a	  dominant	  presence	  in	  our	  minds?	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  trauma	  to	  its	  survivors,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  escape	  the	  truth:	  that	  the	  Blitz	  was	  not	  even	  close	  to	  the	  deadliest,	  most	  destructive,	  or	  longest	  bombing	  campaigns	  of	  the	  war.	  The	  Blitz	  was	  comparably	  short,	  lasting	  not	  even	  a	  full	  year	  with	  sustained,	  daily	  bombardment	  for	  just	  about	  three	  months.	  The	  US	  bombing	  campaign	  on	  Japan,	  also	  short,	  far	  exceeded	  the	  Blitz	  in	  time	  span,	  while	  the	  dual	  British-­‐American	  raids	  on	  Germany	  lasted	  longer	  still.	  Admittedly,	  the	  US/	  British	  raids	  seldom	  targeted	  the	  same	  city	  in	  consecutive	  nights,	  but	  the	  point	  stands:	  the	  Blitz	  made	  Brits	  genuinely	  scared	  of	  bombing,	  but	  it	  was	  an	  event	  hardly	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  what	  would	  come	  later.	  
The	  Blitz	  was	  also	  one	  of	  the	  least	  destructive	  strategic	  bombing	  campaigns	  of	  the	  war	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  life.	  Though	  estimates	  vary,	  40,000	  British	  civilian	  deaths	  during	  the	  entire	  eight-­‐month	  campaign	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  commonly	  accepted	  number.	  The	  Germans	  did	  real	  damage,	  yes,	  but	  hardly	  on	  the	  scale	  as	  seen	  elsewhere	  during	  the	  war.	  To	  put	  the	  Blitz’s	  toll	  in	  perspective,	  the	  Royal	  Air	  Force	  killed	  more	  than	  40,000	  individuals	  in	  a	  single	  night	  when	  787	  RAF	  bombers	  attacked	  Hamburg	  on	  the	  night	  of	  July	  27-­‐28,	  1943.	  Temperatures	  in	  the	  blazing	  city	  approached	  1,800	  degrees	  Fahrenheit.	  A	  British	  pilot	  observing	  the	  destruction	  below	  noted	  that	  the	  city	  looked	  like	  a	  volcano—as	  if	  all	  the	  bomber	  pilots	  were	  doing	  was	  simply	  “putting	  another	  shovelful	  of	  coal	  into	  the	  furnace.”102	  The	  US	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Stephen	  A.	  Garrett,	  Ethics	  and	  Airpower	  in	  World	  War	  Two	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1993),	  xii.	  This	  book	  is	  highly	  recommended	  for	  those	  interested	  in	  the	  ethics	  of	  the	  British	  strategic	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attacks	  on	  Japan	  make	  even	  such	  attacks	  on	  Germany	  look	  relatively	  humane;	  in	  a	  single	  night,	  the	  United	  States	  burned	  or	  asphyxiated	  to	  death	  over	  100,000	  Japanese,	  mostly	  women,	  children,	  and	  the	  elderly	  when	  it	  assaulted	  Tokyo	  in	  March	  1945.	  According	  to	  Stephen	  Garrett,	  throughout	  the	  entire	  war,	  the	  Luftwaffe	  managed	  to	  deliver	  just	  1	  ton	  of	  bombs	  on	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  for	  every	  315	  that	  the	  United	  States	  Army	  Air	  Force	  and	  Royal	  Air	  Force	  dumped	  on	  Germany.103	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  miss	  the	  gross	  discrepancy	  in	  tonnage,	  a	  tonnage	  which	  translated	  into	  damage	  and	  destruction	  done.	  
	   Much	  of	  the	  Blitz’s	  popularity,	  of	  course	  comes	  from	  the	  myth-­‐making	  of	  it	  after	  the	  war	  rather	  than	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  event	  itself.	  The	  Blitz’s	  “after	  the	  fact”	  importance	  is	  a	  consideration	  unique	  for	  historians	  of	  Britain	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War;	  after	  all,	  it	  was	  only	  after	  Britain	  won	  the	  war	  that	  the	  nationalist	  narrative	  of	  a	  “down-­‐but-­‐not-­‐out”	  Britain	  standing	  strong	  as	  one	  and	  then	  rising	  back	  to	  victory	  actually	  made	  sense	  as	  a	  coherent	  narrative.104	  The	  stories	  of	  German	  and	  Japanese	  bombing	  do	  not	  align	  with	  any	  great	  national	  narrative	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  the	  way	  that	  the	  Blitz	  does	  for	  Britain,	  for	  those	  nations	  did	  not	  win.	  And	  align	  it	  has.	  For	  British	  nationalism,	  the	  Blitz	  represented	  a	  time	  when	  free,	  democratic	  society	  stood	  alone	  against	  a	  European	  continent	  overrun	  by	  the	  evils	  of	  fascism—the	  horrible	  “other”	  to	  the	  glamorous,	  British	  “us.”	  The	  Blitz	  represented	  the	  great	  triumph	  not	  just	  of	  the	  British	  war	  machine,	  which	  managed	  to	  maintain	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  bombing	  campaign	  of	  Germany,	  a	  topic	  which	  this	  thesis	  did	  not	  treat	  but	  which	  deserves	  considerable	  attention	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  103	  Stephen	  Garrett,	  Ethics	  and	  Airpower	  in	  World	  War	  Two,	  193.	  104	  Angus	  Calder	  addresses	  this	  idea	  extensively	  in	  his	  book	  The	  Myth	  of	  the	  Blitz	  (London:	  Pimlico	  Publishing,	  1991).	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air	  superiority	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1940,	  but	  of	  the	  entire	  British	  population	  as	  well.	  Perhaps	  Winston	  Churchill	  put	  it	  best	  when	  he	  declared	  that	  “history	  is	  written	  by	  the	  victors.”	  Britain	  won	  the	  war,	  and	  the	  Blitz	  played	  and	  continues	  to	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  Britain’s	  national	  memory	  of	  it	  in	  large	  part	  because	  of	  it.	  
And	  while	  much	  of	  the	  perceived	  importance	  of	  the	  Blitz	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  it	  to	  British	  national	  myths,	  this	  in	  no	  way	  impinges	  upon	  the	  Blitz’s	  value	  beyond	  the	  lens	  of	  postwar	  idealism.	  Though	  it	  was	  not	  the	  largest,	  longest,	  or	  deadliest	  strategic	  bombing	  campaign,	  it	  offers	  historians	  both	  of	  Britain	  and	  of	  warfare	  and	  social	  history	  a	  unique	  case	  study	  with	  which	  to	  consider	  their	  own	  scholarship—a	  case	  which	  goes	  far	  beyond	  the	  postwar	  mythology	  of	  the	  event.	  While	  no	  doubt	  a	  challenge	  to	  sift	  through	  the	  nationalist	  myths	  to	  get	  to	  the	  experiences	  of	  those	  who	  lived	  it,	  doing	  so	  offers	  a	  wealth	  of	  opportunities	  to	  scholars	  that	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  fully	  explored.	  
	   For	  one,	  there	  is	  something	  to	  be	  said	  for	  the	  Blitz’s	  timing:	  it	  was	  the	  first	  true	  event	  of	  its	  kind.	  Though	  hardly	  the	  first	  time	  that	  bombs	  had	  been	  dropped	  on	  civilian	  population	  centers,	  the	  Blitz	  was	  the	  first	  time	  that	  a	  large-­‐scale	  campaign	  had	  been	  launched	  and	  carried	  out	  over	  many	  months	  targeting	  a	  civilian	  population	  in	  a	  routine,	  systematic	  way.	  It	  was	  the	  first	  time	  that	  a	  civilian	  population	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  great	  airpower	  theorists	  and	  their	  advocates	  in	  governments	  around	  the	  world	  had	  been	  wrong.	  It	  demonstrated	  to	  the	  world	  what	  happened	  when	  a	  city	  or	  cities	  faced	  sustained	  aerial	  bombardment.	  As	  the	  prevalence	  of	  aerial	  bombardment	  has	  only	  increased	  in	  the	  years	  since	  the	  end	  of	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the	  Second	  World	  War,	  so	  has	  interest	  in	  the	  world’s	  first	  great	  example	  of	  aerial	  bombardment.	  The	  Blitz	  will	  forever	  hold	  that	  claim	  to	  fame,	  not	  as	  the	  largest,	  longest,	  or	  deadliest,	  but	  as	  the	  first	  sustained	  aerial	  assault.	  
	   The	  Blitz	  is	  also	  particularly	  intriguing	  because	  of	  the	  way	  that	  it	  underscores	  the	  larger	  failure	  of	  imagination	  from	  those	  whose	  theories	  laid	  the	  ideological	  framework	  for	  it.	  These	  thinkers,	  whose	  lives	  and	  theories	  stretch	  far	  beyond	  the	  British	  Isles,	  suggest	  just	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  the	  Blitz	  can	  have	  importance	  for	  scholars	  not	  only	  of	  Britain	  but	  for	  other	  fields	  as	  well.	  This	  is	  a	  theme	  that	  began	  long	  before	  the	  first	  planes	  swooped	  over	  London	  that	  August	  day.	  The	  bomber	  emerged	  in	  combat	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  an	  infant	  weapon	  which,	  while	  frightening,	  had	  limited	  capabilities.	  Bombers	  were	  slow,	  hard	  to	  maneuver,	  light	  on	  armament,	  and	  very	  vulnerable	  to	  attack.	  Many	  simply	  fell	  apart	  long	  before	  reaching	  their	  targets.	  But	  few	  doubted	  that	  the	  years	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War	  would	  witness	  revolutions	  in	  the	  technology	  and	  tactics.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  virtually	  every	  airpower	  theorist	  believed	  that	  strategic	  bombing	  would	  bring	  about	  the	  rapid	  surrender	  of	  a	  population.	  	  The	  German	  plan	  to	  bomb	  British	  cities,	  particularly	  London,	  relied	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  doing	  so	  would	  force	  a	  surrender,	  removing	  the	  need	  to	  invade	  Britain	  and	  allowing	  Hitler	  to	  focus	  on	  other	  priorities.	  This	  was	  a	  common	  idea	  in	  1930s	  Europe.	  Argued	  famous	  Italian	  airpower	  theorist	  Giulio	  Douhet,	  “a	  complete	  breakdown	  of	  the	  social	  structure	  cannot	  but	  take	  place	  in	  a	  country	  subjected	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  merciless	  pounding	  from	  the	  air.”	  British	  thinker	  Sir	  Basel	  Liddell	  Hart	  shared	  Douhet’s	  sentiment,	  claiming	  that	  in	  the	  next	  war,	  bombing	  would	  be	  the	  decisive	  strategy	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since	  civilians	  under	  attack	  from	  the	  sky	  would	  necessarily	  demand	  surrender	  immediately.105	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  ominous	  prewar	  predictions,	  the	  forecasted	  outcomes	  never	  came	  to	  fruition	  in	  any	  theater	  of	  war.	  The	  Blitz	  was	  the	  first	  case	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  prewar	  airpower	  thinkers	  had	  been	  wrong,	  but	  it	  was	  far	  from	  the	  only	  one.	  For	  any	  scholar	  trying	  to	  evaluate	  the	  effects	  of	  aerial	  bombardment	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  civilians,	  it	  seems	  the	  Blitz	  is	  a	  strong	  choice.	  
	   The	  Blitz	  may	  not	  have	  been	  the	  biggest,	  deadliest,	  or	  longest	  incident,	  but	  its	  experiential	  value	  at	  the	  time—that	  is,	  not	  in	  hindsight	  as	  part	  of	  a	  national	  myth	  of	  British	  unity	  and	  ultimate	  victory—is	  nonetheless	  extreme.	  British	  citizens	  at	  the	  time	  understood	  that	  what	  they	  were	  experiencing	  would	  later	  be	  remembered	  as	  a	  key	  part	  of	  history.	  Their	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  story	  of	  history’s	  largest	  war	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  them.	  To	  many	  who	  survived	  it,	  the	  Blitz	  represented	  a	  time	  when	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  progress	  itself,	  seemingly	  so	  benign	  before	  the	  events	  of	  1914	  plunged	  Europe	  into	  conflict,	  once	  again	  seemed	  a	  mockery.106	  But	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  horror	  of	  living	  in	  a	  city	  under	  constant	  attack,	  Londoners	  understood	  and	  frequently	  recorded	  their	  belief	  that	  the	  future	  would	  be	  interested	  in	  the	  event,	  a	  sensation	  described	  long	  before	  any	  national	  myth	  of	  the	  Blitz	  had	  time	  to	  form	  in	  the	  postwar	  world.	  And	  because	  Londoners	  understood	  that	  what	  they	  were	  experiencing	  was	  the	  making	  of	  a	  history,	  there	  remains	  much	  for	  scholars	  to	  learn.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  the	  Blitz	  illuminates	  the	  history	  of	  London,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  the	  Empire,	  and	  social	  history	  more	  generally.	  The	  Blitz	  grants	  scholars	  the	  remarkable	  ability	  to	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study	  the	  history	  of	  ordinary	  men	  and	  women	  at	  a	  time	  in	  which	  their	  most	  fundamental	  security—that	  of	  life	  itself—is	  removed.	  It	  offers	  historians	  a	  way	  to	  see	  inside	  the	  workings,	  both	  bright	  and	  dark,	  of	  cities	  and	  countrysides	  under	  attack.	  It	  demonstrates	  where	  loyalties	  rested	  as	  well	  as	  where	  they	  didn’t.	  And	  it	  offers	  scholars	  thinking	  not	  only	  about	  other	  instances	  of	  aerial	  bombardment	  but	  about	  the	  history	  of	  everyday	  men	  and	  women	  both	  in	  and	  out	  of	  war	  a	  very	  different	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  view	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  humans	  interact	  with	  one	  another.	  These	  are	  all	  themes	  that	  have	  implications	  far	  beyond	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Blitz,	  London,	  and	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  itself.	  
Given	  how	  much	  the	  Blitz	  can	  tell	  present-­‐day	  observers	  about	  humanity	  itself,	  it	  should	  be	  no	  surprise	  that	  thinkers	  in	  the	  academy	  as	  well	  as	  common	  men	  and	  women	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  spaces	  and	  times	  have	  drawn	  links	  between	  the	  Blitz	  and	  other	  bombing	  campaigns	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  bring	  understanding	  to	  their	  own	  presents.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  obvious	  link	  drawn	  has	  been	  to	  Vietnam,	  a	  conflict	  which	  many	  felt	  the	  Blitz	  offered	  a	  constructive	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  view	  the	  United	  States’	  deliberate	  bombing	  campaign	  in	  southeast	  Asia.	  And,	  alas,	  there	  is	  much	  to	  learn	  from	  the	  Blitz	  today.	  As	  civilians,	  politicians,	  and	  scholars	  continue	  to	  consider	  the	  possibilities	  and	  limitations	  of	  airpower	  into	  the	  21st	  century,	  there	  remains	  value	  to	  looking	  back	  seventy	  years	  to	  the	  dark	  days	  when	  Britain	  stood	  alone—to	  see,	  above	  all	  else,	  how	  people	  respond	  to	  bombing	  and	  how	  they	  perceive	  their	  own	  world	  within	  it.	  Far	  more	  than	  just	  suggesting	  that	  strategic	  bombing	  does	  not	  yield	  the	  surrenders	  envisioned	  by	  the	  airpower	  theorists	  in	  the	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1930s,	  the	  Blitz	  underscores	  the	  complex	  ways	  in	  which	  people	  simultaneously	  adapt	  and	  maintain	  their	  lives	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  virtually	  random	  destruction.	  
	   It	  was	  not	  long	  ago	  that	  the	  First	  World	  War	  receded	  out	  of	  living	  memory,	  leaving	  behind	  just	  the	  archives	  of	  its	  existence	  to	  speak	  for	  it.	  The	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  with	  it,	  the	  Blitz,	  are	  but	  a	  generation	  away	  from	  approaching	  that	  point.	  Yet	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  the	  end	  of	  its	  survivors	  will	  diminish	  interest	  in	  the	  Blitz.	  It	  is	  likely	  to	  remain	  a	  part	  of	  both	  British	  memory	  and	  historical	  scholarship	  for	  years	  to	  come.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  heavily	  studied	  nature	  of	  the	  Blitz,	  this	  interest	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  resoundingly	  positive	  development.	  Years	  of	  separation	  from	  the	  present	  do	  not	  diminish	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Blitz	  promises	  to	  offer	  future	  lessons	  to	  scholars	  of	  all	  types.	  The	  Blitz	  matters	  to	  British	  historians,	  including	  those	  who	  do	  not	  study	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  London,	  or	  urban	  spaces,	  for	  it	  informs	  the	  wartime	  constructions	  of	  self,	  family,	  community,	  country,	  and	  nation.	  It	  matters	  to	  social	  historians	  of	  all	  types	  trying	  to	  make	  out	  the	  patterns	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  common	  people.	  It	  matters	  to	  scholars	  trying	  to	  understand	  strategic	  bombardment;	  for	  those	  trying	  to	  analyze	  how	  and	  why	  people	  react	  the	  way	  that	  they	  did	  under	  assault	  both	  in	  London	  and	  elsewhere;	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  before	  it,	  and	  after	  it.	  And	  of	  course,	  it	  matters	  to	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  for	  the	  Blitz	  is	  perhaps	  the	  defining	  feature	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  for	  British	  nationalism.	  Though	  scholars’	  and	  civilians’	  understandings	  of	  the	  Blitz	  may	  in	  the	  future	  change,	  there	  seems	  little	  doubt	  that	  individuals	  will	  remain	  interested	  in	  examining	  and	  exploring	  what	  the	  Blitz	  did	  to	  London,	  Britain,	  and	  the	  world,	  even	  two	  generations	  after	  it	  ended.
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